Assess The Validity Of A Historian Analysis

There are many factors that can determine why a historian arrives at a certain viewpoint. These are factors not limited to: The zeitgeist in which the source was written, the information available to them (e.g. where the US or Soviet archives open to the historian), the focus of the source, the historical methods employed, the assumptions they make, their political convictions and their agenda (the purpose of the source). Evaluating these different areas can help explain the various discrepancies between articles.

The later a source was written, the greater the wealth of knowledge available to the historian.
As historians are able to read and expand previously written accounts. This is particularly evident in the work of Gaddis as on page
173, Gaddis actually cites the work by Williams in the footnotes which happens to be one of my selected works. So basing just on dates, one could say that Gaddis had a more informed view of the cold war compared to the other works as Gaddis wrote his account in 1983, whereas Schlesinger was penned in 1967 and Williams in 1959.
Another reason Historians arrive at differing opinions in the differences in sources they use. Looking at the Bibliography of the three selected works can give us great insight into how the Historians arrived at their respective views. Williams uses the testimony of Truman to back up the aggressive imperialist role Truman took on, he offers us the following testimony, “the Russians would soon be put in their places; and that the united states would then take the lead in running the world in a way that the world ought to be run.” At face value one could say that it is clear from this quote that Truman was an advocate of imperialism to reinforce Americas supremacy as the leading global power. However, looking at his bibliography the origins of this quote appear to be quite vague. Williams’ source for this is not a speech Truman gave or even in an article which could be checked for historical accuracy, it instead is the testimony of a visitor whom Truman reportedly spoke to after he took his Oath as president.
Therefore, this quote could have been entirely made up and used by Williams to further his arguments as we have no way of checking the veracity of this quote.
His reliance quotes from an unnamed source could mean that he is relying on possibly the misquoted words of Truman to further his argument. This is an example of how a certain historian could have arrived at a certain view based on misquote of a president. For this example, Williams is not using sound historical methods to further his arguments, eye witness accounts are usually the most unreliable. Gaddis also uses dodgy historical methods to further his arguments. Gaddis claims in regards to containment evolving against the will of the American people “Indeed some post revisionists have suggested that public and congressional opinion moved in this direction before the policymakers did.” Gaddis proceeds to footnote this sentence in his work to give an example of Post revisionists that have put forward this thesis and then footnotes himself and cites his own book “The United States and the origins of the cold war, 1941-1947”. this makes his point look very weak as if he can’t even cite another historian except himself it makes it look like no other Post-Revisionist historians hold this view and the statement “some revisionists…” means he is the only one. This another example of how a statement can be misleading if footnotes are not checked. Conversely, Schlesinger seems only to reference his work from well respected
scholarly articles and books from other historians, he does not cite himself like Gaddis and doesn’t rely on quotes unless properly referenced. A quick review of his Bibliography reveals that he references his work from scholars such as W.H. McNeill who awarded the National Humanities Medal by President Obama in 2010. Both Williams and Gaddis also quote scholarly articles however as shown above their citations are not always rigorous as they could be and their reliance on using primary quotes from unattributed sources and their tendency to quote themselves shows intellectual laziness which makes one wonder what other inaccuracies lie beneath the surface.

Another reason why historians disagree is the assumptions they make when confronted with a lack of evidence.
These assumptions are usually based on the political convictions of the historians. This evident in the contrasting opinions of Williams, Gaddis and Schlesinger, regarding the role Marxist ideology played in the outset of the cold war of the Soviet regime. The nature of the Soviet regime is vital in understanding the US’s role in the outbreak of the cold war, as whether or not the USSR acted like a traditional nationalist state or was compelled by ideology is essential in understanding whether the conflict was avoidable or not and whether the actions of the US made a difference. Indeed, Schlesinger asserts that the conflict could have been avoidable only if the USSR was not convinced of the infallibility of the communist system. Gaddis asserts the lack of an “ideological blueprint for world revolution in Stalin’s mind”, whereas Schlesinger asserts the USSR was a Messianic power possessed by Marxist-Leninist ideology bent on world domination. Williams however claims that the soviet threat was largely exaggerated in order to convince congress to ratify the Marshall plan. How can we account for this discrepancy? Schlesinger comes to this conclusion based on the teachings of Lenin, who stated that while both capitalism and communism exist there cannot be peace between the two. However, Schlesinger is basing this assumption not on the actual actions of the Soviets, but
instead on the teachings of a long dead Marxist, Schlesinger did not have access to the soviet archives and therefore cannot claim this with absolute certainty the extent to which Stalin was driven by ideology. Gaddis however, bases his opinion on the actual actions of Stalin, whom he describes as a “cagey opportunist”. Explaining why historians arrive at certain assumptions is difficult to explain, such distinctions are incredibly subjective and tend to be based on the political leanings of the historian or the zeitgeist in which the source was written. It is almost impossible to understand where these biases manifest from. Perhaps Schlesinger had a specific agenda in writing this article. After all, he was a presidential advisor to Kennedy and maybe his job would have been in jeopardy if he placed a greater amount of blame on the role of the US rather the USSR. It is impossible to know.