Analysis Of Lucretius 'The Way Things Are'

"Death is nothing to us, has no relevance to our condition, seeing that the mind is mortal". So claimed Lucretius: Roman poet, philosopher and Epicurean. In prolific verse from The Way Things Are, Lucretius denied that death was an evil and suggested that death should not be feared at all. Lucretius' beliefs put him in the same camp as Epicurus, whom he mentions in his verse, making him known as an Epicurean, which I shall define for the purposes of this paper as someone who believes that death is not something to be feared. The opposing camp to this view comprises, among others, Nagel and Williams, who argue that death should be feared. I will discuss and analyze the conflict between several arguments put forth by both parties and conclude
which makes the more convincing argument.
The central argument to the Epicurean view is probably the most highly contended position. The Epicurean's central argument on why we should not fear death is simply put by Epicurus himself: "Since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist." His point is essentially that a bad event can only affect us if we can experience it. If we are dead, we do not exist and cannot experience the event as good or bad. Death cannot be bad for us if we are unable to experience and since we should not fear things which are not bad for us, Epicurus concludes that it is irrational to fear death. Nagel objects strongly to this view. He rejects the idea that a person must experience something for it to be bad for them. He supports this by saying that what happens to a man can include "much that does not take place within the boundaries of his life". One example he cites is that of betrayal at the deathbed. Even if you are unable to experience this betrayal, he claims, it is still bad for you because "the discovery of betrayal makes us unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed- not that betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy". Simply put, betrayal is malum in se, an innately immoral act. I would tend to disagree. It is true that betrayal is a terrible thing in and of itself, but the main evil of betrayal is the resulting consequence of it and how it may affect my life, whether I am aware of it or not. This obviously does not apply posthumously. For example, pretend that you told your friend, Andy, some secret about yourself that you are not comfortable with anyone else knowing. Andy promises not to tell anyone, but betrays your trust and tells everybody you know. Even if nobody openly tells you what they now know about you, their knowledge of this fact may subconsciously influence the way they act toward you. Andy's betrayal of your trust has influenced the way others view you. If you were on your death bed when you told Andy your secret, and he only told others about it after you had died, it cannot do you any harm. Others may think differently of you, but it has no effect because you no longer exist; they cannot act differently in any way toward you, and furthermore, their having an opinion on something non-existent is perfectly possible but completely pointless. It is precisely the point that something is bad for us because it makes us unhappy: a betrayal is not bad for us unless it is detrimental to an aspect of our lives. Even with a more poignant deathbed betrayal, the result is still the same. Imagine that Andy promised that he would give all your money to your children once you were gone. Instead, he takes all your money and goes to live a rich life in the Bahamas. It could be argued that even if your non-existence makes you immune to this betrayal, it is still detrimental to your children and therefore, an evil. I think that argument completely misses the point. The Epicurean view covers how death is no evil to the individual-- once again, the betrayal by Andy is a dastardly deed, but you are not around to feel its ill-effects. You entrusted him with your wealth; though your children suffer because of his betrayal, you are in no state to suffer as a result. Because it cannot be disproven that bad things can occur even when you no longer exist, the Epicurean view still holds in this case.
Another claim fielded by the Epicureans is Lucretius' argument of temporal asymmetry.
Lucretius proposes that death mirrors pre-birth; we did not exist prior to birth, and likewise, we will not exist after death. We are not bothered by the fact that we did not exist before we were born; therefore, Lucretius concludes, the fact that we will not exist after death should not bother us either. Nagel counters this by asserting that the time after a man's death deprives him of something. It is a time "in which, had he not died then, he would be alive". Nagel is saying that without the death, there would be the continuance of life. Since Nagel believes that life is a good in itself, death therefore deprives a man of that good. However, this deprivation of life by death cannot, in Nagel's view, be paralleled with the period of pre-birth. The period of time before a man is born cannot be significantly shortened; if it were, he would be a different person. In this way, the time prior to a man's birth does not prevent him from living because it does not cause any loss of life in any way. I agree with Nagel on this point. The deprivation of life by death is largely a deprivation because we are unable to continue experiencing what we have been experiencing prior to death. Not so with pre-birth: prior to birth, you are not experiencing anything and never have. The time that you are non-existent does not actually deprive you of something you could be having if you were born. As Nagel says,
the time before birth cannot be shortened significantly because the person would not be the same person as he would have been, had he been born later. Thus, Nagel succeeds in showing the difference between pre-birth and death. Since Nagel argues that life is a good, his refute of the asymmetry argument supports his view that death is an evil because it is a "loss of life" and is not comparable to the period before birth. Here, I feel that Nagel provides convincing contradiction to Lucretius' claim.
One thing the Epicureans fail to take into consideration is a reason for living.
They make a good argument as to why death may be a welcome thing in terms of ending certain suffering, but they do not discuss why wanting to live would make death undesirable. Williams carefully addresses this issue in The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality. He puts forth the notion of ‘categorical desires': some desire which ‘propels [a man] into the future', something which makes a man want to continue with life. Williams argues from a utilitarian perspective, describing how the non-satisfaction of a person's desires should be counted as a disutility; seeing as how death prevents one from fulfilling all his categorical desires, Williams concludes that death is a disutility because it frustrates the completion of categorical desires and is therefore an evil. Though this is intuitively convincing, upon closer examination it does nothing to refute the Epicureans. Referring back to the Epicurean central argument, things cannot possibly affect you when you are dead. With regard to your categorical desires, your not fulfilling them would only be detrimental if you existed to experience the consequences of not achieving them. Pretend, for example, that you want to write an award winning book. Over your lifetime, you never succeed in this. You are depressed and upset: then you die. It can be said that your dying prevents you absolutely from ever reaching your goal. Yet, after
your death, it does not matter to you anymore. You no longer exist, and will not feel either depressed or upset at the loss of your opportunity. Once again, bad things cannot happen to you once you do not exist. Your inability to achieve your goals will cease to trouble you. It can be further argued that death is even a good precisely because it rids you of dissatisfaction. As Lucretius puts it, death steals "…all your covetings". Thus, Williams' categorical desire argument does not stand. In this paper, I have examined three main points of contention on whether death is something to be feared. The Epicureans appear to have stronger cases; though Nagel manages to rebut one of the main arguments, the Epicurean central argument manages to hold strong in the face of skepticism. But is there a real answer? Death is a topic of much dispute and speaks more to our passions than our reason. As long as there are people who feel that they have too much to lose in this life, or people who do not care much for life, there is nothing this paper can do to solve that.