Battle Of Cambrai Research Paper
The Battle of Cambrai, from the 20th November to the 7th December 1917, was the first British campaign in World War One that tanks were used successfully by demonstrating the fact that the Hindenburg line could be penetrated. The town of Cambrai is in the North of France near the border between France and Germany. By 1917, Cambrai had become one of the most important railheads and HQ towns behind the German lines. In front of it lay the immensely powerful Siegfried Stellung - better known to the British as the Hindenburg Line. So strong was the defensive position here that German Divisions decimated during the Third Battle of Ypres were sent here to recuperate and refit. It included two lines of fortifications, with barbed wire belts tens of yards wide, concrete emplacements and underground works. A third parallel line was also under construction.
The initial plan proposed by J.F.C. Fuller in June of 1917 and almost simultaneously proposed by Henry Hugh Tudor, was that the tanks would sweep around the back of Cambrai and encircle the German forces. Both plans were taken up by the commander of the British Third Army, Julian Byng and the final plan was approved by Douglas Haig in September 1917 after another failure at Ypres. The plan was quite complex but basically the …show more content…
German line would be broken by a concentrated attack across a narrow front between the Canal de Nord and the St. Quentin canal. Cambrai would then be encircled and Boulon Ridge would be captured. Fuller had initially reported that the raid was "to destroy demoralize and disorganize and not to capture ground." (Fuller, 1917) By the time that focus had shifted from Ypres to Cambrai the raid had become a full sized assault.
The Tank Corps deployed its entire strength of 476 tanks, of which 350 were armed fighting tanks. They were led by the Tank Corps GOC, Hugh Elles, in an Mk IV tank called Hilda'. Supporting the tanks attack was 1000 guns of the Royal Artillery and 14 newly formed squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps. The attack opened at 6.20am with an intensive predicted fire barrage on the Hindenburg Line and key points to the rear, which caught the Germans by surprise. Initially, this was followed by the curtain of a creeping barrage behind which the tanks and infantry followed. The 20th Division captured La Vacquerie after a hard fight and then advanced as far as Les Rues Vertes and Masnieres where there was a bridge crossing the St Quentin Canal. Securing the bridge was going to be vital for the 2nd Cavalry Division, planning to move up to the east of Cambrai. However, the weight of the first tank to cross the bridge, 'Flying Fox', broke its back. Infantry could cross slowly by a lock gate a couple of hundred yards away, but the intended cavalry advance was effectively halted.
General Erich Ludendorff, commanding the German armies, ordered an immediate counter-attack only to learn that it would take 48 hours for German reserves to arrive. So serious was the situation that Ludendorff was forced to consider an extensive withdrawal along the whole of the Cambrai front. The success of the attack had taken the British General Staff by surprise also. In fact they could not believe it and much valuable time was wasted while they received confirmatory reports dispatched from the front. The whole of the morning's objectives, with one important exception, had been taken with relative ease. The advancing infantry too could not believe their luck and many failed to keep up with the advancing tanks, wishing instead to remain in the comfort of the captured trench systems. Many were far better built and equipped than those they had just recently left behind. This resulted in some tanks having to retire due to the lack of infantry support.
The way should now have been clear for the 1st Cavalry Division to pass through the village of Flesquieres, which was in the centre of the attack, and take advantage of the gap punched through the lines. But it was at Flesquieres that the one holdup of the morning had occurred. The attack in that sector had been left to General Harper and his 51st Highland Division. Harper ignored the recommended tactics of the Tank Corps and this led to tragic results on the Flesquieres ridge. Harper's men advanced with the tanks and captured the Hindenburg Line by 8.30am. The Germans were in full retreat, as they were elsewhere along the front. He let his men rest for an hour before continuing the attack. When he did renew his attack, he did so by keeping his infantry well behind the tanks. This left the infantry unprotected and, when met by a hail of machine gun bullets, they were forced to retreat. Meanwhile, unaware of the infantry's plight, the tanks pressed on towards the crest of the ridge. The tanks were now unprotected by the infantry, and they too became easy targets for the German guns until, one by one, all 16 were picked off.
By the end of the day, however, the British had achieved a remarkable success but it could have been more decisive. The Germans evacuated Flesquieres under the cover of darkness and, whilst the advance continued the following day, it was beginning to run out of steam. Of the 476 tanks put into action the morning before, 179 were now knocked out. The remainder had been fighting, continually, for almost 16 hours, and was in much need of maintenance work. The British had still failed to reach the heights of the Bourlon Ridge. When the battle was renewed on the 21st the pace of the British advance was greatly slowed. The abandoned Flesquieres was captured in the very early morning but in general the British took to reinforcing their gains rather than expanding. Even though the Germans had taken out the other Cavalry Divisions trying to enter the Bourlon Woods, Haig still wanted Bourlon Ridge. The 40th Division, which had replaced the 62nd Division, were supported by almost a hundred tanks and 430 guns. The Germans had put two division of Gruppe Arras on the ridge with another two in reserve, Gruppe Caudry was reinforced and to challenge the Royal Flying Corps.
The Germans, on the other hand, were now beginning to see the arrival of their fresh reserves and the defenses around Cambrai were being strengthened. Haig did not see the danger; he did not wish to halt at this time and so the offensive continued. On the morning of the 30th November, whilst the British were carrying out an orderly withdrawal, the Germans unleashed their counter-attack at 0700. Almost immediately the majority of III Corps were heavily engaged. The initial speed of the German infantries advance was completely unexpected by the British. In the south the German advance spread across eight miles and came within a few miles of the vital village of Metz and its link to Bourlon. At Bourlon itself the men under Otto von Moser met with stiff resistance. The British had assigned eight Divisions worth of fire support to the ridge and the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Despite this the Germans closed and there was fierce fighting. British units displayed reckless determination one group of eight British machine guns fired over 70,000 rounds in their efforts to stem the German advance around Bourlon. By the following day the impetus of the German advance was lost, but continued pressure on 3rd December led to the German capture of La Vacquerie and the withdrawal of the British from the east of the St. Quentin canal. The Germans had by then formed a line looping from the ridge at Quentin to near Marcoing.
On 3rd December Haig ordered a retreat and by the 7th all the British gains were abandoned except for a portion of the Hindenburg Line around Havrincourt, Ribecourt and Flesquieres.
The Germans had exchanged this territorial loss for a sweep of land to the south of Welsh ridge. The total casualties for both sides were around 45,000 each with 11,000 Germans and 9,000 British taken prisoner. In terms of territory the Germans had recovered the early losses and a little more. Despite the outcome, the battle was seen as evidence that even the strongest trench defenses could be overcome. The British had seen the advantage of tanks while the German command had seen the potential of new infantry
tactics.
There are different views on the outcome of the Battle of Cambrai. Some believe that it was the best battle in World War One, while some question whether it was worth the gamble of British lives to try to capture Cambrai and the Bourlon Woods. One Captain believed: "The Battle of Cambrai ranks as one of the most thrilling episodes of the whole war. Tanks at last came into their kingdom. The notion that the Hindenburg Line was impregnable was exploded." (Gillon, 1925) Whereas one soldier believed it to be: "a highly speculative gamble which I find inexplicable, so out of character is it with the rest of Haig's career, not because it was inventive but because it was haphazard, not thought through. It was a harum-scarum affair, ill-planned and feebly directed, yet in military history it stands as the most significant battle of the First World War." (Carrington, 1965)
The initial plan proposed by J.F.C. Fuller in June of 1917 and almost simultaneously proposed by Henry Hugh Tudor, was that the tanks would sweep around the back of Cambrai and encircle the German forces. Both plans were taken up by the commander of the British Third Army, Julian Byng and the final plan was approved by Douglas Haig in September 1917 after another failure at Ypres. The plan was quite complex but basically the …show more content…
German line would be broken by a concentrated attack across a narrow front between the Canal de Nord and the St. Quentin canal. Cambrai would then be encircled and Boulon Ridge would be captured. Fuller had initially reported that the raid was "to destroy demoralize and disorganize and not to capture ground." (Fuller, 1917) By the time that focus had shifted from Ypres to Cambrai the raid had become a full sized assault.
The Tank Corps deployed its entire strength of 476 tanks, of which 350 were armed fighting tanks. They were led by the Tank Corps GOC, Hugh Elles, in an Mk IV tank called Hilda'. Supporting the tanks attack was 1000 guns of the Royal Artillery and 14 newly formed squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps. The attack opened at 6.20am with an intensive predicted fire barrage on the Hindenburg Line and key points to the rear, which caught the Germans by surprise. Initially, this was followed by the curtain of a creeping barrage behind which the tanks and infantry followed. The 20th Division captured La Vacquerie after a hard fight and then advanced as far as Les Rues Vertes and Masnieres where there was a bridge crossing the St Quentin Canal. Securing the bridge was going to be vital for the 2nd Cavalry Division, planning to move up to the east of Cambrai. However, the weight of the first tank to cross the bridge, 'Flying Fox', broke its back. Infantry could cross slowly by a lock gate a couple of hundred yards away, but the intended cavalry advance was effectively halted.
General Erich Ludendorff, commanding the German armies, ordered an immediate counter-attack only to learn that it would take 48 hours for German reserves to arrive. So serious was the situation that Ludendorff was forced to consider an extensive withdrawal along the whole of the Cambrai front. The success of the attack had taken the British General Staff by surprise also. In fact they could not believe it and much valuable time was wasted while they received confirmatory reports dispatched from the front. The whole of the morning's objectives, with one important exception, had been taken with relative ease. The advancing infantry too could not believe their luck and many failed to keep up with the advancing tanks, wishing instead to remain in the comfort of the captured trench systems. Many were far better built and equipped than those they had just recently left behind. This resulted in some tanks having to retire due to the lack of infantry support.
The way should now have been clear for the 1st Cavalry Division to pass through the village of Flesquieres, which was in the centre of the attack, and take advantage of the gap punched through the lines. But it was at Flesquieres that the one holdup of the morning had occurred. The attack in that sector had been left to General Harper and his 51st Highland Division. Harper ignored the recommended tactics of the Tank Corps and this led to tragic results on the Flesquieres ridge. Harper's men advanced with the tanks and captured the Hindenburg Line by 8.30am. The Germans were in full retreat, as they were elsewhere along the front. He let his men rest for an hour before continuing the attack. When he did renew his attack, he did so by keeping his infantry well behind the tanks. This left the infantry unprotected and, when met by a hail of machine gun bullets, they were forced to retreat. Meanwhile, unaware of the infantry's plight, the tanks pressed on towards the crest of the ridge. The tanks were now unprotected by the infantry, and they too became easy targets for the German guns until, one by one, all 16 were picked off.
By the end of the day, however, the British had achieved a remarkable success but it could have been more decisive. The Germans evacuated Flesquieres under the cover of darkness and, whilst the advance continued the following day, it was beginning to run out of steam. Of the 476 tanks put into action the morning before, 179 were now knocked out. The remainder had been fighting, continually, for almost 16 hours, and was in much need of maintenance work. The British had still failed to reach the heights of the Bourlon Ridge. When the battle was renewed on the 21st the pace of the British advance was greatly slowed. The abandoned Flesquieres was captured in the very early morning but in general the British took to reinforcing their gains rather than expanding. Even though the Germans had taken out the other Cavalry Divisions trying to enter the Bourlon Woods, Haig still wanted Bourlon Ridge. The 40th Division, which had replaced the 62nd Division, were supported by almost a hundred tanks and 430 guns. The Germans had put two division of Gruppe Arras on the ridge with another two in reserve, Gruppe Caudry was reinforced and to challenge the Royal Flying Corps.
The Germans, on the other hand, were now beginning to see the arrival of their fresh reserves and the defenses around Cambrai were being strengthened. Haig did not see the danger; he did not wish to halt at this time and so the offensive continued. On the morning of the 30th November, whilst the British were carrying out an orderly withdrawal, the Germans unleashed their counter-attack at 0700. Almost immediately the majority of III Corps were heavily engaged. The initial speed of the German infantries advance was completely unexpected by the British. In the south the German advance spread across eight miles and came within a few miles of the vital village of Metz and its link to Bourlon. At Bourlon itself the men under Otto von Moser met with stiff resistance. The British had assigned eight Divisions worth of fire support to the ridge and the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Despite this the Germans closed and there was fierce fighting. British units displayed reckless determination one group of eight British machine guns fired over 70,000 rounds in their efforts to stem the German advance around Bourlon. By the following day the impetus of the German advance was lost, but continued pressure on 3rd December led to the German capture of La Vacquerie and the withdrawal of the British from the east of the St. Quentin canal. The Germans had by then formed a line looping from the ridge at Quentin to near Marcoing.
On 3rd December Haig ordered a retreat and by the 7th all the British gains were abandoned except for a portion of the Hindenburg Line around Havrincourt, Ribecourt and Flesquieres.
The Germans had exchanged this territorial loss for a sweep of land to the south of Welsh ridge. The total casualties for both sides were around 45,000 each with 11,000 Germans and 9,000 British taken prisoner. In terms of territory the Germans had recovered the early losses and a little more. Despite the outcome, the battle was seen as evidence that even the strongest trench defenses could be overcome. The British had seen the advantage of tanks while the German command had seen the potential of new infantry
tactics.
There are different views on the outcome of the Battle of Cambrai. Some believe that it was the best battle in World War One, while some question whether it was worth the gamble of British lives to try to capture Cambrai and the Bourlon Woods. One Captain believed: "The Battle of Cambrai ranks as one of the most thrilling episodes of the whole war. Tanks at last came into their kingdom. The notion that the Hindenburg Line was impregnable was exploded." (Gillon, 1925) Whereas one soldier believed it to be: "a highly speculative gamble which I find inexplicable, so out of character is it with the rest of Haig's career, not because it was inventive but because it was haphazard, not thought through. It was a harum-scarum affair, ill-planned and feebly directed, yet in military history it stands as the most significant battle of the First World War." (Carrington, 1965)