The text “brains in a vat” talks about representation as reference with intent. It argues that referring to ‘anything as anything’ is not representation unless it is done with intention. This is explained, one may refer to an object through words, however, it is necessary to have the mental image of that object so that the words become a representation of the object. This characteristic of intentionality is consistent in our thoughts (it allows us to refer one thing as another).
For one to refer to something (create a mental image) as another, the pre-requisite is the knowledge of the existence of that thing (physical object), without which intention cannot exist. If one is led to believe the existence of something, …show more content…
Descartes has argued and established that we think therefore we exist. His theory is somewhat interrelated to the above mentioned conception in the way that, our thoughts can represent one thing as another due to their characteristic of intentionality, thoughts prove that we exist and hence other things that are external to us also …show more content…
According to this theory, the sceptic contends that one does not realize that the mind in-a-vat hypothesis is false, since if the theory were genuine, one's experience would be generally as it really seems to be. In this way, as per the sceptic, one does not know any suggestions about the outside world (recommendations which would be false if the vat hypothesis were valid). Hilary Putnam gave a clear refutation of a version of the brain in-a-vat theory. This perspective was that the implications and truth state of one's sentences, and the substance of one's deliberate mental condition, rely on the character of one's external, causal