Aquinas Vs Leibniz Essay

As Is or Otherwise? Although both G. W. Leibniz and Thomas Aquinas were theists, they had significant differences in their understanding of God’s free ability to do other than what he chooses to do. Leibniz allows that God could have done otherwise, but only in a logical sense of possibility, because God, by his goodness and wisdom, would always choose the best possible world. Aquinas wisely disagrees with this and asserts that God, in order to be a first principle, must not have his actions determined necessarily. There has to be real potential, not just logical potential. Aquinas’s approach is ultimately far more successful because it avoids the errors of more extreme views about God’s freedom. Leibniz argues for the necessity of God’s actions on the grounds of God’s goodness and wisdom. He
Aquinas argues that God is actually free in his actions. He really can do other than he does, and he is not obligated to make the Leibnizian best possible world. Aquinas uses his standard method of objections and replies, and so he responds to two different arguments, the latter of which is an earlier version of Leibniz’s that is essentially the same. Aquinas refutes Leibniz’s argument by making distinctions about where actions and possible actions occur. Aquinas says there are three realms of possibility for God: “First, the intellect, secondly, the will, thirdly, and the power of nature.” Aquinas then says that God is limited in his intellect because he cannot make both yes and no be true simultaneously, secondly God is limited in his will because he cannot will one end and it’s contrary at the same time. However, both of these are not every possibility for God. Just because he cannot will the contrary of a thing does not mean he cannot will anything else. God still has a wide range of possibilities open to