Boeing 737-200
April 28,1988
Honolulu, HI
Aloha 243 was a watershed accident :
There were very clear precursors that were not acted upon
It reflected a basic lack of airplane level awareness It pointed out errors in basic design and certification philosophies
There were catastrophic unintended effects April 28, 1988, Flight 243 was scheduled for several “Island-hopping” flights:
First Officer conducted preflight inspection in darkness and noted nothing unusual
Airplane initially flew 3 round trip flights from
Honolulu to Hilo, Maui, and Kauai. All flights were uneventful
No requirement for visual inspection between flights, and none were conducted
Accident flight departed Hilo at 1:25 pm with flight crew and 89 passengers on board
While leveling at inter-island cruise altitude of 24000 feet, a portion of the forward fuselage separated from the airplane:
Resulted in immediate depressurization
Captain assumed control, noting that airplane was rolling left and right, and flight controls were “loose”
Captain noticed that the cockpit door was missing, and he could see blue sky where the first class ceiling had been Left engine failed, restart attempts unsuccessful
Captain and first First Officer donned oxygen masks and initiated emergency descent
Successful landing in Honolulu:
Separated section extended from cabin floor, equivalent to ~1/4 of fuselage length
One fatality, seven serious injuries
The fatality was a flight attendant who had been standing at row 5, and was swept out of the cabin
A flight attendant at row 15 was thrown to the floor and slightly injured. Flight attendant at row 2 sustained serious injuries from flying debris
When depressurization occurred, all passengers were in their seats, and seat belt sign was already illuminated Damage Summary:
At the time of the accident, the airplane had 89,680 flight cycles, and 35,496 flight hours
After the accident, a passenger reported that as she boarded, she noticed a large