As Kagan said, the Europeans are the ones who actually believe they are living in the end of history - that is, in a largely peaceful world which increasingly can be controlled by the law. In this world, classic realpolitik become obsolete. Americans, in contrast, think that they still live in history, and must use traditional means of political force to deal with the threat of Iraq, al-Qaeda, North Korea and other malignant forces. According to Kagan, the Europeans are half right: indeed, they did build themself a world of end-history within the EU, where sovereignty gave a way to a supranational organization. However, what they do not understand is that the peace and security of their 'European bubble' is ultimately guaranteed by U.S. military forces. Following these, I would agree on Kagan's statement, actually assessment of transatlantic relations, about Mars and Venus, and how 'Americans ans Europeans agree on little and understand one another less and less'.
There are indisputable differences in the two continents, with the accent on different historical, civilizational, and cultural worldview, along with the current political reality which shows differences too. Starting with the Bush's emphasis on strong U.S. leadership in the new anti-terrorist circumstances and unipolarity as new model of international relations, that could hardly be accepted in all European regions, especially when international circumstances are different and there is no longer any possibility of terror from outside.
So, looking at beginning of this 'gap', we can see that the change occurred with the inauguration of the president G. W. Bush to the White House in January 2001, and especially after the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States. Terrorism immediately became the number-one enemy of the U.S., Atlantic Alliance and Western democracies. For the first time in history, NATO activated Article 5, which is the foundation of the collective defense. The USA responded by attacking the regime in Afghanistan, which was undoubtedly sponsoring terrorism. But when the U.S. administration started to focus on Iraq, accusing the Iraqi regime for sponsoring terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction, although there was no evidence of it, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg took the side opposite to the America's. Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands and the new members from Central and Eastern Europe supported the U.S. This is the most important cause of the transatlantic divide, at least the most visible one. The real origins of the divide are deeper and more complex. The Iraqi crisis was a moment in history of the transatlantic relations in which they were at the lowest point. No such differences and misunderstandings existed before, throughout the history of transatlantic relations, and especially in NATO, which was always a prism that reflected the condition of transatlantic relations.
As we can see, all the more in the forefront are coming different views of activity of force, morality of using force and desirability of its use. Unlike America, which is still largely under the influence of September 11th and the tragedy that hit them, Europe is moving away from the use of force. Instead of such actions, most European countries insist on the rule of law, transnational bargaining and expanding international cooperation. Although not all European countries do accept this policy (the first exception is the United Kingdom, which bombards Iraq along with U.S. Air Force), it is obvious that most of the member states prefer diplomacy in negotiations before the war and war punishment. This is partly linked to the activity of socialist and social democratic governments in some European countries, a relatively quiet period of post-Cold War European development, and especially an assurance that the current process of European integration may be the best way to remove the use of force. Careful and patient policies are building the new Europe, which is increasingly moving away from the model of Europe that caused two world wars.
Furthermore, the structure of relations that United States are favoring towards Europe, it is now, when there is stronger political integration in the EU, contrary to European interests. Also, U.S. policy advocates instrumental multilateralism in international organizations, while Europeans seeking consistent multilateralism. From the American perspective, position of the United States as the sole super power has the advantage that orients the behavior of other countries to the United States and from United States demands stronger leadership in world politics. This structure is however once again unsuitable for the realization of European interests.
Two continents have also a different view of the transatlantic-relationship-bridge, NATO. United States see European military resources as help to their resources and strategic goals, while Europeans tend autonomy that would later be complementary to NATO resources. United States are seeing that as decoupling from NATO. Also, America is looking to expand NATO's scope of responsibilities while maintaining monocentric leadership structure, and Europeans want to keep the main contents of NATO responsibilities, but of course, with a change of leadership structure, actually change of excessive importance of one state in this organization.
The main problem in the American-European relations, besides the disproportion in military power, is the difference in political programs and differences in the view of the world. Washington deals with rogue states and weapons of mass destruction, and the Europeans are concerned for the future of the Earth, especially regarding the global economy and climate change, the differences in wealth and the distribution of the world's resources. So, in the sphere of practical political dissent, collection of different approaches led to the open separation of the United States and the European approach which can be seen in particular: first, U.S. abandonment of protracted negotiations on the UN Convention on biological weapons, then threats of leaving the conference on so-called Small Arms, third, the rejection of the ratification of the treaty banning nuclear tests, forth, rejection of the ratification of agreements in antipersonnel mines, and in the end, in U.S. policy in the Middle East, which strongly supports different governments than Europe support in that area.
As I mentioned above, there is an important difference in perception of world ecology and sustainable development. Namely, Kyoto Protocol was envisaging that by the 2012 most countries reduce their emissions by 5.2 percent compared to 1990. As a consumer, which emits about 25 percent of global CO2 emissions, the United States should have reduce emissions by 7 percent. However, in March of 2001, the Bush administration said it will not ratify the Protocol, with an excuse that would cost the United States approximately 400 billion dollars, with a loss of about 4.9 million jobs. Unlike the United States, in that time all fifteen member states have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and their goal was to reach 8 percent reduction in emissions. Disillusioned by American behavior, many European countries have emphasized that with such a policy, they not only did not participate in the overall efforts to create a cleaner environment, but they also privileged the U.S. companies (which do not adhere to these rules) that will have lower prices for its products.
Misunderstanding, crisis or conflict of concepts can be part of the name that will be used to indicate this state of relations between the transatlantic allies. The new schedule of the current international forces obviously show that transatlantic relations are far from those stabilized and disciplined images from the time of concentration of power and block model of international relations.
To conclude, the transatlantic divide can be seen as a natural consequence of various factors, such as: disappearance of a common enemy that homogenized the USA and Europe; separation in the notion of 'force philosophy'; huge gap in military power along with different view on NATO existence; different foreign policy priorities of the USA and Europe; neglect of ecology by United States and other environment matters that are important to Europeans; and of course, US policy regarding the Middle East region.
At the end, it is often claimed that Americans are strategically oriented and that they are systematic, and that Europeans are oriented to historical experiences and multilateralism. However, it must not be forgotten common interests and relationships that were developed in the Euro-Atlantic circle for more than fifty years. They now form a strong barrier for any definitive hasty weakening of mutual relations. I still think neither the European defense and security policy, neither the Bush doctrine, nor other aspects of the U.S. unilateral behavior may not be so great to completely nullify past and deny the Euro-Atlantic ties and relations. Therefore, it might be a good idea to agree with experienced Henry Kissinger, who says that just in the post-Cold War period, the Euro-Atlantic democracies will demonstrate the strength and value to the extent that they manage to 'overlive' and revive their relationship, confronting all the challenges, both inside and outside; but for that, we are still waiting.