Austin’s Speech Act Theory and the Speech Situation
Austin’s Speech Act Theory and the Speech Situation
Etsuko Oishi
Esercizi Filosofici 1, 2006, pp. 1-14
ISSN 1970-0164 link: http://www.univ.trieste.it/~eserfilo/art106/oishi106.pdf
AUSTIN’S SPEECH ACT THEORY AND THE SPEECH SITUATION
Etsuko Oishi
The talk starts with a question, why do we discuss Austin now? While answering the question, I will (I) present an interpretation of Austin’s speech act theory,
(II) discuss speech act theory after Austin, and (III) extend Austin’s speech act theory by developing the concept of the speech situation. And in the following section, three aspects of the speech situation, that is, (I) conventionality, (II) actuality, and (II) intentionality, will be explained. Then a short conclusion follows.
1. Why do we discuss Austin now?
Half a century ago, John Austin gave a series of lectures, the William James
Lectures at Harvard, which were published posthumously as a book entitled
How to Do Things with Words. Austin presented a new picture of analysing meaning; meaning is described in a relation among linguistic conventions correlated with words/sentences, the situation where the speaker actually says something to the hearer, and associated intentions of the speaker. The idea that meaning exists among these relations is depicted successfully by the concept of acts: in uttering a sentence, that is, in utilizing linguistic conventions, the speaker with an associated intention performs a linguistic act to the hearer.
Austin’s analysis of meaning is unique in the sense that meaning is not explained through some forms of reduction. In reductive theories of meaning, complexities of meaning expressed by a sentence are reduced by a single criterion to something else, and this is claimed to be the process of explaining the meaning of the sentence. We can find this reductive «explanation» of meaning typically in Russell: using a logical/mathematical model, Russell reduces the meaning of a sentence to a fact to which
Etsuko Oishi
Esercizi Filosofici 1, 2006, pp. 1-14
ISSN 1970-0164 link: http://www.univ.trieste.it/~eserfilo/art106/oishi106.pdf
AUSTIN’S SPEECH ACT THEORY AND THE SPEECH SITUATION
Etsuko Oishi
The talk starts with a question, why do we discuss Austin now? While answering the question, I will (I) present an interpretation of Austin’s speech act theory,
(II) discuss speech act theory after Austin, and (III) extend Austin’s speech act theory by developing the concept of the speech situation. And in the following section, three aspects of the speech situation, that is, (I) conventionality, (II) actuality, and (II) intentionality, will be explained. Then a short conclusion follows.
1. Why do we discuss Austin now?
Half a century ago, John Austin gave a series of lectures, the William James
Lectures at Harvard, which were published posthumously as a book entitled
How to Do Things with Words. Austin presented a new picture of analysing meaning; meaning is described in a relation among linguistic conventions correlated with words/sentences, the situation where the speaker actually says something to the hearer, and associated intentions of the speaker. The idea that meaning exists among these relations is depicted successfully by the concept of acts: in uttering a sentence, that is, in utilizing linguistic conventions, the speaker with an associated intention performs a linguistic act to the hearer.
Austin’s analysis of meaning is unique in the sense that meaning is not explained through some forms of reduction. In reductive theories of meaning, complexities of meaning expressed by a sentence are reduced by a single criterion to something else, and this is claimed to be the process of explaining the meaning of the sentence. We can find this reductive «explanation» of meaning typically in Russell: using a logical/mathematical model, Russell reduces the meaning of a sentence to a fact to which
References: 13 Esercizi Filosofici 1, 2006 / Testi Russell, Bertrand, On denoting, «Mind», 14, 1905; reprinted in T.M. Olshewsky (ed.), Problems in the Philosophy of Language, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1969, pp Searle, John R., Vanderveken, Daniel, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. Tarski, Alfred, The semantic conception of truth, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», V, 1944; reprinted in T.M