American Failures in Vietnam

Gloria A. Loftin
American History II
Ken Whitehurst
December 5, 2012

UNITEDS STATES FAILURES IN VIETNAM
It was the war that lasted ten thousand days. The war that inspired scores of songs. The war that sparked dozens of riots. (Caputo, Phillip, 10,000 Days of Thunder: A History of the Vietnam War.)
The Vietnam War, one of the most controversial wars in American history, has been one of the few wars where the United States was not a victor. Despite being a world superpower, the United States was not able to defeat a small, third-world, Asian country. The war divided the nation’s own people in half, and even resulted in violence. The US failure in Vietnam was caused by a mixture of factors including: the difficulties of fighting an offensive war in a foreign country, poor decisions on the American part, and unexpected North Vietnamese resilience leading to massive casualties on both sides that could have been avoided. The United State’s involvement in Vietnam can be traced back to the immediate results of the First Indochina War, which led to a humiliating defeat of the French and their withdrawal from North Vietnam, which came under communist forces. (Caputo, Phillip, A Rumor of War, 1977, Henry Holt and Company, Inc, NY, NY.) The Geneva Accords, which ended the First Indochina War, temporarily divided Vietnam into two sections: a communist north and an anti-communist south, pending a national election to unify them.

The United Stated, fearing a communist victory in national elections and a communist takeover of South Vietnam, supported the South Vietnamese government to elect Ngo Dinh Diem, a staunch anti-communist, as Prime Minister. (Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, 1983, Penguin Group, NY, NY)
The United States feared if South Vietnam were to fall to communism; the rest of Indochina would follow. They believed a “domino effect” would follow any small communist changes in South Vietnam or any concessions made to communists. The United States believed the best way to prevent this from happening was to contain communism. Various American politicians argued to prevent a domino effect, the United States must contain the spread of communism at any cost. This theory fueled much of the United States policies toward Vietnam, such as their support for Diem.
Diem’s rein was repressive at best. He canceled the nation-wide elections that were to unify Vietnam and instead rigged election in South Vietnam to elect himself president and create the Republic of Vietnam. However, Diem retained the United States backing because he was staunchly anti-communist. As Diem’s regime became increasingly repressive, resistance to his government increased, especially in rural areas. The Unites States, in an attempt to prevent Diem’s government from collapsing sent military advisors and financial consultants to aid Diem’s regime. However, the resistance was strong, so United States created the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), which Diem used to crush communist and other rebels. (Brigham, Robert K, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, April 2006, University Press of Kansas)
However, when Kennedy took office in January 1961, he faced an increasingly unsuccessful policy in Vietnam. The ARVN faced desertion, corruption, double agents, and a lack of effectiveness. Kennedy, however, believed that the ARVN could still become effective with proper steps. Kennedy increased the number of American advisors to the ARVN from 800 in January 1961 to 16,700 in November 1963. Kennedy believed if the ARVN could win the support of the Vietnamese villages the National Liberation Front (NLF) insurgency could be defeated. Kennedy began The Strategic Hamlet Program, which was an attempt to resettle villagers into fortified camps. The aim was to isolate the population from the insurgents, provide education and health care, and strengthen the government’s hold over the countryside.
However, Kennedy’s policy was largely unsuccessful. The peasants usually resented being resettled, and the resentment only added to the NLF’s support base. Diem’s government was highly corrupt, and Diem appointed his brother Nhu to administer the program. Nhu, a corrupt official himself, undermined the program by his harsh policies. For example, he often charged villagers for material the United States had donated and many peasants were forced to leave their hamlets. The effect of Kennedy’s and Diem’s Strategic Hamlet Program was more harmful the helpful.
The Kennedy Administration began to blame Diem’s incompetence for the failure of the South Vietnamese government. Diem was urged to remove his brother, but he refused to. When the United States was informed that a military coup was planned against Diem, it did not act. The confusion following Diem’s assassination led to deteriorate, the NLF gained more ground in South Vietnam. Soon after Kennedy, was assassinated and Johnson took office. (Miller, Edward, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam, 2012, Harvard University Press)
If Kennedy had not been assassinated, the course of Vietnam could and would have been dramatically different. Before his death, Kennedy had clearly expressed the intent of withdrawal and had already acted upon it by removing 1000 advisers. However, he was not able to act upon the rest of his plan. Johnson had a very different view on the war. He believed he needed to take forceful action against the NLF to scare the North Vietnamese and other communists from acting. Johnson began a covert bombing campaign, known as Rolling Thunder, against North Vietnamese and other communist targets in Indochina. Johnson approved commando raids, navy surveillance, and secret bombings against targets in North Vietnam and Laos (the NLF were belied to be supplied from Laos). Johnson also increased the number of advisors in Vietnam to about 27,000 reversing to what his predecessor had done. . (Parnell, Ted, Vietnam Stories: Dreams to Nightmares, 1989, Viking Press, NY, NY)

The involvement of the US was greatly escalated by the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August of 1964. According to President Johnson, the North Vietnamese had fired on the USS Maddox and Turner Joy without provocation. As a result, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave Johnson authority for the use of military force without an official declaration of war from Congress. Johnson would use this resolution as the legal basis for the dramatic escalation of US involvement. It basically gave Johnson a “blank check” to do as he wished in Vietnam, which protesters began to complain in a short time. (Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, (May 18, 1995), Oxford University Press, NY, NY)
Soon after, Johnson utilized Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, in his policy of escalation. The idea that the South Vietnamese government could manage the affairs of the country was abandoned. The US adopted the strategy of creating a war of attrition, upon General William Westmoreland’s advice, who took over Military Assistance Command in Vietnam in 1964. The strategy required escalation of US troops to wear down the other side. It was decided in March 1965 that the United States Air Force could not handle the war alone, so 3,500 US Marines were sent as aid. A staggering 200,000 Marines were in Vietnam in December of the same year, showing the dramatic effect of the war of attrition. Westmoreland had a three point plan to win the war which included “major offensive actions” for the “final destruction of enemy forces.” (Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, (May 18, 1995), Oxford University Press, NY, NY) – (Goulden, Joseph C. (1969).)Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair--Illusion and Reality)
The turning point in the war for the American public was the Tet Offensive in 1967. During the traditional cease-fire of Tet, or the Vietnamese observance of the lunar New Year, the Vietcong led a surprise attack on American and South Vietnamese forces mainly in the cities of Saigon and Hue. The city of Hue experienced the bloodiest fighting, and American onlookers watched on in horror as they received images through photographs and videos on television. There were massive killings of NLF by US soldiers and the massive casualties sparked controversy over the war. (Robert Tonsetic, DAYS OF VALOR: An Inside Account of the Bloodiest Six Months of the Vietnam War, 2007, Viking Press, NY, NY)
Public opinion of the war had been favorable at first, because they had seen the war in the larger effort against communism. However, public support waned as scandals began to be exposed in the government. Many did not come to believe Johnson, seeing him as a lying politician typical of those days and began to mistrust the news as they believed there was a “credibility gap.” Especially after the Tet Offensive, there was a battle between hawks, those who supported war, and doves, those who opposed it. A greater number of Americans supported a complete withdrawal from the war, after seeing how many casualties it would take to end. A greater amount of doves were also more outspoken. In fact, the stress of the war and the hostile public opposition led Johnson not to run again in 1968.
Johnson’s unsuccessful policy was caused by numerous factors, especially the underestimation of the North Vietnamese people. Operation Rolling Thunder was not a success because North Vietnam was highly agrarian, and as a result, there were not many heavily populated or industrial areas which the US could target. Also, the Viet Cong were much more resilient than Johnson had expected. Their motivation, willingness, and dedication were higher than those of the American soldiers. Vietnamese soldiers were more willing to die, a major setback in Johnson’s strategy. The US was forced to fight an offensive war, and as a result, they would have to pay the higher price The terrain was unfamiliar, and the US soldiers could not differentiate between friend and foe. The US was simply not prepared for this kind of war, and Johnson’s greatest mistake was to escalate involvement instead of reducing it like his predecessor had wished. As a result, he was haunted by Vietnam for the rest of his life. (H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (May 8, 1998), Harper Perennial Press, Harpers Collins Press, NY, NY)
A new face would enter the war: Richard Nixon, who promised “peace with honor” in Vietnam with his policy of Vietnamization. It was the process of training South Vietnamese soldiers to fend for themselves. Nixon also pursued negotiations, which were marginally successful because he signed an arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union in his policy known as détente, but he failed to stop them from continuing to support North Vietnam. Although to the public he seemed to be ending the war, Nixon actually did some of the opposite. He escalated the Phoenix Program, where the CIA killed 20,000 suspected NLF members, many of whom were actually innocent and ordered the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969. While the four years of bombing did upset the Cambodian people’s lives, it was a failure because NLF base camps were not destroyed. He also had Laos secretly bombed, which also led to the destruction and upheaval of the natives.
Public opposition soared during Nixon’s presidency, as a result of the exposure of several scandals. The My Lai Massacre, the killing of 300 innocent Vietnamese civilians by US soldiers, polarized many against the war as they saw the brutality and the murder involved. The Pentagon Papers were not much of a help either as these papers exposed the President’s secret bombings of Cambodia and Lao, sparking outrage across the country. These papers also showed that the real motive of the war was to uphold the US’s reputation instead of trying to help a nation in need. As a result, protests dramatically increased. One notable one in Kent State University resulted in four civilians being shot by the National Guard. The nation had become divided, yet the movement to end the war had gained a loud voice (Downs, Frederick, The Killing Zone: My Life in Vietnam, 1978, W. W. Horton and Company, NY, NY.
Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization was tested in the Easter Offensive, an invasion of South Vietnam, when it was made clear that South Vietnam would need US help to survive. Nixon even reverted to the first bombing of Vietnam since 1969, showing the recession into aggressive military tactics. The bombings, popularly known as the Christmas Bombings were meant to intimidate North Vietnam into agreement with American terms for a cease-fire, and the campaign was successful. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 1973 ended direct US involvement in the war. In its terms, American POWs were released, fighting was temporarily ended between North and South Vietnam, the US had sixty days to leave, and the reunification of Vietnam was encouraged.
However, the Paris Peace Accords were not upheld by the Vietnamese. By then, Nixon had resigned after Watergate and Ford had taken office. The North Vietnamese invaded the South in 1975, but Ford was unable to act because of the majority of Democrats in Congress. Without US aid, South Vietnam began to crumble rapidly as it flew deeper into a pit of despair.
The North Vietnamese continued with their offense, capturing cities and towns along the way. Finally they arrived at the capital city of Saigon, and the South Vietnamese were powerless to defend it. The fall of Saigon marked the end of the Vietnam War.
Nixon, promising peace, did succeed in that effort, but his foreign policy was a failure. The corruption during his presidency contributed to the loss of public support, thus sealing in defeat. His unwise decisions to bomb the neighboring countries of Cambodia and Laos were only in successful in alienating the public. His policy of Vietnamization was a failure; the South Vietnamese were not adequately prepared to hold up on their own, which is indicated by the quick fall of Saigon.
The aftermath of the war was enormous. Many soldiers returned home, their lives having been scarred forever and forced to deal with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Many families had to endure the loss of a loved one – at least 58,000 American troops had died. The nation was now in a deep federal deficit, spurred by military spending in the Vietnam War and Johnson’s Great Society programs. The US economy had to suffer as soaring inflation and a stagnant economy led to a new economic problem – “stagflation.” There was a growing resentment and mistrust of the federal government, caused by all the secrecy and lies the government had been involved during the war. (Downs, Frederick, The Killing Zone: My Life in Vietnam, 1978, W. W. Horton and Company, NY, NY.)
Whether or not the US made the right decision with increased involvement is highly debated. Their involvement should have never been expanded, because anything further than that became an American war, because they would have been too involved.
The Marines should have never been sent in, and Johnson should have followed Kennedy’s plan. South Vietnam ultimately did fall to North Vietnam, meaning the war would have had the same outcome whether the US left in 1975 or in 1963. Even after Operation Rolling Thunder, the US should have calculated how difficult a land war would have been. US involvement was not justified, because the nation even ended up committing horrible crimes against the South Vietnamese.
American failure in Vietnam was caused by numerous factors, most namely difficulties of fighting an offensive war, poor leadership, and unexpected North Vietnamese morale resulting in countless deaths that could have been avoided. The war would drag on for what felt like centuries, claiming around 58,000 American lives and countless Vietnamese. It would leave a beautiful nation in tatters, just to fight communism. (Lawrence, Mark Atwood, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 2008, Oxford University Press, NY, NY)
In conclusion, Vietnam was very personal for me. Friends of mine went and never returned. Wars are fought by young and idealistic men. War is not glorious. We did not enter this war prepared. It was another senseless war, fought by governments. The phrase “He died for this country, he fought for OUR Freedom” has never been true, except WWII where there was a real threat of war on our shores. When young men and women die in a senseless cause it makes us culpable for their deaths. Parents have to have something to hang onto so they believe this lie. This war was a clusterfuck from beginning to end, and we have not learned from our mistakes.

WORK CITED
Caputo, Phillip, A Rumor of War, 1977, Henry Holt and Company, Inc, NY, NY. Downs, Frederick, The Killing Zone: My Life in Vietnam, 1978, W. W. Horton and Company, NY, NY. Brigham, Robert K, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, April 2006, University Press of Kansas
Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, 1983, Penguin Group, NY, NY Parnell, Ted, Vietnam Stories: Dreams to Nightmares, 1989, Viking Press, NY, NY Caputo, Phillip, 10,000 Days of Thunder: A History of the Vietnam War, 2005, Henry Holt and Company, Inc, NY. NY. Robert Tonsetic, DAYS OF VALOR: An Inside Account of the Bloodiest Six Months of the Vietnam War, 2007, Viking Press, NY, NY

Lawrence, Mark Atwood, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 2008, Oxford University Press, NY, NY

Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, (May 18, 1995), Oxford University Press, NY, NY

H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (May 8, 1998), Harper Perennial Press, Harpers Collins Press, NY, NY

Miller, Edward, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam, 2012, Harvard University Press
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Cited: Caputo, Phillip, A Rumor of War, 1977, Henry Holt and Company, Inc, NY, NY. Downs, Frederick, The Killing Zone: My Life in Vietnam, 1978, W. W. Horton and Company, NY, NY. Brigham, Robert K, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, April 2006, University Press of Kansas Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, 1983, Penguin Group, NY, NY Parnell, Ted, Vietnam Stories: Dreams to Nightmares, 1989, Viking Press, NY, NY Caputo, Phillip, 10,000 Days of Thunder: A History of the Vietnam War, 2005, Henry Holt and Company, Inc, NY Robert Tonsetic, DAYS OF VALOR: An Inside Account of the Bloodiest Six Months of the Vietnam War, 2007, Viking Press, NY, NY Lawrence, Mark Atwood, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History, 2008, Oxford University Press, NY, NY Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, (May 18, 1995), Oxford University Press, NY, NY H.R Miller, Edward, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam, 2012, Harvard University Press arHarper