Analysis of the Case: Columbia’s Final Mission
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning stages of NASA’s birth, there have been numerous cases of unfortunate but possibly preventable failure and disappointment. Looking back in time not only at the Columbia but also the Challenger shuttle missions, one can see and briskly imagine what went wrong and how the crises could’ve been prevented. Also, one can see how these problems were not addressed in time and in proper manner. As we take a look back, we can pin point many problems that occurred with communication, schedule pressure, and “true” professionalism across diverse teams that led to the catastrophic disasters. With all this we can quickly derive to conclusions that the poorly designed communication system was doomed for failure.
BODY
From the start, Columbia’s shuttle mission organizational team of managers and engineers experienced tremendous pressure. The entire team had huge task responsibility’s that not only affected their work in the way they performed their jobs but also in their ability to make tough decisions. The entire management team of Columbia’s mission had to analyze each individual system of flight and respectively assess the engineers. Engineers were divided into teams of specific expertise. All engineering teams were running into specific challenges that needed to be corrected in time for flight. Managers heavily depended on all engineers to provide good data that could then be prioritized in order of acceptance. On the same token, management was pressured by NASA to stay on course and stick to schedule. In the end it was really up to the management team to decide what was crucial to the mission, and this is where mistakes were made because certain engineering concerns were overlooked and unfortunately eventually accepted.
In early NASA missions, danger of foam loss was considered as an acceptable risk by the NASA organization. Therefore threat of foam loss on the Columbia mission was no different and never was thought of as an
Since the beginning stages of NASA’s birth, there have been numerous cases of unfortunate but possibly preventable failure and disappointment. Looking back in time not only at the Columbia but also the Challenger shuttle missions, one can see and briskly imagine what went wrong and how the crises could’ve been prevented. Also, one can see how these problems were not addressed in time and in proper manner. As we take a look back, we can pin point many problems that occurred with communication, schedule pressure, and “true” professionalism across diverse teams that led to the catastrophic disasters. With all this we can quickly derive to conclusions that the poorly designed communication system was doomed for failure.
BODY
From the start, Columbia’s shuttle mission organizational team of managers and engineers experienced tremendous pressure. The entire team had huge task responsibility’s that not only affected their work in the way they performed their jobs but also in their ability to make tough decisions. The entire management team of Columbia’s mission had to analyze each individual system of flight and respectively assess the engineers. Engineers were divided into teams of specific expertise. All engineering teams were running into specific challenges that needed to be corrected in time for flight. Managers heavily depended on all engineers to provide good data that could then be prioritized in order of acceptance. On the same token, management was pressured by NASA to stay on course and stick to schedule. In the end it was really up to the management team to decide what was crucial to the mission, and this is where mistakes were made because certain engineering concerns were overlooked and unfortunately eventually accepted.
In early NASA missions, danger of foam loss was considered as an acceptable risk by the NASA organization. Therefore threat of foam loss on the Columbia mission was no different and never was thought of as an
References: AP Wire Service (2003, February 1). Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrates into flames over Texas, killing all seven astronauts aboard: [FINAL HOME EDITION]. Tulsa World, p. BR. Retrieved June 16, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 283094721). Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=283094721&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD Excerpts From Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board: [Text]. (2003, August 27). New York Times (Late Edition (east Coast)), p. A.18. Retrieved June 16, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 388965331). Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=388965331&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD Marcia Dunn (2003, August 27). NASA gets shuttle blame Scathing report faults management for the Columbia disaster: [Metro Edition]. San Antonio Express-News, p. 01A. Retrieved June 16, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 783048001). Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=783048001&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD Marcia Dunn, Pam Easton. (2003, February 2). Tragedy in the sky; 7 die as shuttle disintegrates; Debris rains over Texas: [ALL Edition]. Telegram & Gazette, p. A1. Retrieved June 16, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 282662751). Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=282662751&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD