Advantages Of Anomalous Monism

Supporting a non-reductive physicalism: Anomalous monism According to Davidson “Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, but rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations” (Davidson, 1970/2002, p. 119) In other words, only the physical may be described by causal laws, but if a physical event is described as a mental event there is no causal law, and there are no psychophysical laws that connect the mental with the physical. Davidson, may defend a view of identity theory, but he also argues that it is not possible to reduce the mental states to a physical explanation. In Davidson’s words:
Suppose m, a mental event, caused
One of the advantages of the view of Lewis and Armstrong is the role of the phenomenal character of experience. According to Lewis “What it is the phenomenal character of his state? If it feels to him like pain, then it is pain, whatever its causal role of physical nature. If not it isn’t. It’s that simple!” (Lewis, 1980/1991, p. 233)
However, the phenomenal character of experience in functionalism has been the source or many debates, for instance Block suggest that functionalism may assume “that systems that lack of mentality have mentality” (Block, 2007, p. 70). In other words, how can it be known that a robot or computer or other creature under a functionalist view is or is not full of mental activity? As a result of such puzzles, some have argued that qualia do not have a functional role – ‘absent qualia’ arguments. For instance, Block has proposed the “Chinese nation” mental experiment to support the view of the lack of phenomenal qualities in the functional sates (Block, 2007, pp.
For instance, if a system is equivalent functionally to a given creature, and since the “Chinese nation” is conceived as ‘functionally equivalent’ to that creature, then it is not the case that an exact duplicate may lack some features of the original. Robert Van Gulick suggests another line of arguments against absent qualia, Van Gulick asserts that “The ultimate outcome of such theorizing remains an empirical question not open to a priori answer.” (Gulick, 1992/1997, p. 441). In other words, this can only be answered as empirical research into consciousness progresses However, it is at this stage of sciences is possible to say that empirical research is unlikely to bring about an explanation without remainder in purely reductive terms. For, as Chalmers maintains, “ it might be found that systems that duplicate our functional organization will be conscious even if they are made of silicon, constructed out of water-pipes, or instantiated in an entire population” (Chalmers, 1995, p. 327) – that is one the characteristics of functionalism, and non-reductive physicalism: the idea of multiple realizability. So the argument of absent qualia is flawed and is not a threat to functionalism or non-reductive