Artificial Intelligence by Anthony J. Bell
Levels and loops: the future of arti®cial intelligence and neuroscience
Anthony J. Bell
Interval Research Corporation, 1801 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA In discussing arti¢cial intelligence and neuroscience, I will focus on two themes. The ¢rst is the universality of cycles (or loops): sets of variables that a¡ect each other in such a way that any feed-forward account of causality and control, while informative, is misleading. The second theme is based around the observation that a computer is an intrinsically dualistic entity, with its physical set-up designed so as not to interfere with its logical set-up, which executes the computation. The brain is di¡erent. When analysed empirically at several di¡erent levels (cellular, molecular), it appears that there is no satisfactory way to separate a physical brain model (or algorithm, or representation), from a physical implementational substrate. When program and implementation are inseparable and thus interfere with each other, a dualistic point-of-view is impossible. Forced by empiricism into a monistic perspective, the brain^mind appears as neither embodied by or embedded in physical reality, but rather as identical to physical reality. This perspective has implications for the future of science and society. I will approach these from a negative point-of-view, by critiquing some of our millennial culture 's popular projected futures. Keywords: arti¢cial intelligence; neuroscience; cyclic systems; dualism; science ¢ction
The `Net-heads ' will have been passed on the way by the `Worldbots ', digital mechanical life-forms which will ¢rst ease human life by performing all mundane tasks, but will shortly after become so much more intelligent than the unenhanced us that they will practically become `spiritual machines ', which may or may not use sel¢sh altruism to decide to be benign towards the human animals, and if we are lucky, they will continue to serve us, something like digital Bodhisattvas. Back in
Anthony J. Bell
Interval Research Corporation, 1801 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA In discussing arti¢cial intelligence and neuroscience, I will focus on two themes. The ¢rst is the universality of cycles (or loops): sets of variables that a¡ect each other in such a way that any feed-forward account of causality and control, while informative, is misleading. The second theme is based around the observation that a computer is an intrinsically dualistic entity, with its physical set-up designed so as not to interfere with its logical set-up, which executes the computation. The brain is di¡erent. When analysed empirically at several di¡erent levels (cellular, molecular), it appears that there is no satisfactory way to separate a physical brain model (or algorithm, or representation), from a physical implementational substrate. When program and implementation are inseparable and thus interfere with each other, a dualistic point-of-view is impossible. Forced by empiricism into a monistic perspective, the brain^mind appears as neither embodied by or embedded in physical reality, but rather as identical to physical reality. This perspective has implications for the future of science and society. I will approach these from a negative point-of-view, by critiquing some of our millennial culture 's popular projected futures. Keywords: arti¢cial intelligence; neuroscience; cyclic systems; dualism; science ¢ction
The `Net-heads ' will have been passed on the way by the `Worldbots ', digital mechanical life-forms which will ¢rst ease human life by performing all mundane tasks, but will shortly after become so much more intelligent than the unenhanced us that they will practically become `spiritual machines ', which may or may not use sel¢sh altruism to decide to be benign towards the human animals, and if we are lucky, they will continue to serve us, something like digital Bodhisattvas. Back in
References: Arkin, R. C. 1998 Behavior-based robotics (intelligent robots and autonomous agents). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bell, A. J. & Sejnowski, T. J. 1997 The independent components of natural scenes are edge ¢lters. Vision Res. 37, 3327^3338. Phil. T rans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1999)