Objective of study
The objective is to investigate how principle-principle agency conflicts impact on the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance in European listed companies.
Motivation for study
Most of corporate governance research only reveals that corporate governance can solute the agency conflicts between management and shareholders which fails to identify principle-principle agency conflicts and their influences on corporate governance.
Research question
Whether more severe principal-principal conflict is relevant with weaker corporate governance and whether the severity of the conflict affects the effectiveness of corporate governance and firm value with certain complementarities.
Contribution of study
Firstly, using the severity of the principal-principal conflicts to explain a sample of the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance. Secondly, majority shareholders consider about the costs of installing good governance. Thirdly, it shows how institutional factors impact on the decisions and outcomes of companies. Finally, it contributes to corporate control literature that develop an aggregate measure to exceed pure ownership structures in capturing the severity of the principle-principle conflict.
Literature review and Hypotheses
The study focuses on the “open system” approach providing the impact of the environment factors to the costs, contingencies, complementarities and organizational outcome (Aguilera et al., 2008). Two hypotheses on how the severity of the incongruity among shareholder groups in a corporation impacts to the quality of Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance effectiveness were presented by the researchers in accordance with this approach.
Principal-Principal Conflict and Good Corporate Governance:
The researchers concentrate on the ownership structure and corporate governance regulatory procedure in Europe to study on the way in which the severity