Dworkin Vs. Scalia On Constitutional Interpretation

Riley S.
Altman- Philosophy of Law
Final Research Paper

The Human Element of Law:
Dworkin vs. Scalia on Constitutional Interpretation

The constitution is the document that binds American citizens to uniformed rule. Granted states may vary their decisions for a vast array of laws, the focus of my argument will be dealing with the interpretation of the nation’s most powerful document. The two stances of interpretation I will be addressing are those of Ronald Dworkin and Antonin Scalia, who are known for disagreement amongst their constitutional views. On the one hand there is Scalia, who labels his position “textualism”, where judges are encouraged to stray away from discretion and make clarifications to vague statutes in a commonsensical
To Scalia, this translates to wavering meaning of constitutional text; whereas Dworkin might call is a just interpretation of its “true meaning”. Though they have both been considered some form of “originalists”, the historical significance of the law’s origins differs between them. Scalia and Dworkin both believe that it is important to look to former courts’ rulings on cases for a frame of reference, however Dworkin’s focus is on the values and principles that were present at that time so as to apply them to novel cases. In this way there is an application of traditional morals to new legal predicaments, showing that the constitution is far from abandoned, but open-ended and subject to necessary expansion to adapt to a progressive
The position that Dworkin suggests is based on this possibility, though not required, and is designed with the possibility of legal adjustment in mind. Scalia’s Originalism: The Lesser Evil describes how he is emphatically against the idea of differing readings of the constitution, and that a nonoriginalist approach to the constitution allows for too much variance on a newly arrived meaning of a law: “I also think that the central practical defect of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to replace original meaning, once that is abandoned”(Scalia). As valid of a concern as this may be, Dworkin’s position in particular is not simply permitting the rewriting of laws by judges. It is true that differing opinions are inescapable through Dworkin’s position, but they are varied on a case-by-case basis due to specific mitigating circumstances and ethical considerations, rather than judges’ desires to change the meaning of laws. The word “discretion” itself also implies some level of secrecy on the part of the adjudicators; hence there is no fuel to start a legal debate over the meaning of a law, such as Scalia worries