Boethius The Consolation Of Philosophy: An Analysis

In Boethius’s work The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius uses the character Lady Philosophy to present the argument that justice is always served in that “the good are always rewarded and the wicked always punished” (81). I support that the argument is sound and valid through evaluation, then I continue by extrapolating Boethius’s reasoning to understand that although the nature of true reward is singular, the nature of punishment is diverse.
Boethius presents his claim on the nature of good, which is a crucial lead-in to his arguments on good and evil. He reasons that for there to be imperfect and lesser goods like fortune and fame, there must be an absolute perfect good which we compare the lesser goods to in order to deem them imperfect
(61). I agree that this is true, because without a standard the reality cannot exist, only our impression of the idea of a reality (which is subject to change). For example, the metric system has a standard for length based on the unchanging speed of light in a vacuum. If a standard for the metric system did not exist, a meter would be reduced to a subjective and volatile idea rather than a stable reality. After establishing the existence of this absolute good, Boethius reasons that because the absolute good is perfect it therefore lacks nothing. Because the absolute good lacks nothing, it must possess everything (62-63).
Boethius builds on this argument with the premise that good and evil are dichotomous in nature, where good is everything and thus “evil is nothing” (72). Although good and evil may occur side-by-side, they are by necessity separate entities because something cannot exist and be nonexistent simultaneously. Next, Boethius rightly claims that the motivation for action is reward and that happiness is the reward that motivates us (81). Even without external rewards, we still experience a positive feeling from doing virtuous actions like helping those in need. More often than not, the positive feeling of helping someone without receiving an external reward (such as money or recognition) is stronger than the positive feeling of helping someone and receiving the external reward. This phenomenon supports Boethius’s conclusion that the prize of happiness is always attained by good people because they are virtuous by nature. Going back to the example, a virtuous person would choose the greater good of helping someone in need and receiving a feeling of happiness inside rather than settling for the lesser good of helping them in order to receive an external reward. The prize of happiness itself, given by goodness, is enduring because of the nature of its source. Thus, “no matter how the wicked rave, the wise man never loses his prize; nor does it ever diminish” (81). Ultimately, the good receive reward as a result of their good nature.
If the good man receives goodness as a reward, the wicked receives punishment as a reward by the same logic. Boethius’s premise on evil is that whatever ceases to exist in goodness becomes evil since evil is equivalent to nothingness. Instead of moving toward greater goodness, the actions of the wicked result in their ceasing to exist in goodness, bit by bit, and erasing themselves into the void of evil.
There are three main types of punishment, two of which are redemptive and one of which is ultimate.
The first and least severe punishment is mercy: the choice not to inflict external punishment upon a wrongdoer. This is most useful on those who still possess enough goodness to realize the evilness of their deed after being shown mercy. It is important to note that mercy is shown and not given; it is not a punishment administered by others but rather a virtuous act meant to bring out the reconciliatory nature of the good within a person. If mercy is effective, a sense of guilt arises in the individual. This guilt would be considered by Boethius to be “natural” because it guides the individual toward good which he says is the goal of all creation (68-69). The second type of redemptive punishment is more useful on the wicked who do not have enough goodness to see the wrong of their actions through mercy alone. This second type of redemptive punishment is atonement. The virtuous, motivated by their desire for good, determine an act of atonement for the wicked to perform with the hopes that the wicked will learn to follow the good also. A common example of this is when an individual who is guilty of a crime is sentenced to community service. The punishment is not given in order to keep the criminal from being happy, but rather to show them that virtuous acts like helping others can bring about happiness and good. Atonement is like mercy in that it turns a wicked individual back toward the natural pursuit of good. Because these punishments ultimately lead the wicked toward good, they are truly rewards stemming from goodness rather than true punishment stemming from
wickedness.
True punishment therefore could only be found where goodness does not exist. According to Boethius, the nature of this punishment is that the wicked, through their evil deeds, deny themselves happiness. Whereas good actions raise individuals up toward happiness, evil actions pull individuals down toward punishment. Punishment is therefore the absence of happiness. The wicked who are “transformed by vice cannot be counted a man” because their wickedness pulls them down beneath the level of goodness that exists within human nature. The wicked are thus left without happiness, lowered beneath their human status, and “only their mind remain[s] to mourn the monstrous change they had suffered” (83).
I have supported Boethius’s stance that the good are always rewarded and the wicked are always punished; furthermore, I inquired into the diverse nature of punishment and found that the acts of mercy and atonement are not punishment at all but rather virtues; true punishment, which is the absence of happiness, can only come from one’s own evilness. Therefore, we cannot truly punish the wicked but only try to bring them back toward the good.