Analysis Of J. L. Mackie's Moral Error Theory
On the stage of philosophy concerning meta-ethics, the Moral Error Theory followed in Hume’s footsteps and made significant breakthroughs with J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong and Richard Joyce’s more recent The Myth of Morality. They both argue that i) moral judgments presuppose objective and categorical moral values and ii) this presupposition is false since there are no such things. Therefore, they conclude, moral judgments are systematically false. Although Mackie offers an argument from relativity and an argument from queerness in support of his claim, this paper will focus on the former.
The Moral Error Theory
To begin, Mackie’s first sentence sides with anti-realism concerning moral facts in that “there are no objective …show more content…
values”, which he clarifies as “moral goodness and value… rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being rotten and contemptible, and so on.” (Mackie, 15). He then goes on to make two claims:
1) Presupposition: moral judgments presuppose objective and categorical moral facts
2) Error: this presupposition cannot be reconciled in the natural world.
Mackie identifies the presupposition claim with a conceptual analysis of the moral predicate “is good” and concludes that “given any sufficiently determinate standards, it will be an objective issue, a matter of truth and falsehood, how well any particular specimen measures up to those standards” (Mackie 26).
Joyce interprets this idea as “when we up-the ante to a moral ‘good’, we are implicitly referring to requirements for which there is no requirer” (Joyce, 2001, 16 emphasis mine). Mackie then argues that merely these objective standards is a substantive failing -an error- because it does not possess categorical value, or universal and prescriptive imperatives regardless of an agent’s desires. For instance, Mackie uses the example of objective standards such as justice and injustice to point out how, regardless of a court decision being just or unjust, it still does not hold categorical value. In another section, he clearly draws a line between natural and moral facts by questioning “What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty and the moral fact that it is wrong?” (Mackie, 41). Likewise, Joyce also rejects Moral Internalism in that he denies a necessary connection between “an agent who judges that one of his available actions is morally obligatory” and “motivation to perform that action” (Joyce, 2001, 18). According to Mackie, no such connection exists. For, he makes the metaphysical claim that objective and prescriptive …show more content…
values “are not part of the fabric of the world” (Mackie, 15). It is my aim to offer an alternative solution that rejects this anti-realist sentiment.
In support of the Moral Error Theory, Mackie offers the Argument from Relativity upon which Joyce later builds upon by distinguishing between institutional and non-institutional backings of moral judgments. I will now examine both arguments and possible rejections:
The Argument from Relativity
R1) there are obvious disagreements between moral codes between societies across space, time, and classes
R2) the best way to explain the moral disagreement is that people’s moral codes are founded upon their way of life instead of an objective truth
RC): therefore, societies do not apprehend objective truths
Of course, many would intuitively balk at this argument because the mere difference in unique values of a culture cannot justify their crimes! One may attack Mackie’s claim that disagreement implies non-existence. Recalling our map example, holding two different maps does not entail the non-existence of the third. It should seem, then, that mere disagreement is not enough. Mackie acknowledges this claim by conceding that “it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tell against the objectivity of values” (Mackie, 36). Yet, he holds that since moral facts are not grounded in natural facts, there can be no frame of reference to compare them to. To further illustrate this principle, imagine one is holding two maps: an accurate and inaccurate map of England. The easiest way to determine which is more accurate is to compare them to a third map established as a true map of England. In Mackie’s argument from relativity, the third map does not exist and therefore one is left holding different maps.
With this, Mackie essentially believes that moral disagreement are merely culture clashes. For instance, since the Aztec culture normalized and encouraged human sacrifices to their gods, they would objectively hold that “sacrificing slaves is good.” In other words, they construct an entire ethical system on just the way things are. In contrast, since it is not normal to make human sacrifices in the vast majority of contemporary cultures, somebody from today would hold that “sacrificing anybody is wrong.” Again, Mackie’s argument claims that the moral code from contemporary culture is founded upon the way things are, not because there are objective truths for a culture to apprehend and then approve of. Therefore, Mackie claims, there are no objective values to provide a reference for determining which culture’s moral code is right.
One is left to attack Mackie’s second claim by appealing to agreement.
However, Mackie predicts this “well-known argument” that appeals to “general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all societies” and then refutes such claims by saying “if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right” (Mackie, 37). In other words, to argue for such a principle like the Utilitarian or Universalist would ground morals in the circumstances. Yet, to undermine Mackie’s argument, one does not have to look to universal principles in contemporary society. For, ancient religions developed in isolation from and completely different circumstances compared to each other still express some form of the golden rule:
Ancient Egyptian: “Do for one who may do for you, that you may cause him thus to do” (the Tale of the Eloquent Peasant, 109-110 Translated by R.B. Parkinson)
Zoroastrianism: “whatever is disagreeable to yourself do not do unto others” (Shayast-na-Shayast
13:29)
Hinduism: “do not do unto others what would cause pain if done to you” (Mahabharata 5:1517)
Confucianism: “do not do unto others what you do not want them to do to you” (Analects 15:23)
Mackie would most likely again refute this argument by claiming that these instances “are very far from constituting the whole of…ordinary moral thought” (Mackie, 37). He could counter that despite the reasoned tenets of the religions, ordinary moral discourse led to drastically different ethical systems unique to the values of the particular culture. For, as David Hume reminds us, “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular” (Hume, T. 3.1.1. SBN 457). Thus, one is left to explain differences among ethical systems regarding the passions of everyday life.
Here, Joyce who better clarifies how Mackie’s point supports the Presupposition claim by distinguishing between institutional and non-institutional facts concerning moral discourse:
“The Mackian Error-Theoretic argument claims (a*) that moral discourse presupposes non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical imperatives while maintaining (b*) that all genuine desire-transcendent reasons are institutional and all genuine categorical imperatives are institutional” (Joyce, 2010, 523).
These institutions that Joyce identifies are socially constructed and are relevant only to the subscribers, or in the case of our ancient cultures, the members. Therefore, “we in fact have no reasonable argument” to offer to somebody who does not subscribe to our institution (Joyce, 2010, 524). Recalling our human sacrificing Aztecan example, moral judgments by a different culture would not work because it subscribes to a different institution. Joyce then suggests our moral judgments presuppose objectivity because people need a stronger argument and therefore appeal to the non-existent notion of “objectively wrong” instead of an institutional notion of “what we found wrong” (Joyce, 2010, 528). In other words, our need to be correct forces us to pretend the third map from our example exists. Hence, the Presupposition claim is supported.
In contrast to Mackie & Joyce’s Error Theory, I propose the following:
1) Objective moral values are reducible to natural facts that objectively promote everybody’s long-term physical, mental, and emotional health
2) Cultures and individuals alike aim to develop institutions of behavior and speech that adhere to these objective moral values
3) However, moral judgments presuppose attitudes of superiority that interfere with this aim
4) Were these attitudes eliminated through a Rawlsian thought experiment, moral agents would be motivated to act upon these objective moral values.
The first component refutes the Error Premise in that objective and categorical moral values do exist. For, long-term health in all aspects is metaphysically identical to natural facts, which can therefore be physically experienced through biological and psychological feedback. I choose long-term health because, humans as a species, are motivated to find certain needs. Consider Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, which argues that humans require biological needs be met, security of resources, positive interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships, and a sense of autonomy, and “self-actualization” in that order (Maslow, 1970). Thus, long-term health has common grounding that addresses Mackie’s attack of basic principles of utility and happiness, which are indeed vague terms constituted in different circumstances and individual dispositions.
The second and third components offer a simpler alternative to Mackie’s Argument from relativity in that it can accommodate both variations and similarities in moral codes in that each culture develops at different rates dependent upon how strongly they are affected by attitudes of superiority. Consider our Aztecan culture example: they believe that slaves and spoils of war are somehow sub-human and therefore allow certain people to be killed against their will. This attitude of superiority manifests in violations of objective moral values between individuals, resulting in murder, lying, stealing, raping, abusing, and so on; and throughout societies, resulting in wars, complete censorship, and slavery. In each case, the perpetrator does not recognize the victim as equal.
The third component is also compatible with Joyce’s distinction between institutional and non-institutional. The attitude of superiority, differing between the culture, affects the development of varying institutions as well as has this need to be right. Therefore, we arrive at the same situation where there is a moral disagreement and, since each side possessing an attitude of superiority, want to be right. Thus, it is an understandable misconception of ordinary moral discourse presupposing of objective moral values instead of attitudes of superiority.
Finally, the fourth component provides a connection between natural facts and moral motivations with the help of John Rawl’s concepts of “veil of ignorance” and “maximin.” Let me elaborate: Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” theory describes a social contract with two fundamental elements. First, there is an initial situation called the “original position” in which everybody starts off with equal opportunity from behind a veil of ignorance. In other words, all parties has knowledge about the world and its workings (facts about biology, economics, etc…) along with a lack of knowledge about themselves (their talents, abilities, wealth, etc…) and their future. Secondly, each party is mutually disinterested in others’ interests. In other words, all parties must not be motivated by external emotions such as envy, jealousy, benevolence, or altruism concerning others because they cause irrationality and prevent social cooperation. Rawl’s veil of ignorance forces moral agents to eliminate attitude of superiority in approach to moral discourse due to the uncertain future. The moral agent could end up as “the worst” and will suffer greatly unless he follows the Rawlsian principles:
The Moral Error Theory
To begin, Mackie’s first sentence sides with anti-realism concerning moral facts in that “there are no objective …show more content…
values”, which he clarifies as “moral goodness and value… rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being rotten and contemptible, and so on.” (Mackie, 15). He then goes on to make two claims:
1) Presupposition: moral judgments presuppose objective and categorical moral facts
2) Error: this presupposition cannot be reconciled in the natural world.
Mackie identifies the presupposition claim with a conceptual analysis of the moral predicate “is good” and concludes that “given any sufficiently determinate standards, it will be an objective issue, a matter of truth and falsehood, how well any particular specimen measures up to those standards” (Mackie 26).
Joyce interprets this idea as “when we up-the ante to a moral ‘good’, we are implicitly referring to requirements for which there is no requirer” (Joyce, 2001, 16 emphasis mine). Mackie then argues that merely these objective standards is a substantive failing -an error- because it does not possess categorical value, or universal and prescriptive imperatives regardless of an agent’s desires. For instance, Mackie uses the example of objective standards such as justice and injustice to point out how, regardless of a court decision being just or unjust, it still does not hold categorical value. In another section, he clearly draws a line between natural and moral facts by questioning “What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty and the moral fact that it is wrong?” (Mackie, 41). Likewise, Joyce also rejects Moral Internalism in that he denies a necessary connection between “an agent who judges that one of his available actions is morally obligatory” and “motivation to perform that action” (Joyce, 2001, 18). According to Mackie, no such connection exists. For, he makes the metaphysical claim that objective and prescriptive …show more content…
values “are not part of the fabric of the world” (Mackie, 15). It is my aim to offer an alternative solution that rejects this anti-realist sentiment.
In support of the Moral Error Theory, Mackie offers the Argument from Relativity upon which Joyce later builds upon by distinguishing between institutional and non-institutional backings of moral judgments. I will now examine both arguments and possible rejections:
The Argument from Relativity
R1) there are obvious disagreements between moral codes between societies across space, time, and classes
R2) the best way to explain the moral disagreement is that people’s moral codes are founded upon their way of life instead of an objective truth
RC): therefore, societies do not apprehend objective truths
Of course, many would intuitively balk at this argument because the mere difference in unique values of a culture cannot justify their crimes! One may attack Mackie’s claim that disagreement implies non-existence. Recalling our map example, holding two different maps does not entail the non-existence of the third. It should seem, then, that mere disagreement is not enough. Mackie acknowledges this claim by conceding that “it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tell against the objectivity of values” (Mackie, 36). Yet, he holds that since moral facts are not grounded in natural facts, there can be no frame of reference to compare them to. To further illustrate this principle, imagine one is holding two maps: an accurate and inaccurate map of England. The easiest way to determine which is more accurate is to compare them to a third map established as a true map of England. In Mackie’s argument from relativity, the third map does not exist and therefore one is left holding different maps.
With this, Mackie essentially believes that moral disagreement are merely culture clashes. For instance, since the Aztec culture normalized and encouraged human sacrifices to their gods, they would objectively hold that “sacrificing slaves is good.” In other words, they construct an entire ethical system on just the way things are. In contrast, since it is not normal to make human sacrifices in the vast majority of contemporary cultures, somebody from today would hold that “sacrificing anybody is wrong.” Again, Mackie’s argument claims that the moral code from contemporary culture is founded upon the way things are, not because there are objective truths for a culture to apprehend and then approve of. Therefore, Mackie claims, there are no objective values to provide a reference for determining which culture’s moral code is right.
One is left to attack Mackie’s second claim by appealing to agreement.
However, Mackie predicts this “well-known argument” that appeals to “general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all societies” and then refutes such claims by saying “if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right” (Mackie, 37). In other words, to argue for such a principle like the Utilitarian or Universalist would ground morals in the circumstances. Yet, to undermine Mackie’s argument, one does not have to look to universal principles in contemporary society. For, ancient religions developed in isolation from and completely different circumstances compared to each other still express some form of the golden rule:
Ancient Egyptian: “Do for one who may do for you, that you may cause him thus to do” (the Tale of the Eloquent Peasant, 109-110 Translated by R.B. Parkinson)
Zoroastrianism: “whatever is disagreeable to yourself do not do unto others” (Shayast-na-Shayast
13:29)
Hinduism: “do not do unto others what would cause pain if done to you” (Mahabharata 5:1517)
Confucianism: “do not do unto others what you do not want them to do to you” (Analects 15:23)
Mackie would most likely again refute this argument by claiming that these instances “are very far from constituting the whole of…ordinary moral thought” (Mackie, 37). He could counter that despite the reasoned tenets of the religions, ordinary moral discourse led to drastically different ethical systems unique to the values of the particular culture. For, as David Hume reminds us, “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular” (Hume, T. 3.1.1. SBN 457). Thus, one is left to explain differences among ethical systems regarding the passions of everyday life.
Here, Joyce who better clarifies how Mackie’s point supports the Presupposition claim by distinguishing between institutional and non-institutional facts concerning moral discourse:
“The Mackian Error-Theoretic argument claims (a*) that moral discourse presupposes non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical imperatives while maintaining (b*) that all genuine desire-transcendent reasons are institutional and all genuine categorical imperatives are institutional” (Joyce, 2010, 523).
These institutions that Joyce identifies are socially constructed and are relevant only to the subscribers, or in the case of our ancient cultures, the members. Therefore, “we in fact have no reasonable argument” to offer to somebody who does not subscribe to our institution (Joyce, 2010, 524). Recalling our human sacrificing Aztecan example, moral judgments by a different culture would not work because it subscribes to a different institution. Joyce then suggests our moral judgments presuppose objectivity because people need a stronger argument and therefore appeal to the non-existent notion of “objectively wrong” instead of an institutional notion of “what we found wrong” (Joyce, 2010, 528). In other words, our need to be correct forces us to pretend the third map from our example exists. Hence, the Presupposition claim is supported.
In contrast to Mackie & Joyce’s Error Theory, I propose the following:
1) Objective moral values are reducible to natural facts that objectively promote everybody’s long-term physical, mental, and emotional health
2) Cultures and individuals alike aim to develop institutions of behavior and speech that adhere to these objective moral values
3) However, moral judgments presuppose attitudes of superiority that interfere with this aim
4) Were these attitudes eliminated through a Rawlsian thought experiment, moral agents would be motivated to act upon these objective moral values.
The first component refutes the Error Premise in that objective and categorical moral values do exist. For, long-term health in all aspects is metaphysically identical to natural facts, which can therefore be physically experienced through biological and psychological feedback. I choose long-term health because, humans as a species, are motivated to find certain needs. Consider Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, which argues that humans require biological needs be met, security of resources, positive interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships, and a sense of autonomy, and “self-actualization” in that order (Maslow, 1970). Thus, long-term health has common grounding that addresses Mackie’s attack of basic principles of utility and happiness, which are indeed vague terms constituted in different circumstances and individual dispositions.
The second and third components offer a simpler alternative to Mackie’s Argument from relativity in that it can accommodate both variations and similarities in moral codes in that each culture develops at different rates dependent upon how strongly they are affected by attitudes of superiority. Consider our Aztecan culture example: they believe that slaves and spoils of war are somehow sub-human and therefore allow certain people to be killed against their will. This attitude of superiority manifests in violations of objective moral values between individuals, resulting in murder, lying, stealing, raping, abusing, and so on; and throughout societies, resulting in wars, complete censorship, and slavery. In each case, the perpetrator does not recognize the victim as equal.
The third component is also compatible with Joyce’s distinction between institutional and non-institutional. The attitude of superiority, differing between the culture, affects the development of varying institutions as well as has this need to be right. Therefore, we arrive at the same situation where there is a moral disagreement and, since each side possessing an attitude of superiority, want to be right. Thus, it is an understandable misconception of ordinary moral discourse presupposing of objective moral values instead of attitudes of superiority.
Finally, the fourth component provides a connection between natural facts and moral motivations with the help of John Rawl’s concepts of “veil of ignorance” and “maximin.” Let me elaborate: Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” theory describes a social contract with two fundamental elements. First, there is an initial situation called the “original position” in which everybody starts off with equal opportunity from behind a veil of ignorance. In other words, all parties has knowledge about the world and its workings (facts about biology, economics, etc…) along with a lack of knowledge about themselves (their talents, abilities, wealth, etc…) and their future. Secondly, each party is mutually disinterested in others’ interests. In other words, all parties must not be motivated by external emotions such as envy, jealousy, benevolence, or altruism concerning others because they cause irrationality and prevent social cooperation. Rawl’s veil of ignorance forces moral agents to eliminate attitude of superiority in approach to moral discourse due to the uncertain future. The moral agent could end up as “the worst” and will suffer greatly unless he follows the Rawlsian principles: