Assess the View That Appeasement Was the Only Realistic Option for British Policy Towards Germany Between 1936 and 1938
Assess the view that appeasement was the only realistic option for British policy towards Germany between 1936 and 1938
The erosion of Neville Chamberlain’s# reputation was brought about quickly as his policy of appeasement failed to prevent WW2. The Cato# collective branded him as a criminal in the ‘Guilty men’#. Churchill# further reinforced this view telling the commons “England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war.”#. These more orthodox views starkly contrast the reactions of the public and media pre-war. Hailed as a hero “Most newspapers supported Chamberlain uncritically, and he received thousands of gifts, from a silver dinner service to many of his trademark umbrellas.”#, with newspapers such as the Stockholm Tidningen# suggesting he receive the Nobel peace prize, Strasbourg renaming her streets overnight and the Telegram# concluding "Your name will go down in history as a statesman who saved civilisation from destruction”#. Ultimately appeasement, “the reduction of tensions between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them, which might otherwise lead to war.”# may not have been the only realistic option, but it was certainly an option and it was taken forward. Used as a synonym for weakness and ‘giving in’ in today’s world, there are Historians who argue that Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement was weak and lead to WW2 such as L.B. Namier, while there are also historians, such as A.J.P Taylor, who argue it was the only realistic option for him, during the years 1936-38.
An assumption can be made that to go to war, or engage in conflict, a government must have a certain level of public backing and a stable economy. The Oxford union debate in 1933 caused shock waves in Britain as they voted “257 votes to 153 that ‘This house will in no circumstances fight for king and country’”#, suggesting the ruling class had become open to
The erosion of Neville Chamberlain’s# reputation was brought about quickly as his policy of appeasement failed to prevent WW2. The Cato# collective branded him as a criminal in the ‘Guilty men’#. Churchill# further reinforced this view telling the commons “England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war.”#. These more orthodox views starkly contrast the reactions of the public and media pre-war. Hailed as a hero “Most newspapers supported Chamberlain uncritically, and he received thousands of gifts, from a silver dinner service to many of his trademark umbrellas.”#, with newspapers such as the Stockholm Tidningen# suggesting he receive the Nobel peace prize, Strasbourg renaming her streets overnight and the Telegram# concluding "Your name will go down in history as a statesman who saved civilisation from destruction”#. Ultimately appeasement, “the reduction of tensions between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them, which might otherwise lead to war.”# may not have been the only realistic option, but it was certainly an option and it was taken forward. Used as a synonym for weakness and ‘giving in’ in today’s world, there are Historians who argue that Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement was weak and lead to WW2 such as L.B. Namier, while there are also historians, such as A.J.P Taylor, who argue it was the only realistic option for him, during the years 1936-38.
An assumption can be made that to go to war, or engage in conflict, a government must have a certain level of public backing and a stable economy. The Oxford union debate in 1933 caused shock waves in Britain as they voted “257 votes to 153 that ‘This house will in no circumstances fight for king and country’”#, suggesting the ruling class had become open to
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