However, his assessment that evil is accidental and has no intrinsic cause only appears to work conceptually as opposed to actuality. In J.L Mackie’s piece “The Subjectivity of Values” he makes the claim that there are no objective values. (Mackie 181) Mackie’s approach prefers subjectivity insofar as it relates to judgements and standards that one uses every day and in various situations. Mackie describes the subjectivity as “This action is right means I approve of this action” (Mackie 182), it can also be interpreted as I believe this action is morally right or wrong or “moral judgements are equivalent to reports of the speaker’s own feelings or attitudes.” (Mackie 182) In evaluating standards Mackie notes decisions made by judges or experts in certain fields about a variety of topics all of which have a subjective guideline detailing what is exceptional and what is subpar. Mackie however does argue that standards do bare relations to the work that is in question but standards are not concrete as a(n) (objective) rule would be. Mackie then argues similarly to Rachels, who will be introduced later, that moral values do not rely upon desires and this can work in Aquinas’s favor however, the argument as a whole does
However, his assessment that evil is accidental and has no intrinsic cause only appears to work conceptually as opposed to actuality. In J.L Mackie’s piece “The Subjectivity of Values” he makes the claim that there are no objective values. (Mackie 181) Mackie’s approach prefers subjectivity insofar as it relates to judgements and standards that one uses every day and in various situations. Mackie describes the subjectivity as “This action is right means I approve of this action” (Mackie 182), it can also be interpreted as I believe this action is morally right or wrong or “moral judgements are equivalent to reports of the speaker’s own feelings or attitudes.” (Mackie 182) In evaluating standards Mackie notes decisions made by judges or experts in certain fields about a variety of topics all of which have a subjective guideline detailing what is exceptional and what is subpar. Mackie however does argue that standards do bare relations to the work that is in question but standards are not concrete as a(n) (objective) rule would be. Mackie then argues similarly to Rachels, who will be introduced later, that moral values do not rely upon desires and this can work in Aquinas’s favor however, the argument as a whole does