Values have been a central concept in the social sciences since their inception. For both Durkheim (1893, 1897) and Weber (1905), values were crucial for explaining social and personal organization and change. Values have played an important role not only in sociology, but in psychology, anthropology, and related disciplines as well. Values are used to characterize societies and individuals, to trace change over time, and to explain the motivational bases of attitudes and behavior.
Despite or, perhaps, because of the widespread use of values, many different conceptions of this construct have emerged (e.g., Boudon, 2001; Inglehart, 1997; Kohn, 1969; Parsons, 1951; Rokeach 1973). Application of the values construct in the social sciences has suffered, however, from the absence of an agreed-upon conception of basic values, of the content and structure of relations among these values, and of reliable empirical methods to measure them (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). This article presents a theory intended to fill the part of this gap concerned with the values of individuals (Schwartz, 1992, 2005a).
The theory concerns the basic values that people in all cultures recognize. It identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations and specifies the dynamics of conflict and congruence among these values. Some values contradict one another (e.g., benevolence and power) whereas others are compatible (e.g., conformity and security). The "structure" of values refers to these relations of conflict and congruence among values, not to their relative importance. If value structures are similar across culturally diverse groups, this would suggest that there is a universal organization of human motivations. Of course, even if the types of human motivation that values express and the structure of relations among them are universal, individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute to their values. That is,