Analysis Of Allan Wood's Metaphysics Of Morals
What is ‘Metaphysics of Morals’? For thirty years, Kant intended to entitle his system of ethics ‘Metaphysics of Morals.’ In discussing the Metaphysics of Morals, I will discuss Allan Wood’s article in Mark Timmons’s volume Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays; Woods presents a thoughtful interpretation that might be a clue for our discussion of emptiness charge. By examining each of the two major doctrines of Metaphysics of Morals, that is, principle of right and the class of juridical (or coercively enforceable) duties, Woods argues it will help us more clearly understand Kant’s implication. Wood claims,
Kant’s admirers, in fact, as well as his critics tend almost by reflex to think of the universalizability test as his …show more content…
All the duties of love (and likewise benevolence) are loosely derived from CI1. While we might consider other’ ends, we may not give practical assistance to others, such as a neighbor who is in bad circumstances. This does not appear to conflict with CI1 since to love our neighbors is to regard their ends as our own. However, for Kant, such imagination of action or in active thoughtfulness is merely a sort of benevolence, not active love. So, the question remains whether a person has a duty to be beneficent; Kant responds positively to this question by applying …show more content…
This is because only in this way is my maxim (of beneficence) qualified for the universal legislation on which every law of duty is founded (Ms.451).
Hence, benevolence must be practicable. In the end, after we have considered moral matters and universalization, benevolence must act. So, referring to the former example, we undoubtedly act in accord with our duties to help our neighbor.
It is not surprising that duties with respect to others originate from CI2 since such duties are essentially a negative statement of the imperative: namely, do not treat others as means but ends. Treating others as means implies disrespect, calumny, acts of pride, and mockery, which corrupt the ideal of CI2. Just as Kant shelves investigating the concept of value and instead introduces the notion of harmony when addressing imperfect duties in the Groundwork, he also sets aside the analogy with nature in his treatment of duties to the
Kant’s admirers, in fact, as well as his critics tend almost by reflex to think of the universalizability test as his …show more content…
All the duties of love (and likewise benevolence) are loosely derived from CI1. While we might consider other’ ends, we may not give practical assistance to others, such as a neighbor who is in bad circumstances. This does not appear to conflict with CI1 since to love our neighbors is to regard their ends as our own. However, for Kant, such imagination of action or in active thoughtfulness is merely a sort of benevolence, not active love. So, the question remains whether a person has a duty to be beneficent; Kant responds positively to this question by applying …show more content…
This is because only in this way is my maxim (of beneficence) qualified for the universal legislation on which every law of duty is founded (Ms.451).
Hence, benevolence must be practicable. In the end, after we have considered moral matters and universalization, benevolence must act. So, referring to the former example, we undoubtedly act in accord with our duties to help our neighbor.
It is not surprising that duties with respect to others originate from CI2 since such duties are essentially a negative statement of the imperative: namely, do not treat others as means but ends. Treating others as means implies disrespect, calumny, acts of pride, and mockery, which corrupt the ideal of CI2. Just as Kant shelves investigating the concept of value and instead introduces the notion of harmony when addressing imperfect duties in the Groundwork, he also sets aside the analogy with nature in his treatment of duties to the