I found this rather interesting to read about, since it implied questions of what really differentiated naturalistic explanations from religious experiences in the question of faith. Now, presumably, a naturalistic explanation is not dependent on faith in quite the same way as the religious explanation for a phenomena. Whereas the naturalistic explanation needs to be able to describe phenomena under multiple conditions, repeatedly, in order to be held as valid, a religious explanation does not have to do this; partly for the fact that the contents of religious experience are held to be beyond the natural world (and so subjecting these contents to a naturalistic explanation is inherently unfair from Jordan’s view), and partly for the fact that faith—rather than tangible evidence—becomes the ultimate basis of truth within the religious
I found this rather interesting to read about, since it implied questions of what really differentiated naturalistic explanations from religious experiences in the question of faith. Now, presumably, a naturalistic explanation is not dependent on faith in quite the same way as the religious explanation for a phenomena. Whereas the naturalistic explanation needs to be able to describe phenomena under multiple conditions, repeatedly, in order to be held as valid, a religious explanation does not have to do this; partly for the fact that the contents of religious experience are held to be beyond the natural world (and so subjecting these contents to a naturalistic explanation is inherently unfair from Jordan’s view), and partly for the fact that faith—rather than tangible evidence—becomes the ultimate basis of truth within the religious