Battle Of Gettysburg Essay
Introduction
Throughout early American history we see a country struggling to define itself. The Revolutionary War, followed shortly after by the War of 1812, secured America’s freedom from foreign powers but left a country of loosely gathered states that were, quite often, at odds with one another. Following the Mexican American War, The Civil War brought to culmination events that would forever change the political and social landscape of our great nation. Gettysburg effectively ended the Confederate Army’s offensive capabilities and essentially ended the war. General Lee’s ego and his desire to crush the Union Army on the field of battle led to the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. Victories just prior to the main battle exhausted his men …show more content…
and helped to contribute to the defeat.
The Men in Charge of The Army of Northern Virginia
General Robert E. Lee, a white bearded man with a red face, fifty-seven years of age, was short in stature at five feet tall, but is short in the legs so when he sits upon a horse he seems taller. Lee does not support slavery, however, he also does not believe that the Africans are capable of being equal to white men at their current stage of development. He has no vices. He doesn’t drink, smoke, gamble or chase women. He does not lose his temper or his faith. He is the most beloved man in either Army (Shaara, 1974).
Lieutenant General James Longstreet, forty-two years of age. He is Lee’s second in command, a large man with blue eyes. Slow talking and crude, he opposes the invasion of Pennsylvania and lets Lee know of his disapproval. Once the invasion begins he is no longer opposed to it because of the reassurances that Lee gives him. He will always speak his mind. Becomes Lee’s right hand man after the death of Stonewall Jackson; Lee affectionately calls him “my old warhorse.” In command of the Confederate I Corps (Shaara, 1974).
Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, forty-six years of age, is bald and missing a leg due to the Second Bull Run Campaign which caused a nine month absence in order for him to heal. He served under Stonewall Jackson. After Jackson’s death, Lee places Ewell in charge of the Confederate II Corps, which is comprised of roughly 20,000 of Jackson’s former command (Shaara, 1974).
Major General Ambrose Powell Hill, thirty-seven years of age, is an impatient and ill-tempered man but makes up for this in his fierce fighting ability. Has been reprimanded for attacking without orders several times before. He commands the remnants of Stonewall Jackson’s former command, the newly formed Confederate III Corps (Shaara, 1974).
Lieutenant General J.E.B. Stuart, thirty years of age, is a gaudy man who loves to read about himself in the newspapers (Weber, 1994). He thinks much of himself and as he should for he literally rides circles around the Union Cavalry with his own cavalry brigades. He is responsible for providing Lee and his army vital information about the enemy’s whereabouts (Shaara, 1974).
The Men in Charge of the Union Army
Major General John Buford, thirty-seven years of age. Buford is given command of two brigades of cavalry and ordered to discover the main body of the Confederate troops under Lee while reporting their movements. He is the first segment of the Union Army to enter Gettysburg. Buford also has an eye for terrain and immediately notices the hills surrounding Gettysburg, making notations of where to establish skirmish lines (Shaara, 1974). Major General George Gordon Meade, forty-seven years of age. Meade is a bad tempered and somewhat vain individual. He takes command of the Army of the Potomac just two days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade wanted to hold a grand review of the Army but had to postpone this action in order to rally a defensive line along Pipe Creek in the hopes that Lee would meet him on his own terms (Shaara, 1974). General Joseph Hooker, forty-nine years of age. While successful earlier in his military career, Hooker failed miserably at Chancellorsville to stop General Lee. Following the loss, the federal government, and even his own men lost faith in his abilities. Hooker tries to bluff President Lincoln and Congress by tendering his resignation in order to press an attack against the Confederate Army, but to his surprise it is accepted just days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Hooker’s actions left Major General Meade a mess to clean up within his former command (Clark, 1987).
The Battles Leading to Gettysburg
Of the battles leading up to Gettysburg, Brandy Station and the Confederate advances north into Maryland and Pennsylvania were the direct causes of the Confederate loss at Gettysburg.
By over extending themselves and pressing their supplies to the limits, the Confederates were exhausted prior to the main battle at Gettysburg. Coupled with Lee’s discretionary orders to his subordinates and his inability to micro-manage his troops, the Confederates were on the path to destruction.
At Brandy Station, Jeb Stuart was caught unaware by a Union Cavalry advancement that was sent to destroy him outright. The Union Cavalry was lead by Brigadier General Pleasonton who was order by General Hooker to attack and destroy Stuart’s forces in the area. On June 9th, 1863, Pleasonton and his men crossed the Rappahannock River in order to assault the Confederate Cavalry units in the area (Clark, 1987). In the corresponding battle that took place, the Union Cavalry was able to catch the Confederates off guard and tarnished Jeb Stuart’s flawless cavalry record. The Battle of Brandy Station ended in a Confederate victory but it also showed the Union Cavalry that Stuart’s forces were not invincible, as they had once thought (Clark, 1987). This battle demoralized Stuart to an extent. He often claimed that the newspapers were wrong and that he was never caught off guard, and to an extent he was correct. Stuart had successfully screened Pleasanton and his men who were never able to ascertain the whereabouts of the main body of the Confederate
Army.
On the afternoon of June 10th, the day after the cavalry clash, Lee ordered Ewell’s II Corps into the northern Shenandoah Valley in order to attack the garrisoned troops located in Winchester, Virginia. At the Battle of Winchester, there were three forts located within the area, with the westernmost fort over shadowing the other two. Ewell used the tactical advantage of the wood nearest the fort in order to attack and overcome it. With the Western Fort captured and its guns being pointed at the other two, Winchester fell quickly to the Confederate forces in the area and was captured by June 14th (Clark, 1987). The Confederates kept up this fevered pace of advancement and actually travelled through Gettysburg before the main battle. The Confederate movements took them through many of the towns and cites of the area where they captured supplies and food for their army. The advancement reached Carlisle, Pennsylvania, led by Ewell who looked upon Harrisburg as easy pickings, but was recalled by Lee to march south once again into Gettysburg. During this time General Lee gave the fateful order to Jeb Stuart to harass the enemy as long as General Hooker’s troops remained inactive south of the Potomac. Jeb Stuart is believed to have taken artistic freedom in interpreting this message and for eight days Lee was blind to the movements of the Union Army.
The Battle of Gettysburg
On the night of June 28, a Confederate spy, by the name of Harrison, entered Longstreet’s camp. Soon after meeting with Longstreet, Harrison was brought before Lee. Harrison reported Federal troop movements heading towards South Mountain, on the other side of which lays the Cumberland Valley and Lee’s supply lines (Clark, 1987). After much thinking, Lee finally decided to go with the spy’s reports, as he had no other information on which to go upon with Jeb Stuart’s absence. This was a failure on Lee 's behalf, as he had at his disposal a number of cavalry men that he could have sent out for reconnaissance. Instead, Lee chose to explicitly rely on Stuart’s information about the enemy that would never come. General Lee gave the order to cease northern advancement and to hold the line in order to stop any further Federal western advancement. By this time General Hooker had finally managed to move his troops north and by June 27th, the Union Army had finally crossed the Potomac River. This was Hooker’s last few hours of command before Major General Meade was sent to replace him. When General Hooker asked permission of General in Chief Halleck to remove his troops from Maryland Heights, a defensive position above Harper’s Ferry, he was denied this course of action. General Hooker decided to, at this time, attempt to force his decision by offering his resignation as commander of the Army of the Potomac, to his surprise it was accepted. Major General Meade took immediate control of an army in which the commanding officer simply walked away without telling him of the disposition of the troops or any of the current planning. As a man of action, Meade immediately decided to move the army towards Frederick, Maryland, and formulated a strategy on the way. He continued to march his men north towards the Maryland-Pennsylvania border into Westminster. At this point he sent John Buford’s cavalry division further north and into Gettysburg. Once in Gettysburg, Buford immediately ordered his men to take up defensive positions on Seminary Ridge after a minor confrontation with a confederate raiding party. Buford immediately recognized the hills surrounding and in Gettysburg as an advantage that he must hold on to in order to keep the Federal troops from being destroyed. If the Confederates had reorganized and pressed their early advantages here, they would have had complete control over Gettysburg before Meade would have been able to arrive. Instead, not wanting to engage the enemy, Lee’s vague orders led to a Confederate withdrawal from Gettysburg. The following morning after Buford had setup his troops, July 1st, the Confederates returned en mass, expecting to find simple militia comprised of the local townspeople. Instead they found two brigades of well-trained cavalry troops armed with breech loading carbines. Buford held his defensive positions until two infantry regiments led by Major General John Reynolds relieved him. Reynolds sent word to Meade of the fight occurring at Gettysburg and vowed to make the enemy pay for every inch of ground. Soon after Reynolds joined the battle he was shot off of his horse and killed leaving his troops without a leader. By only following the orders that were given to them, Reynolds’ troops were able to capture, wound or kill roughly twenty-three hundred Confederate troops before being repulsed and sent into a general retreat away from Seminary Ridge (Davis, 1995). This fighting exhausted A.P. Hill’s men, who could no longer pursue the enemy that day. The fighting seemed to make A.P. Hill sick, which happened often to him before a major battle. General Lee was actually surprised by the victory and immediately issued the order to pursue the enemy. Lee’s order to General Ewell had a discretionary clause in it to seize the high ground only “if practical.” Ewell was confused by this order and delayed moving forward until it was too late. The Federal Army had established itself along Cemetery Ridge and was reinforced by the time any action was taken (Highsmith & Landphair, 2003). Major General Meade did not show up to Gettysburg until July 2nd, a full day after the initial fighting took place. He immediately setup defensive positions on cemetery hill and along cemetery ridge in the form of a fishhook. By not pressing the assault on July 1st, General Lee and the Confederate Army let a strategic terrain advantage slip into the enemy’s hands. General Meade would use this to his advantage and stop a massive frontal assault by the Confederates with this beneficial piece of ground. After fierce fighting on the Union flanks and much more maneuvering on both sides, the fighting had extended the length of Cemetery Ridge extending from Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill in the north all the way down to Little and Big Round Top in the south (Highsmith & Landphair, 2003). July 3rd started the beginning of the end for the Confederates. After heavy fighting on July 2nd and being repulsed at almost every point along the Union skirmish lines, General Lee was determined to destroy General Meade and the Army of the Potomac at any cost. He orders one final charge to be made at the Union center in the hopes of breaking the army in two. A massive artillery barrage commenced on the Union center in order to soften them up for the infantry assault, which was commanded by General Longstreet. Commonly referred to as Pickett’s Charge, this was the last attack of the Confederate Army before conceding to defeat. There was still hope, however, as Jeb Stuart was in the midst of fighting his own battle against the Union Cavalry just a few short miles away from Gettysburg. General Stuart’s plan was to come around the backside of the Union Army and to tear them apart from behind while Lee and the others assaulted their front. Stuart was slowed down by some provision wagons that he had captured as part of his orders from Lee. As such, he could not maneuver as effectively as he once could without them. If Stuart had been able to contact Lee, dropped or burnt the supply wagons in order to move more quickly, or arrived on the Union left flank in a more timely fashion, then the outcome of Gettysburg may have been different. As it were, Jeb Stuart ran into two brigades of cavalry led by David Gregg who destroyed any hopes that the Confederate Army had left by annihilating Jeb Stuart’s Cavalry Divisions.
Summary
As we can see this major battle started as a minor skirmish with neither army ready to fully commit or engage in heavy fighting with the other. Gettysburg itself was not a town of any military or political significance, it just happened to be in the middle of a fight that would soon end the Confederate Army’s ability to wage an offensive. We can also see that the fighting in the days prior to Gettysburg left the men of the Confederate Army, particularly Jeb Stuart’s, unable to perform as they were expected too. Stuart’s brigades preformed to the best of their abilities with the limited information received in the order from General Lee. General Lee was inexplicably unable to issue a forthright command. This was uncharacteristic of the great leader and ultimately led to his downfall. The actions of his subordinates may have been lackluster during the battle, but it was ultimately Lee’s ego and desire to crush the Union Army in the field that led to defeat at Gettysburg.
References
Clark, C. (1987). Gettysburg, The Confederate High Tide. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books.
Davis, W. C. (1995). Brothers in Arms. London, England: Salamander Books.
Highsmith, C. M., & Landphair, T. (2003). Civil War Battlefields and Landmarks. New York, New York: Random House.
Shaara, M. (1974). Gettysburg, The Killer Angels. New York: Ballantine Books.
Weber, E. (1994). Great Photographers of The Civil War. North Dighton, Massachusetts: World Publications Group.
Throughout early American history we see a country struggling to define itself. The Revolutionary War, followed shortly after by the War of 1812, secured America’s freedom from foreign powers but left a country of loosely gathered states that were, quite often, at odds with one another. Following the Mexican American War, The Civil War brought to culmination events that would forever change the political and social landscape of our great nation. Gettysburg effectively ended the Confederate Army’s offensive capabilities and essentially ended the war. General Lee’s ego and his desire to crush the Union Army on the field of battle led to the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. Victories just prior to the main battle exhausted his men …show more content…
and helped to contribute to the defeat.
The Men in Charge of The Army of Northern Virginia
General Robert E. Lee, a white bearded man with a red face, fifty-seven years of age, was short in stature at five feet tall, but is short in the legs so when he sits upon a horse he seems taller. Lee does not support slavery, however, he also does not believe that the Africans are capable of being equal to white men at their current stage of development. He has no vices. He doesn’t drink, smoke, gamble or chase women. He does not lose his temper or his faith. He is the most beloved man in either Army (Shaara, 1974).
Lieutenant General James Longstreet, forty-two years of age. He is Lee’s second in command, a large man with blue eyes. Slow talking and crude, he opposes the invasion of Pennsylvania and lets Lee know of his disapproval. Once the invasion begins he is no longer opposed to it because of the reassurances that Lee gives him. He will always speak his mind. Becomes Lee’s right hand man after the death of Stonewall Jackson; Lee affectionately calls him “my old warhorse.” In command of the Confederate I Corps (Shaara, 1974).
Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, forty-six years of age, is bald and missing a leg due to the Second Bull Run Campaign which caused a nine month absence in order for him to heal. He served under Stonewall Jackson. After Jackson’s death, Lee places Ewell in charge of the Confederate II Corps, which is comprised of roughly 20,000 of Jackson’s former command (Shaara, 1974).
Major General Ambrose Powell Hill, thirty-seven years of age, is an impatient and ill-tempered man but makes up for this in his fierce fighting ability. Has been reprimanded for attacking without orders several times before. He commands the remnants of Stonewall Jackson’s former command, the newly formed Confederate III Corps (Shaara, 1974).
Lieutenant General J.E.B. Stuart, thirty years of age, is a gaudy man who loves to read about himself in the newspapers (Weber, 1994). He thinks much of himself and as he should for he literally rides circles around the Union Cavalry with his own cavalry brigades. He is responsible for providing Lee and his army vital information about the enemy’s whereabouts (Shaara, 1974).
The Men in Charge of the Union Army
Major General John Buford, thirty-seven years of age. Buford is given command of two brigades of cavalry and ordered to discover the main body of the Confederate troops under Lee while reporting their movements. He is the first segment of the Union Army to enter Gettysburg. Buford also has an eye for terrain and immediately notices the hills surrounding Gettysburg, making notations of where to establish skirmish lines (Shaara, 1974). Major General George Gordon Meade, forty-seven years of age. Meade is a bad tempered and somewhat vain individual. He takes command of the Army of the Potomac just two days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade wanted to hold a grand review of the Army but had to postpone this action in order to rally a defensive line along Pipe Creek in the hopes that Lee would meet him on his own terms (Shaara, 1974). General Joseph Hooker, forty-nine years of age. While successful earlier in his military career, Hooker failed miserably at Chancellorsville to stop General Lee. Following the loss, the federal government, and even his own men lost faith in his abilities. Hooker tries to bluff President Lincoln and Congress by tendering his resignation in order to press an attack against the Confederate Army, but to his surprise it is accepted just days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Hooker’s actions left Major General Meade a mess to clean up within his former command (Clark, 1987).
The Battles Leading to Gettysburg
Of the battles leading up to Gettysburg, Brandy Station and the Confederate advances north into Maryland and Pennsylvania were the direct causes of the Confederate loss at Gettysburg.
By over extending themselves and pressing their supplies to the limits, the Confederates were exhausted prior to the main battle at Gettysburg. Coupled with Lee’s discretionary orders to his subordinates and his inability to micro-manage his troops, the Confederates were on the path to destruction.
At Brandy Station, Jeb Stuart was caught unaware by a Union Cavalry advancement that was sent to destroy him outright. The Union Cavalry was lead by Brigadier General Pleasonton who was order by General Hooker to attack and destroy Stuart’s forces in the area. On June 9th, 1863, Pleasonton and his men crossed the Rappahannock River in order to assault the Confederate Cavalry units in the area (Clark, 1987). In the corresponding battle that took place, the Union Cavalry was able to catch the Confederates off guard and tarnished Jeb Stuart’s flawless cavalry record. The Battle of Brandy Station ended in a Confederate victory but it also showed the Union Cavalry that Stuart’s forces were not invincible, as they had once thought (Clark, 1987). This battle demoralized Stuart to an extent. He often claimed that the newspapers were wrong and that he was never caught off guard, and to an extent he was correct. Stuart had successfully screened Pleasanton and his men who were never able to ascertain the whereabouts of the main body of the Confederate
Army.
On the afternoon of June 10th, the day after the cavalry clash, Lee ordered Ewell’s II Corps into the northern Shenandoah Valley in order to attack the garrisoned troops located in Winchester, Virginia. At the Battle of Winchester, there were three forts located within the area, with the westernmost fort over shadowing the other two. Ewell used the tactical advantage of the wood nearest the fort in order to attack and overcome it. With the Western Fort captured and its guns being pointed at the other two, Winchester fell quickly to the Confederate forces in the area and was captured by June 14th (Clark, 1987). The Confederates kept up this fevered pace of advancement and actually travelled through Gettysburg before the main battle. The Confederate movements took them through many of the towns and cites of the area where they captured supplies and food for their army. The advancement reached Carlisle, Pennsylvania, led by Ewell who looked upon Harrisburg as easy pickings, but was recalled by Lee to march south once again into Gettysburg. During this time General Lee gave the fateful order to Jeb Stuart to harass the enemy as long as General Hooker’s troops remained inactive south of the Potomac. Jeb Stuart is believed to have taken artistic freedom in interpreting this message and for eight days Lee was blind to the movements of the Union Army.
The Battle of Gettysburg
On the night of June 28, a Confederate spy, by the name of Harrison, entered Longstreet’s camp. Soon after meeting with Longstreet, Harrison was brought before Lee. Harrison reported Federal troop movements heading towards South Mountain, on the other side of which lays the Cumberland Valley and Lee’s supply lines (Clark, 1987). After much thinking, Lee finally decided to go with the spy’s reports, as he had no other information on which to go upon with Jeb Stuart’s absence. This was a failure on Lee 's behalf, as he had at his disposal a number of cavalry men that he could have sent out for reconnaissance. Instead, Lee chose to explicitly rely on Stuart’s information about the enemy that would never come. General Lee gave the order to cease northern advancement and to hold the line in order to stop any further Federal western advancement. By this time General Hooker had finally managed to move his troops north and by June 27th, the Union Army had finally crossed the Potomac River. This was Hooker’s last few hours of command before Major General Meade was sent to replace him. When General Hooker asked permission of General in Chief Halleck to remove his troops from Maryland Heights, a defensive position above Harper’s Ferry, he was denied this course of action. General Hooker decided to, at this time, attempt to force his decision by offering his resignation as commander of the Army of the Potomac, to his surprise it was accepted. Major General Meade took immediate control of an army in which the commanding officer simply walked away without telling him of the disposition of the troops or any of the current planning. As a man of action, Meade immediately decided to move the army towards Frederick, Maryland, and formulated a strategy on the way. He continued to march his men north towards the Maryland-Pennsylvania border into Westminster. At this point he sent John Buford’s cavalry division further north and into Gettysburg. Once in Gettysburg, Buford immediately ordered his men to take up defensive positions on Seminary Ridge after a minor confrontation with a confederate raiding party. Buford immediately recognized the hills surrounding and in Gettysburg as an advantage that he must hold on to in order to keep the Federal troops from being destroyed. If the Confederates had reorganized and pressed their early advantages here, they would have had complete control over Gettysburg before Meade would have been able to arrive. Instead, not wanting to engage the enemy, Lee’s vague orders led to a Confederate withdrawal from Gettysburg. The following morning after Buford had setup his troops, July 1st, the Confederates returned en mass, expecting to find simple militia comprised of the local townspeople. Instead they found two brigades of well-trained cavalry troops armed with breech loading carbines. Buford held his defensive positions until two infantry regiments led by Major General John Reynolds relieved him. Reynolds sent word to Meade of the fight occurring at Gettysburg and vowed to make the enemy pay for every inch of ground. Soon after Reynolds joined the battle he was shot off of his horse and killed leaving his troops without a leader. By only following the orders that were given to them, Reynolds’ troops were able to capture, wound or kill roughly twenty-three hundred Confederate troops before being repulsed and sent into a general retreat away from Seminary Ridge (Davis, 1995). This fighting exhausted A.P. Hill’s men, who could no longer pursue the enemy that day. The fighting seemed to make A.P. Hill sick, which happened often to him before a major battle. General Lee was actually surprised by the victory and immediately issued the order to pursue the enemy. Lee’s order to General Ewell had a discretionary clause in it to seize the high ground only “if practical.” Ewell was confused by this order and delayed moving forward until it was too late. The Federal Army had established itself along Cemetery Ridge and was reinforced by the time any action was taken (Highsmith & Landphair, 2003). Major General Meade did not show up to Gettysburg until July 2nd, a full day after the initial fighting took place. He immediately setup defensive positions on cemetery hill and along cemetery ridge in the form of a fishhook. By not pressing the assault on July 1st, General Lee and the Confederate Army let a strategic terrain advantage slip into the enemy’s hands. General Meade would use this to his advantage and stop a massive frontal assault by the Confederates with this beneficial piece of ground. After fierce fighting on the Union flanks and much more maneuvering on both sides, the fighting had extended the length of Cemetery Ridge extending from Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill in the north all the way down to Little and Big Round Top in the south (Highsmith & Landphair, 2003). July 3rd started the beginning of the end for the Confederates. After heavy fighting on July 2nd and being repulsed at almost every point along the Union skirmish lines, General Lee was determined to destroy General Meade and the Army of the Potomac at any cost. He orders one final charge to be made at the Union center in the hopes of breaking the army in two. A massive artillery barrage commenced on the Union center in order to soften them up for the infantry assault, which was commanded by General Longstreet. Commonly referred to as Pickett’s Charge, this was the last attack of the Confederate Army before conceding to defeat. There was still hope, however, as Jeb Stuart was in the midst of fighting his own battle against the Union Cavalry just a few short miles away from Gettysburg. General Stuart’s plan was to come around the backside of the Union Army and to tear them apart from behind while Lee and the others assaulted their front. Stuart was slowed down by some provision wagons that he had captured as part of his orders from Lee. As such, he could not maneuver as effectively as he once could without them. If Stuart had been able to contact Lee, dropped or burnt the supply wagons in order to move more quickly, or arrived on the Union left flank in a more timely fashion, then the outcome of Gettysburg may have been different. As it were, Jeb Stuart ran into two brigades of cavalry led by David Gregg who destroyed any hopes that the Confederate Army had left by annihilating Jeb Stuart’s Cavalry Divisions.
Summary
As we can see this major battle started as a minor skirmish with neither army ready to fully commit or engage in heavy fighting with the other. Gettysburg itself was not a town of any military or political significance, it just happened to be in the middle of a fight that would soon end the Confederate Army’s ability to wage an offensive. We can also see that the fighting in the days prior to Gettysburg left the men of the Confederate Army, particularly Jeb Stuart’s, unable to perform as they were expected too. Stuart’s brigades preformed to the best of their abilities with the limited information received in the order from General Lee. General Lee was inexplicably unable to issue a forthright command. This was uncharacteristic of the great leader and ultimately led to his downfall. The actions of his subordinates may have been lackluster during the battle, but it was ultimately Lee’s ego and desire to crush the Union Army in the field that led to defeat at Gettysburg.
References
Clark, C. (1987). Gettysburg, The Confederate High Tide. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books.
Davis, W. C. (1995). Brothers in Arms. London, England: Salamander Books.
Highsmith, C. M., & Landphair, T. (2003). Civil War Battlefields and Landmarks. New York, New York: Random House.
Shaara, M. (1974). Gettysburg, The Killer Angels. New York: Ballantine Books.
Weber, E. (1994). Great Photographers of The Civil War. North Dighton, Massachusetts: World Publications Group.