Oil companies were the worst performing brands in the world market. There was no brand in the oil industry that had created positive perception in the public. During the late 1990’s BP has decided to change this perception for their brand. The main idea was to create a symbolic capital for BP. The definition of symbolic capital is given by (Bourdieu, 1974/1977 sited in Holt & McNulty,2008,p.76) as “ the resources by which authority and credibility are established amongst employees, peers, customers, regulators and other organizational constituents through the capability to articulate legitimate judgments and actions from a specific institutional position”. This could be a powerful tool in certain conditions. The CEO was John Browne at that period. He was also member of Intel Company and he had influenced with the perception of Intel brand in the market. He had wanted to position BP as it’s been done for Intel. Browne made a declaration about the relation between greenhouse gases and climate change in Stanford University in 1997. That was a big change of strategy for the oil market and for BP. An oil company was making a big shift in the market and joining the fight against the climate change as stated by Sachs (2012, p.38) From that point, company had positioned itself as an environmental company as well as an oil company. That was a revolutionary change for the company. His service to the board of Intel Company might help him to take this radical decision according to Sachs. The company was using the positive perception of ‘being British’. Now time has changed and company has needed a new way of perception in the public. There are three stages for a change as stated by (Lewin,1951 sited in Weick & Quinn, 1999). These are unfreeze, transition and freeze again. Browne had started to unfreeze the existing patterns both in BP and both in the market. This was a start of a big change. This would change all the market and BP paradigms.
BP was
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