Basic Argument Analysis

Consequently, if we accept that our beliefs, desires, and predisposed psychological structures, inform our actions, then we are not free to choose them. As a result of this inability to choose, it would be impossible to claim that we are morally responsible for the results of the actions that come from these beliefs, desires, and predisposed psychological structures. In order, “To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly responsible for the way you are – at least in certain crucial mental respects.”1 As suggested by Robert Kane in A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Premise (2) of the Basic Argument is where an objection must be made. According to Kane, “Is it the case that to be truly responsible for what you do, you must be truly responsible for the way you are (for your nature or character)?”2 As Kane suggests, through the examples of Mc Veigh (Oklahoma City Bombing 1995), Dylan, and Klebold (Columbine High School Massacre 1999), we hold these individuals responsible for their acts. The reason we hold them responsible is, “we think they were responsible, at least in part, for becoming the kinds of persons who would commit such acts.”3 Essentially, the
I am now recalling a problematic component in my personal example. Was it not the case that my decision to accept the issued cell phone was a result of my prior beliefs, desires, and predisposed psychological structures? Every time we make a decision to act, to make a choice, we are relying on these prior beliefs, desires, and predisposed psychological structures. Take a moment to consider any act you have taken, or choice you made, about changing something in yourself. This is a common method that people use when making New Years resolutions. You might resolve to loose weight, eat healthier, or go to the gym “x” amount of times a week,