Aristotle's Nichomachean Friendship

In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle develops a robust definition of friendship. His definition provides distinctions between the true and perfect form of friendship and other inferior likenesses. Not only does he provide a framework for personal relationships, Aristotle also defines several different forms of constitutions and integrates friendship and justice into each. In light of his explanation and praise of monarchy, Aristotle agrees with Plato’s ideal of a philosopher king. Before such an argument can be made, a summary of Aristotelian friendship must be discussed as well as a comparison of his forms of government and the relationships of friendship and justice in each.
Aristotelian friendship is a complex concept that tends to evade
most attempts to bind it to other definitions set forth in the Nichomachean Ethics. Like virtue, friendship is “most necessary with a view to living,”(VII.1, 142). It does much to promote the general welfare and stimulates men to “noble actions,”(VII.1, 142). Not only is it invaluable to individuals, it also “seems to hold states together,” (VII.1, 142). Since such friendship covers such a wide range of human interactions, Aristotle defines several different subcategories of friendship.
Every friendship is based on love, however, not all love is identical.
Aristotle categorizes the different types of love into three basic forms based around three types of lovable objects. These objects are the useful, the pleasant, and the good. These distinctions form the basis for the three different types of friendship. The first friendship is founded on the services that a friend can provide to another. The only reason for the connection to exist is the utility that the friends enjoy. Very similar to the first, the second type of friendship replaces the utility gained with pleasure. These two types of relationships have much in common. Since the overall goal of both situations is self-serving, both friendships are unable to be anything other than self-centered. This is witnessed by the fragility of the connection. As soon as any “one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him,” and the friendship ceases exists (VIII.3,
144). These self-serving friendships contrast with the best kind of friendship between “men who are good,” (VIII.3, 145).
Two good men form a true friendship when they love the good inside of the other. This type of relationship lasts a much lengthier period of time because “goodness is an enduring thing,”(VII.3, 145). Since true friends do not love for personal gain, the focus of their love on the friend in order to “wish well to their friends for their sake,”(VIII.3, 145). When such a bond forms, not only is it good and perfect, it also gains the useful and pleasurable benefits of the imperfect friendships. Unfortunately, though these friendships are sought after, they are not common. Truly good men are few and far between, and though the “wish for friendship may arise quickly,” true friendship does not (VIII.3, 146). It takes time, love, and trust for such a relationship to come to
maturation.
Much like virtue, the perfect friendship has many admirable qualities. Although Aristotle begins his definition by claiming that friendship “is a virtue or implies virtue,” (VII.1, 142), as his arguments unfold, it becomes clear that friendship cannot fall under the same definition as virtue. Instead, it is fundamentally linked to the virtues in discrete ways.
Aristotle presents some compelling evidence for equating friendship and virtue. Moral virtue “is a state of character concerned with choice,” (II.6, 31). Aristotle claims that true friendship is a state of character concerned with a choice to love goodness in another’s soul. The love “involves choice and choice springs from a state of character,” (VIII.5, 148). Under this definition, friendship shares the same properties as virtue. In contrast to this, other passages provide conflicting evidence.
In another definition, Aristotle clearly indicates that, “virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate,”(II.6, 30). The definition of virtue as a mean between two extremes is central to the Nichomachean Ethics. True friendship, however, is not in the middle of any scale. There are no two extremes between which it can reside. Although one might argue that the friendship of pleasure and the friendship of utility are extremes between which true friendship resides, this argument fails when one considers that the true friendship is based on a love of its own. If friendship inhabits any scale, it resides at the zenith and every other form of friend fails to meet it and falls below it.
Even though friendship cannon be defined as a virtue, it has great bearing on different forms of government and the justice found within. Aristotle explains how friendship integrates with several different types of constitutions and analyzes the quality of the different regimes. The three forms of good government are Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Timocracy. Three degenerate forms of rule parallel each good form. Their depravity is proportional to the goodness of their counterparts. They include Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy. Aristotle finds that “each of the constitutions involves friendship as much as it involves justice,” (VIII.2, 156).
According to Aristotle, the best of the six forms is monarchy. Under this regime, a benevolent king cares for his subjects “with a view to their well-being,” (VIII.2, 156). The king is “sufficient to himself” and has no need to exploit his subjects (VIII.10, 154). Instead, he uses his excess time and power to look out for their interests and helps them the best he can. The king’s relationship to his subjects is a kind of friendship. Unlike a friendship between equals, a king is far above his subjects. The inequality results in the greater party, the king, being “more loved than he loves,” (VIII.7, 150). Since “the better get more of what is good,” (VII.11, 156) justice favors the king.
Just as monarchy is the best kind of government, tyranny is the worst. Here the king is no longer benevolent but self serving and cruel. He does not care for his subjects. As Aristotle claims, “in tyranny there is little or no friendship,” (VII.11, 156). The relationship is no more than a master to slave interaction. The slave is a lifeless, unlovable object which the master treats as a tool. Since friendship has no meaning, justice cannot either.
The second regime is aristocracy in which the nation is ruled by those with merit. In this form of government, friendship still has a strong presence. However, since the leaders cannot fully dedicate themselves to the interests the people, the friendship is not as full. The distance between the social orders is not so large as in monarchy. The subjects are less able to love their leaders and the balance of justice shifts more towards the people.
The degenerate form of this is the oligarchy. Here, the aristocratic leaders are no longer selected by merit but rather by wealth. Though they are not as despotic as the tyrant, the leaders still are more concerned with retaining their own wealthier and prestige over serving the citizens. Here, justice is found among the elite but only to small extents
The final good form of government is the Timocracy. This one is where anyone who has property is allowed say in the government. Here, the propertied men can be friends as equals but their benevolence barely extends down to the level of the landless.
The last broken form is democracy where everyone, regardless of their merit, has a hand in the ruling. To Aristotle, this is a poor form of government where only friendship among equals can exist and no benevolence can occur. The justice here is equal between all parties.
Of all six regimes, Aristotle believes that monarchy is the best of all. This benevolent monarchs shares many of the same traits that Plato’s philosopher king exhibits.