and to fight the increasing influx of Islamic militants from late June of 2003 until relieved in July 2004. In an area that was once home to over 2 million Iraqis, his brigade struggled to overcome the poor planning and lack of follow through that occurred back in Washington's policy making circles Mansoor analyzes the management of the first year of the U.S.
occupation. He was in the thick of it all, responsible for a section of Baghdad that was repeatedly in the news during the first year. His focus is on the human dimension of the conflict, especially his own soldiers. The entire book his dedicated to Mansoor’s brigade, especially to those who made the ultimate sacrifice. Mansoor’s accounts are tough reading. They are open and forthcoming about the mistakes he made that got people killed and things he did that saved lives. The circumstances around the loss of each soldier, including his Command Sergeant Major Eric Cooke, is carefully detailed. “These soldiers and others made their stand in the cradle of civilization in an effort to ensure that the progress of mankind continues, and that it will be an evolution worthy of the twenty-first century, not the seventh." (xviii) He is not easy on himself or generous with those he served with. Mansoor never sugar coats things or pretends that the best judgement was always used. He talks of prisoner abuse and mistreatment of Iraqis as an ongoing problem. He recounts instances of stupidity he encountered and times when disciplinary actions were required. Mansoor is suggestive of the failings of those in higher positions. He criticizes those in charge of planning and running the
war. Mansoor is the General Raymond Manson Chair of Military History at The Ohio State University. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel that served as executive officer to General David Petraeus. In the first chapter, Mansoor talks about growing up and getting involved with the military. He met his wife, Jana, in El Paso, Texas where they eloped so she could travel with him on his assignments. Mansoor is well equipped to evaluate historical support and decisions about war. He is a unique soldier-scholar that is able to apply perceptive insights from history with a well-trained and analytical mind, with the skills of a senior combat commander. He holds a Master’s and a Ph. D. in Military History from The Ohio State University and a Master’s in Strategic Studies from the Army War College. He has also taught at the Military Academy. Mansoor also served as the founding director of the U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Center at Leavenworth. The last chapter is titled ‘Reflections’ which synthesizes Mansoor’s year of command and provides battle-hardened lessons learned about insurgency. Mansoor presents a need for a greater adaptation of the U.S. Army. The “culture” must change, or the organization will be unprepared to fight and win wars. The United States needs to learn the strategic, operational, tactical, and doctrinal lessons of the Iraq war to prepare for the now and the future.