BP and the Deepwater Horizon disaster
Managing in a Complex World
MBM500: Semester 1, 2013
Author: Daniel Smith – 5549426
Title: The Analysis of BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010
Due Date: 5/5/13
Word Allocation: 2193 excluding executive summary, headings, tables, references and appendices
Executive Summary
This report provides an examination into British Petroleum (BP) and the Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010. It looks specifically at the functional area of organizing from POLC and the framework from how communication and communication networks effected the decision making process on the oilrig.
The analysis starts by providing a history of BP and what major decisions throughout time contributed to the organizational structure when the disaster occurred.
Findings show that the asset federation model adopted in 1995 took away responsibility from BP’s regional operations and subsequently rewarded each individual site for its performance. This meant the managerial decision making process for each site was geared to time and cost efficiencies rather than that of safety.
The establishing of a wheel communication network on Deepwater meant that any proposals put for from line staff, with safety as a priority, were being overwritten by the senior team leader as they were passed on.
After the disaster occurred, BP established a Safety and Risk division and instilled staff members on each of its rigs to ensure that the safety message was reinforced on its sites.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
Managers are responsible for arranging and structuring work to assist in achieving organizational goals (Robins et al. 2012, p. 14). It is determining what tasks are to be completed, who is responsible for them, how the tasks are to be grouped, who reports to whom and at
MBM500: Semester 1, 2013
Author: Daniel Smith – 5549426
Title: The Analysis of BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010
Due Date: 5/5/13
Word Allocation: 2193 excluding executive summary, headings, tables, references and appendices
Executive Summary
This report provides an examination into British Petroleum (BP) and the Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010. It looks specifically at the functional area of organizing from POLC and the framework from how communication and communication networks effected the decision making process on the oilrig.
The analysis starts by providing a history of BP and what major decisions throughout time contributed to the organizational structure when the disaster occurred.
Findings show that the asset federation model adopted in 1995 took away responsibility from BP’s regional operations and subsequently rewarded each individual site for its performance. This meant the managerial decision making process for each site was geared to time and cost efficiencies rather than that of safety.
The establishing of a wheel communication network on Deepwater meant that any proposals put for from line staff, with safety as a priority, were being overwritten by the senior team leader as they were passed on.
After the disaster occurred, BP established a Safety and Risk division and instilled staff members on each of its rigs to ensure that the safety message was reinforced on its sites.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
Managers are responsible for arranging and structuring work to assist in achieving organizational goals (Robins et al. 2012, p. 14). It is determining what tasks are to be completed, who is responsible for them, how the tasks are to be grouped, who reports to whom and at