These policies were intended to create a social divide within Germany. The argument from the Nazis was that the Jews had penetrated into the German bloodline. Friedlander points out the Nazi’s twenty-five-point party programs of February 24, 1920 had four points, four, five, six, and eight, dealing with the “Jewish question (Friedlander 26).” However, nothing in the program necessary laid out a way to achieve these goals. These ideas set up what is to come—that is, the Nuremberg laws. These racist laws were protecting the “German” blood by making it illegal for Jews and “aryans” to marry or have intercourse (Friedlander 142). Friedlander explains, “taken at face value, the Nuremberg Laws did not mean the end of Jewish life in Germany (Friedlander 143).” The Jews still had a place in Germany—it wasn’t at all good, but it existed to some degree. However, Friedlander wants the reader to know “once again, after taking a major step in line with his ideological goals, Hitler aimed at defusing its most extreme consequences on a tactical level (Friedlander 144).” Hitler wanted a slow transition and not to be “rush ahead” with extending new laws. Friedlander also points out that Hitler could also turn into a brash and reactionary individual (Friedlander 144). Some of his decisions reflected this. The protection of the …show more content…
After the implementing the Nuremberg Laws, Hitler targeted economics measures (Friedlander 144). However, as Friedlander points out, “they must not create a situation that would turn the Jews into a public burden; thus carefully calculated steps were needed (Friedlander 144).” This is a clear example of the larger point Friedlander is making—that is, Hitler, although brash and reactionary, was careful in his planning from the beginning. Hitler did not want the foundations of society crack, causing his vision, whatever it may have been, to fall apart. Friedlander highlights the “fundamental criterion” for measuring the success of anti-Jewish segregation was the level of Jewish economic success (Friedlander 232). In early 1938, the anti-Jewish economic campaign was “full throttle (Friedlander 257).” It was the Kristallnacht pogrom that was the final blow to Jewish economic life in Germany (Friedlander 258). This caused a roar of violence, but also damaged Hitler’s international reputation (Friedlander 262). Friedlander explains the violence “was not what Hitler needed as the international crisis over the fate of the Sudetenland was reaching its climax (Friedlander 262).” So Hitler stopped it. This is another example of tactical decisions made by Hitler regarding the persecution of Jews. Economics sanctions continued to hurt the Jews, but Friedlander explains