Attenuation Doctrine: Fiscal Investigatory Case

EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE INITIAL INVESTIGATORY QUESTION NEEDED MIRANDA WARNINGS, THE ATTENUATION DOCTRINE APPLIES TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT AT THE POLICE STATION WHERE HE WAS ADVISED OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.

The attenuation doctrine is an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree, determine if the attenuation doctrine applies to a given case, evaluates the causal link between the initial illegal search and seizure and a subsequent search and seizure, allows the subsequent evidence to be admitted. (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 S. Ct 2056, 2061.) The intervening cause that the prosecution relies on is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing and untainted the initial violation. (Id. at p. 2061.) Following the analysis of
the intervening cause, the court must then evaluate the three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois. (Id. at p 2061-62). First, the court will analyze the “temporal proximity” between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the conduct. (Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590.) Second, the court will look at the presence of intervening circumstances. (Id. at p. 603.) Third, the court will examine the particular significance of the official misconduct. (Id. at p. 604.)
In Strieff, the Court determined that the temporal proximity favored suppressing the evidence because of the temporal proximity wan only minutes from the illegal search to the discovery conduct of the second search.
(Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 S. Ct 2056, 2062.) Whereas in Wong Sun, the temporal proximity between the first unlawful arrest and the statement were done days after making the arrest and the statement so attenuated as to “dissipate the taint.” (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 83 S. Ct. 407, 419.) The second factor in Strieff weighs in favor of the prosecution because the agents had probable cause to believe that the apartment occupants were dealing cocaine and they sought out a warrant. (Id. at p. 2062.). Finally, the third factor weighs in favor of the prosecution. (Id. at p. 2063.) The Court reasoned that at in most the officer’s conduct was negligent, but that his conduct thereafter was lawful. (Id.) Applying all three factors, the Court in Strieff concluded that the subsequent evidence was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant.
(Id.)
Here, the intervening cause is the reading of the defendant’s Miranda rights at the police station.
(PR.) First, although the record is unclear on how long the from the initial preliminary investigation at the staircase and the reading of the defendant’s Miranda rights at the police station, it was about a few hours but not days as it was in Wong Sun. Even though it has not been days, there has been sufficient time to dissipate the taint. Not only were there hours in between but the Miranda warnings were issues at the police station, away from the apartment. Thus, although there were not days in between, there were hours and a different location that makes this factor weigh in favor of the People. Second, because the defendant did not unequivocally assert his Miranda rights and made his waiver, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, the intervening cause here is legal under the Fifth Amendment and pursuant to Miranda. Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of the People. Third, based on the totality of the circumstances, officers were conducting an investigation where a weapon was involved and made questions to investigate but also to ensure that the public remained safe, a reasonable officer would have believed that their conduct was lawful and that no Miranda warnings were needed at that time. Thus, this third factor weighs in favor of the People. Therefore, applying all three factors, the attenuation doctrine does not apply to this case and any statements gathered by
the officers should be suppressed.