Mission Command
Mission Command Paper
Operation Market Garden: Battle of Arnhem
With German forces on the run following the Allied success at Normandy and the breakout and pursuit across France, Allied forces were staged to enter Germany in late summer 1944. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley clamored to be given the priority of effort. General Eisenhower chose Montgomery’s Operation MARKET GARDEN as the plan for action. It called for airborne forces to open the route for a ground force to move more than sixty miles up a single road, ending up north of the Rhine River near Arnhem, Netherlands. By accomplishing this task, the German Ruhr industrial heartland would be within easy grasp. But the operation failed. The ground force did not make it to the last bridge; it was six more months before Allied forces crossed the Lower Rhine River near Arnhem. Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were 17,000 Allied casualties including eighty percent of the 1st Airborne Division (UK). The historical evidence overwhelmingly shows that the British 1st Airborne Division lost the Battle of Arnhem because of poor planning. This paper will prove the failure of The Battle of Arnhem was not solely the fault of MG Roy Urquhart. Although this was his first command of such a division (being an "outsider") could he have not completed his wartime mission any better despite having inexperienced leaders planning airborne operations, bad intelligence, allowing the Air Force to plan the DZs based off what was best for the air movement plan and poor execution. This paper examines MG Urquhart, the commander of 1st Airborne Division (UK). The 1st Airborne Division (UK) was made up of three brigades of infantry (two parachute, one glider borne), supporting artillery and anti-tank batteries and substantial Royal Engineer units, as well as supporting elements such as Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps units and 1st Independent Polish Brigade. The task of
Operation Market Garden: Battle of Arnhem
With German forces on the run following the Allied success at Normandy and the breakout and pursuit across France, Allied forces were staged to enter Germany in late summer 1944. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley clamored to be given the priority of effort. General Eisenhower chose Montgomery’s Operation MARKET GARDEN as the plan for action. It called for airborne forces to open the route for a ground force to move more than sixty miles up a single road, ending up north of the Rhine River near Arnhem, Netherlands. By accomplishing this task, the German Ruhr industrial heartland would be within easy grasp. But the operation failed. The ground force did not make it to the last bridge; it was six more months before Allied forces crossed the Lower Rhine River near Arnhem. Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were 17,000 Allied casualties including eighty percent of the 1st Airborne Division (UK). The historical evidence overwhelmingly shows that the British 1st Airborne Division lost the Battle of Arnhem because of poor planning. This paper will prove the failure of The Battle of Arnhem was not solely the fault of MG Roy Urquhart. Although this was his first command of such a division (being an "outsider") could he have not completed his wartime mission any better despite having inexperienced leaders planning airborne operations, bad intelligence, allowing the Air Force to plan the DZs based off what was best for the air movement plan and poor execution. This paper examines MG Urquhart, the commander of 1st Airborne Division (UK). The 1st Airborne Division (UK) was made up of three brigades of infantry (two parachute, one glider borne), supporting artillery and anti-tank batteries and substantial Royal Engineer units, as well as supporting elements such as Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps units and 1st Independent Polish Brigade. The task of
Bibliography: MG R. E. Urquhart (1958). Arnhem. London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 73. Greenacre, J. (2004). Assessing the Reasons for Failure: 1st British Airborne Division Signal Communications during Operation ‘Market Garden’. Defence Studies, 4(3), 283-308. Condeno, M. R. (2010). A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation, September 1944. Air Power History, 57(3), 52-53. Badsey, Stephen (1993). Arnhem 1944: Operation Market Garden (Campaign). Osprey Publishing MacDonald C.B. (1990). The European Theater of Operations: The Siegfried Line Campaign. Dept. of the Army