Battle Of Corregidor Battle Analysis
The purpose of this paper is to clearly apply the steps of battle analysis to evaluate the Battle of Corregidor and provide an alternate outcome based from the addition of intelligence variables discussed throughout this paper. The Japanese would have won the battle, if they properly analyzed the geography of the island. The Battle of Corregidor paved way for allied vessels to reenter the Philippines during World War II. Corregidor is the main entrance for Manila Bay and protected the Philippines for 300 years. Japanese had a clear advantage during the Battle of Corregidor ever since they have seized it from General Wainwright and eventually capturing the entire Philippine Archipelago. Corregidor is one of the biggest islands that provides
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the best strategic defense for any amphibious attacks to Manila Bay, the gateway to the Philippines. The island is less than a one square mile and the area is shape like a tadpole. It is about 6300 meters long and with the western part, Topside, approximately 2100 meters. It rose from narrow beaches forming rock cliffs and ravines which provided a dominating terrain. The isthmus where the head joins the tail was known as Bottomside. Corregidor was deeply dug in with powerful coastal artillery, consisting of 23 batteries of 56 guns ranging from 3" (76mm) to 12" (305mm) caliber. The weather favored a combined airborne and amphibious operation. It was during the dry season but sudden rain showers could be expected but usually light and brief. Visibility is conducive for an airborne assault. Corregidor’s defense was led by Captain Akira Itakagi, Senior Staff Officer, 31st Special Base Force and Lieutenant Commander Shoichi Koyameda staff officer, Southwest Area Fleet, commanded the surface special attack unit.
He commanded approximately 6000 Japanese soldiers who consisted of survivors from Battle of Leyte and various types of army and naval units which were not suited for ground combat. Most of them were under provisional basis and it was not organized as an effective fighting force. 3000 were disposed in prepared positions on the defensive perimeter of the island. Command and Control was positioned at the Topside and communications were wired through different ravine strong points and were never backed up. The remaining forces were concentrated in the Malinta Hill and Tunnel the tunnel system. 31st Special Base Force was also posted to the island as lockouts for antisubmarine patrols. They also added a surface special attack unit with 70 suicide boats. Captain Itakagi’s men were ready but only for an amphibious assault. He is aware of the U.S. Army Airborne Assault doctrine and disregarded the possibility of such …show more content…
attack. LT COL George M. Jones led the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team (PRCT) and LT COL Edward M. Postlethwait led 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment from the 24th Infantry Division on the impending assault on the island. LT COL Jones had approximately 3000 paratroopers ready to drop on the initial assault on the island. U.S. planners knew that a full amphibious assault will be costly and was proven when the Japanese half of their initial assault on the Fall of Corregidor. Topside can cover under fire any logical sites for any amphibious attacks while Malinta hill covered troop landings in the tail side of the island.
U.S. planners made multiple aerial reconnaissance of the island to determine the best course of action for the attack. Planners determined a combined airborne assault and amphibious attack will have more suitable outcome. LT COL Jones made a personal aerial reconnaissance in the determination of drop zones in the area. With the aerial reconnaissance, U.S. planners determined that Kindley field, a prewar landing strip, was only one really suitable dropping ground on Corregidor on the central part of the tail. The area was small and was overgrown due to inactivity. General Krueger, one of the planners, overruled the proposal to land on the strip. He determined that paratroopers will succumb under heavy fire. The only other possible locations for dropping paratroopers were a parade ground and a golf course on Topside, which was otherwise nearly covered by the ruins of prewar barracks, officers' homes, headquarters buildings, gun positions, and other artillery installations. The parade ground provided a drop zone--that is, an area not dotted with damaged buildings and other obstacles--325 yards long and 250 yards wide; the sloping golf course landing area was roughly 350 yards long and 185 yards wide. Both were overgrown and entangled with a lot of debris. Despite the disadvantages, planners decided that a drop on the Topside of the island will be a complete surprise for the enemy.
Planners had factored in wind direction and velocity, the speed of flight direction of C-47 aircraft and the time the paratroopers will drop. They also calculated possible drift during the descent of the paratroopers. Planners knew they are violating the airborne experts’ effect to ground warfare’s principal of mass which is to get maximum forces on the ground with minimum time. It will take hours instead of minutes in order to land enough paratroopers to effectively secure the island’s defenses.
U.S. Army Air Force aircraft commenced aerial attack striking Japanese defenders of the island. They were soon joined by the U.S. Navy warship with the bombardment of Corregidor on February 13. Japanese counter fire and damage some Allied ships offshore. On the morning of February 16, U.S. Thirteenth Air Forces started to commence dropping of 503rd PRCT paratroopers on hill tops. The first echelon of paratroopers, from 3 Battalion, 503 Parachute Regiment, began jumping at 0830. Mostly hitting the landing zones, but a few had to be rescued from minor injuries, and one group of 25 paratroops serendipitously came down on top of Captain Itagaki's position, surprising and killing him. The death of Captain Itakagi destroyed the command and control of the Japanese defenders almost from the beginning of the battle. The destruction of headquarters also disrupted the Japanese cohesion during the defense of Corregidor against the U.S. forces. Communication was destroyed for a unified defense against the amphibious attacks. As the paratroopers were landing, Postlethwait’s men began the assault on the Black Beach near San Jose. They met resistance with a small group of Japanese which will eventually maneuver into the Malinta tunnel. The linkup of 503rd paratroopers and Postlethwait’s men trapped most Japanese defenders and divided the Japanese forces between different tunnel systems.
On the night of February 19, approximately 500 Japanese defenders emerged from Battery Smith and mounted a counterattack on 503rd PRCT troops near Battery Hearn which was known as the Battle of Banzai Point. The Battle of Banzai point was the last major counter attack of the Japanese on the island. Japanese continued to conduct sporadic attacks but was completely defeated and remaining forces chose to commit suicide instead of surrendering inside the tunnel systems. It took U.S. forces 10 days to completely reduce the Japanese forces and re-open Manila to Allied forces.
The utilization of aerial reconnaissance and determination of an airborne assault deemed significant to the outcome during the Battle of Corregidor. The sheer determination to locate a possible drop zones on the island was momentous. U.S. forces clearly analyzed the island’s characteristic and adapted to it. The success of 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT with the destruction of the command and control of the Japanese forces allowed a successful amphibious assault overcoming the enemy’s defenses. The linkup between the airborne assault forces and the amphibious assault was also one of the critical moments to the success of the mission.
The Japanese defenses completely neglected a possibility of an airborne operation. Captain Itakagi’s island’s defenses were for amphibious and troop landing attack on the beaches of the island. He was also familiar with the U.S. airborne doctrine and tactics and disregarded it with his own assumptions that the island was not conducive for a complete airborne operation. It was clear that Japanese defenses were not ready for any airborne envelopment. Since their command and control was destroyed due to the airborne assault, Japanese could not initiate an effective counterattack against the enemy forces.
Captain Itakagi should have prepared for an anti-airborne defense as directed by his superiors and would have been a critical during the battle. The U.S. forces were already operating on a bad intelligence that Japanese defenses in Corregidor were only 850 strong instead of 6000. Captain Itakagi used his aerial reconnaissance but only determined that the island has only one drop zone and it was completely overgrown. The critical analysis on the terrain feature of island was lacking. He immediately disregarded the attack based on his own assumptions and neglected his superiors orders. The outcome would have been different if the 503rd paratrooper weren’t able to destroy the command and control of the Japanese defenses.
If the Japanese were victorious during the Battle of Corregidor, General MacArthur and the allied forces would have not been able to retake the Philippines.
The island of Corregidor has been a critical funnel for allied supply lines into the Philippine Archipelago. The campaign in the Philippines would have continued a couple more years and even weakened the U.S. forces. A complete failure on the attack on the Corregidor would have been catastrophic and extremely deteriorated the Allied forces. More resources would have been exhausted for the retaking of the key position and prevented the missions into the Philippines. It could have prevented the seizure of the entire archipelago back into U.S.
command.
In conclusion, the Battle of Corregidor of 1945 would have been a victory for the Japanese if only they have concocted a plan that integrated an anti-airborne operation. The misinformation of enemy’s strength would have been critical for the US if they only planned for an amphibious assault. With the destruction of the command and control due to an incredible airborne operation, the U.S. forces were able to divide the island defenses and eventually overcome every counterattack. The division of forces also led to Japanese self-immolation instead of organizing an efficient attack.
the best strategic defense for any amphibious attacks to Manila Bay, the gateway to the Philippines. The island is less than a one square mile and the area is shape like a tadpole. It is about 6300 meters long and with the western part, Topside, approximately 2100 meters. It rose from narrow beaches forming rock cliffs and ravines which provided a dominating terrain. The isthmus where the head joins the tail was known as Bottomside. Corregidor was deeply dug in with powerful coastal artillery, consisting of 23 batteries of 56 guns ranging from 3" (76mm) to 12" (305mm) caliber. The weather favored a combined airborne and amphibious operation. It was during the dry season but sudden rain showers could be expected but usually light and brief. Visibility is conducive for an airborne assault. Corregidor’s defense was led by Captain Akira Itakagi, Senior Staff Officer, 31st Special Base Force and Lieutenant Commander Shoichi Koyameda staff officer, Southwest Area Fleet, commanded the surface special attack unit.
He commanded approximately 6000 Japanese soldiers who consisted of survivors from Battle of Leyte and various types of army and naval units which were not suited for ground combat. Most of them were under provisional basis and it was not organized as an effective fighting force. 3000 were disposed in prepared positions on the defensive perimeter of the island. Command and Control was positioned at the Topside and communications were wired through different ravine strong points and were never backed up. The remaining forces were concentrated in the Malinta Hill and Tunnel the tunnel system. 31st Special Base Force was also posted to the island as lockouts for antisubmarine patrols. They also added a surface special attack unit with 70 suicide boats. Captain Itakagi’s men were ready but only for an amphibious assault. He is aware of the U.S. Army Airborne Assault doctrine and disregarded the possibility of such …show more content…
attack. LT COL George M. Jones led the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team (PRCT) and LT COL Edward M. Postlethwait led 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment from the 24th Infantry Division on the impending assault on the island. LT COL Jones had approximately 3000 paratroopers ready to drop on the initial assault on the island. U.S. planners knew that a full amphibious assault will be costly and was proven when the Japanese half of their initial assault on the Fall of Corregidor. Topside can cover under fire any logical sites for any amphibious attacks while Malinta hill covered troop landings in the tail side of the island.
U.S. planners made multiple aerial reconnaissance of the island to determine the best course of action for the attack. Planners determined a combined airborne assault and amphibious attack will have more suitable outcome. LT COL Jones made a personal aerial reconnaissance in the determination of drop zones in the area. With the aerial reconnaissance, U.S. planners determined that Kindley field, a prewar landing strip, was only one really suitable dropping ground on Corregidor on the central part of the tail. The area was small and was overgrown due to inactivity. General Krueger, one of the planners, overruled the proposal to land on the strip. He determined that paratroopers will succumb under heavy fire. The only other possible locations for dropping paratroopers were a parade ground and a golf course on Topside, which was otherwise nearly covered by the ruins of prewar barracks, officers' homes, headquarters buildings, gun positions, and other artillery installations. The parade ground provided a drop zone--that is, an area not dotted with damaged buildings and other obstacles--325 yards long and 250 yards wide; the sloping golf course landing area was roughly 350 yards long and 185 yards wide. Both were overgrown and entangled with a lot of debris. Despite the disadvantages, planners decided that a drop on the Topside of the island will be a complete surprise for the enemy.
Planners had factored in wind direction and velocity, the speed of flight direction of C-47 aircraft and the time the paratroopers will drop. They also calculated possible drift during the descent of the paratroopers. Planners knew they are violating the airborne experts’ effect to ground warfare’s principal of mass which is to get maximum forces on the ground with minimum time. It will take hours instead of minutes in order to land enough paratroopers to effectively secure the island’s defenses.
U.S. Army Air Force aircraft commenced aerial attack striking Japanese defenders of the island. They were soon joined by the U.S. Navy warship with the bombardment of Corregidor on February 13. Japanese counter fire and damage some Allied ships offshore. On the morning of February 16, U.S. Thirteenth Air Forces started to commence dropping of 503rd PRCT paratroopers on hill tops. The first echelon of paratroopers, from 3 Battalion, 503 Parachute Regiment, began jumping at 0830. Mostly hitting the landing zones, but a few had to be rescued from minor injuries, and one group of 25 paratroops serendipitously came down on top of Captain Itagaki's position, surprising and killing him. The death of Captain Itakagi destroyed the command and control of the Japanese defenders almost from the beginning of the battle. The destruction of headquarters also disrupted the Japanese cohesion during the defense of Corregidor against the U.S. forces. Communication was destroyed for a unified defense against the amphibious attacks. As the paratroopers were landing, Postlethwait’s men began the assault on the Black Beach near San Jose. They met resistance with a small group of Japanese which will eventually maneuver into the Malinta tunnel. The linkup of 503rd paratroopers and Postlethwait’s men trapped most Japanese defenders and divided the Japanese forces between different tunnel systems.
On the night of February 19, approximately 500 Japanese defenders emerged from Battery Smith and mounted a counterattack on 503rd PRCT troops near Battery Hearn which was known as the Battle of Banzai Point. The Battle of Banzai point was the last major counter attack of the Japanese on the island. Japanese continued to conduct sporadic attacks but was completely defeated and remaining forces chose to commit suicide instead of surrendering inside the tunnel systems. It took U.S. forces 10 days to completely reduce the Japanese forces and re-open Manila to Allied forces.
The utilization of aerial reconnaissance and determination of an airborne assault deemed significant to the outcome during the Battle of Corregidor. The sheer determination to locate a possible drop zones on the island was momentous. U.S. forces clearly analyzed the island’s characteristic and adapted to it. The success of 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT with the destruction of the command and control of the Japanese forces allowed a successful amphibious assault overcoming the enemy’s defenses. The linkup between the airborne assault forces and the amphibious assault was also one of the critical moments to the success of the mission.
The Japanese defenses completely neglected a possibility of an airborne operation. Captain Itakagi’s island’s defenses were for amphibious and troop landing attack on the beaches of the island. He was also familiar with the U.S. airborne doctrine and tactics and disregarded it with his own assumptions that the island was not conducive for a complete airborne operation. It was clear that Japanese defenses were not ready for any airborne envelopment. Since their command and control was destroyed due to the airborne assault, Japanese could not initiate an effective counterattack against the enemy forces.
Captain Itakagi should have prepared for an anti-airborne defense as directed by his superiors and would have been a critical during the battle. The U.S. forces were already operating on a bad intelligence that Japanese defenses in Corregidor were only 850 strong instead of 6000. Captain Itakagi used his aerial reconnaissance but only determined that the island has only one drop zone and it was completely overgrown. The critical analysis on the terrain feature of island was lacking. He immediately disregarded the attack based on his own assumptions and neglected his superiors orders. The outcome would have been different if the 503rd paratrooper weren’t able to destroy the command and control of the Japanese defenses.
If the Japanese were victorious during the Battle of Corregidor, General MacArthur and the allied forces would have not been able to retake the Philippines.
The island of Corregidor has been a critical funnel for allied supply lines into the Philippine Archipelago. The campaign in the Philippines would have continued a couple more years and even weakened the U.S. forces. A complete failure on the attack on the Corregidor would have been catastrophic and extremely deteriorated the Allied forces. More resources would have been exhausted for the retaking of the key position and prevented the missions into the Philippines. It could have prevented the seizure of the entire archipelago back into U.S.
command.
In conclusion, the Battle of Corregidor of 1945 would have been a victory for the Japanese if only they have concocted a plan that integrated an anti-airborne operation. The misinformation of enemy’s strength would have been critical for the US if they only planned for an amphibious assault. With the destruction of the command and control due to an incredible airborne operation, the U.S. forces were able to divide the island defenses and eventually overcome every counterattack. The division of forces also led to Japanese self-immolation instead of organizing an efficient attack.