British View of Soviet Russia in Ww2

The Second World War is called a war of ideologies and morals, unlike the First World War which is called a war of attrition. It brought many nations together to fight against the evil and world-domination seeking Axis powers led by the Germans. Many of these countries had come together to fight against the Axis of evil in the First World War, with the main powers of Britain, France, and the United States joining the Allied forces. One country that had been a key component of the Allied victory in the First World War was Russia, known as the Soviet Union (USSR) during the Second World War. At the beginning of the Second World War the Soviet Union was in a trade agreement and was sided with the German army and assisted in fighting the Allied forces, but on June 22, 1941, the German army put into Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. This led to the Soviets joining the Allied forces in the fight against the Axis powers and completely changed the layout and theater of the war, which came at great cost to the Soviet civilians and military personnel. Although the Soviets war effort in the Allied victory is undeniable, the reaction and opinion of the British public and politicians was far less certain. Prior to the Second World War the Soviet Union had been the global centre for the rise of Communism and the views of the nation varied from admiration to the deepest abhorrence. So when the news of the German invasion of the Soviet Union reached the British people there was a lot of confusion on how to approach the situation. On one hand this powerful nation which could be absolutely pivotal in defeating the German army, and on the other this Communist run regime that the British people had been told to detest for years prior to the war. The leaders of Britain knew the importance of having the Soviets as Allies so they set out to persuade the British people that although the Soviets are communist, this is a war that surpasses that and are going to support the Soviets in fighting the Axis of evil. Through viewing the records of the British House of Commons, the Times Newspaper, Winston Churchill’s speeches, and other media used in Britain during the war, we can see just how, if at all, the view of the public and politicians changed from before and after Operation Barbarossa. To begin the analyses of the change in perception of the Soviet Union by the British we first need to have some background on the relationship leading up to the Second World War. Even before the end of the First World War relations between the two nations were deteriorating because in 1918 the Russians withdrew from the war due to many revolutions that happened within the nation’s borders. This left the Allied forces to face a German onslaught in France at the end of the war, and while the Bolsheviks took control in Russia to form the Soviet Union, the six years that followed the end of the war, talks between the two countries ceased. Talks between the two nations resumed again during the early 1920’s, but accusations of Soviet espionage and corruption once again halted talks. Talks remained elusive until the beginning of the Second World War, as the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934 and made a treaty with France and took a stance that was more supportive of continuing peace and the status quo in Europe. From 1936 to 1938 the Soviet Union went through what was known as the Great Purge, which was led by Joseph Stalin. The Great Purge was a series of political repression and cases of murder, treachery, torture, sabotage, unlawful arrests and monitoring, etc to cleanse the Communist Party and bring sweeping political power for Joseph Stalin and his party. This greatly affected the view of almost every major European power of the Soviets, and this was evident by the exclusion of the Soviet Union to the Munich conference regarding Czechoslovakia. In 1939, as the prospect of war grew larger and larger, Britain attempted to reconnect lost relationships with the Soviets in order to try and dissuade Germany from an outbreak of war. The problem now was that over all these years of broken communications between the two nations the price for reforming an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance once more was, as the only way that the Soviets were willing to sign any sort of alliance was if Britain would acknowledge the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Britain was not willing to make this concession to the Soviets, while the Germans were more than willing, which resulted in the Soviet Union signing a pact with the German forces and abandoning all chances of alliances with what would become the Allied forces. Even as the war waged on, Britain attempted to rekindle talks with the Soviet leaders when France was taken by the Axis in June, 1940, but to no avail. It was not until the German attack on the Soviet Union that talks of an alliance between the two nations really garnered any momentum. It is important to note at this point that while the political view of the Soviet Union in Britain varied throughout the different political parties, once the war began the thoughts on the Soviets became far more universal. The British Labour Party, which had typically defended the Soviet Union from attacks by the Tories, completely changed its attitude. On the day before the signing of the Soviet-German alliance, the Daily Herald, a popular British newspaper, said there should be “an immediate attempt to speed up the negotiations, both political and military, with Russia”. So when the next day the Soviet supporters were faced with the grim reality that the Soviet Union was going a more imperialist direction and aligning themselves with Germany, there was political outcry from the entire political spectrum. The British politicians now had more important matters to attend to then focusing on regaining ties with Russia, and as the war progressed, the discussion of Russia, and certainly any talks of renegotiating with Russia, dropped severely. The records of the discussions held in the British House of Commons shows that in 1939 the topic of Russia was raised a total of 632 times, while in 1940 it was only raised 178 times. So clearly Russia was a topic of importance prior to the war, but as the war progressed the topic subsided. Interest in the Soviets only resurfaced in the month of June, 1941, when Operation Barbarossa was initiated. The stance and importance that the British politicians put on the Soviet Union situation prior to the German invasion of Russia is shown clearly from the mouth of the Prime Minister himself, Mr. Winston Churchill. On May 7th, 1941, the House of Commons gathered to discuss the current war situation, and when asked to comment on the current situation in Greece and the war as a whole he said “At any rate, she is not an Ally at the present moment, and we must hold the position until there is such a change effected in the re-orientation of nations as a whole as will enable us to secure victory.” Later on in the debate, Mr. Churchill then said “Again, much might be said about Russia, but I am not quite sure that we should gain any advantage by saying it, and I am not quite certain we should receive any thanks from the Soviet Government”. Clearly by this point in the war the British government had realized that, although there was no doubt in the importance of having Russia as an ally, there was little if anything to be done about it. As the relations between Germany and Russia began to deteriorate and both countries began to militarize areas around the border, the politicians still did not put much of their focus on attempting to refresh talks with the Soviets. On June 18th, 1941, just four days before the German invasion of Russia, the House of Commons once again sat down and discussed recent war events. Even though this was the height of the tension between Germany and Russia, the conversation only turned to the Russians in passing twice. Interesting to note as well that the two men who spoke of the Soviet Union were Mr Herbert Samuel, a liberal, and Lord Robert Cecil, a conservative, and both stated that the actions of Russia and the future of the German-Soviet relations is important to note, though it is impossible to know what will come of it or what will happen, so the subject was dropped. Even on the week of the initiation of Operation Barbarossa the British still had an unwavering view of the Soviet Union that although their importance was vital, talks or any effort into an alliance with the nation was unfathomable and not worth the effort that it required.
So how exactly did Operation Barbarossa change British politicians’ stance on the Russians immediately after the attack? Firstly the British immediately realized the importance of having such a military and industrial power assisting them in the defeat of Germany. They knew that Germany now had to fight the war on two fronts, and at such a wide geographical area which would help them to regain the upper hand. This was never in question, as just two days after the German attack on Russia occurred on June 24th, 1941, the House of Commons sat down again to discuss the event, and before any discussion was open to any speakers, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden, stated “The House will appreciate that I am not able to reveal the full results of those discussions, but I can tell the House that I have now heard from His Excellency the Soviet Ambassador that his Government have accepted our offer to send military and economic missions to Russia to co-ordinate our efforts in what is now, beyond doubt, a common task—the defeat of Germany. The Soviet Government have made it plain to us that in the period of military collaboration which now lies ahead, help will be upon a mutual and a reciprocal basis. His Majesty 's Government accept and endorse that view.” So before it was even up for debate between the members of the cabinet and opposition, the decision to collaborate once again with the Soviets had already been made. Though there was no doubt to whether or not an alliance between the Soviets would be pursued, it was debated far more whether or not to trust the Soviets. Almost unanimously though it was agreed upon that although the Soviet Union’s actions and their behaviour as well as Communist regime were wrong in the eyes of Britain, this was overshadowed by the war against Nazi Germany and the Axis powers. So even though the Russians were now technically an ally of Britain and the Allied forces, the view of the politicians did not change, they more so just understood the importance of their support and what was needed to attain an Allied victory over the Axis. The biggest change that the German attack on the Soviets had on the British politicians was its focus on the home front. It is near impossible for a democratic government to try and move forward with anything because the first need to support of the people. So beside the probable military planning and coordination with the Soviet Union that went on behind closed doors between the military leaders, the politicians focus turned to beginning a new propaganda campaign to try and garner the public’s support behind the Soviet alliance. The very next House of Commons sitting on the 25th of June, 1941, the discussion at hand was titled “Propaganda”. Throughout the sitting the members discuss and agree that although the Soviet Union and communism are not things they will openly endorse, the need for the public support on this decision is of upmost importance, so they decide to focus on getting the public to realize that the relationship between the two and the animosity that had grown over the decade prior to the war was not as important as the matter at hand, winning the war. This is evident in the speech by Winston Churchill called The Fourth Climacteric, which was broadcasted to the British people on June 22nd, 1941, the day of the German attack. Throughout the speech Churchill reiterates the evil of the Nazi regime and the terrible atrocities that they have forced upon Europe, as well as the Russians. He says that the British have agreed to send support to the Russians in the war against Germany, because this is not a war on class, “but a war in which the whole British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is engaged without distinction of race, creed, or party”. He goes on to say that the Nazis are attacking the Russians with the same idea in mind when they attacked France, and soon to attack Britain, for dominance and power. He closes the speech with a strong statement, “The Russian danger is therefore our danger, and the danger of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe. Let us redouble our exertions, and strike with united strength while life and power remain.” Clearly the message at hand that Churchill and his fellow politicians are trying to convey to the people is that we know that we have our differences, but our similarities are what brings us together now more than ever.
So while the focus of the politicians and the government turned to ensuring the public support by ways of propaganda and media campaigns, the focus now turns to the view of the public on the Soviet Union. It is important to note that although it is an important process to create a propaganda campaign to garner public support, the British public were notorious for being unaffected by propaganda as a whole. The Ministry of Information wrote a paper in November of 1941 stating the overall ineffectiveness of the propaganda campaigns and the overall reluctance of the British people to be propagandized. It stated that the only real time that it was effective was legislative or administrative action followed by an explanation; otherwise it was essentially useless and was just badgering the public. The level of resistance towards propaganda was very high, and A.P Ryan, Home Advisor of the Ministry of Information, agreed with this sentiment. He stated that not only did the audience decide whether or not they wanted to listen to whatever was being broadcasted on the radio or on the BBC, many times it did more harm than good if what was being said was not to the listeners approval. The times in which propaganda was actually most effective was when it reinforced what the audience already believed, such as how long the war was going to last. So this apparent ineffectiveness of the British government to manipulate and encourage the public opinion changes the way that we can analyze public opinion of the Soviet Union.
Prior to the outbreak of the war the view of the general public reflected the same feelings as the politicians. There were those who were attracted to the idea of communism, especially during the Great Depression when the idea of Communism was going to bring them out of the failure of capitalism. During the later part of the 1930’s as well, support for the Soviet Union grew as news of Joseph Stalin’s Five Year Plan accompanied by glowing statistics and pictures of happy, upbeat workers conveyed a prosperous and happy living in Russian society. At the same time though there were those who strongly opposed the Soviet Union, mainly due to ideological differences. Most people who associated with the Conservative party were anti-communist, and thus anti-Bolshevik, and most people who would identify themselves as Christian were also against the communist Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had declared a war against religion in its own country. This large divide in public opinion on the Soviet Union gradually became smaller as the war grew closer, as most people who were anti-Soviet Union were becoming more accepting of the idea of an alliance for political and military power needed in the event of a war with Germany. Frederick Voigt, a foreign correspondent for the Manchester Guardian wrote in March of 1939 “We ought, I think, to be critical about Russia....she is more tyrannically governed than even Germany is. The number of people done to death is Germany runs into thousand- in Russia into tens of thousands...But we cannot afford to be particular about our allies, though we must, I think, always remain particular about our friends”. This sentiment of almost disregarding the Soviet Union’s short comings and opposing ideologies to that of the British for the need of military and political support during the war would recur throughout the pre-Operation Barbarossa campaign and to an extent even after the German attack. This overall feeling is best shown through a series of questionnaires and polls given to public by Gallup Poll from March 1939 to April 1941. The first of these questionnaires asked “Would you like to see Great Britain and Soviet Russia being more friendly to each other?”, and 84% of the respondents said yes, while only 7% said no. The next question, asked once in April and once more in June, asked “Are you in favour of a military alliance between Great Britain, France and Russia?” The first response had 87% of respondents saying yes and only 7% saying no, while the second time had 84% saying yes and 9% saying no. Clearly the people of Britain, though varying in their political and ideological views of the Soviet Union, understood the importance of having Russia as a military ally. All of these questions however were proposed prior to German-Soviet pact and the invasion of Poland, so after these events took place Gallup put forth new questions, the first in October 1939. When asked if a British Cabinet Minister should be sent to Moscow to discuss out future relations with Russia, 47% said yes and 34% said no. The next two questions which were proposed in November of 1939, asked if Finland, Sweden, Norway or Denmark becomes involved in war with Russia, should Great Britain give them military assistance, 42% answered yes and 38% answered no. The second question asked if you thought that Russia intends to give Germany such help as will enable Germany to defeat Britain and France, and only 14% said yes while 68% said no. Clearly a general distaste for the Soviet Union and the overall support for Russia dropped severely after they proclaimed alliance with Germany, yet the people still did not believe that the Russians were going to provide Germany with the necessary forces to beat the British. The last question, which was asked a year apart, first in March 1940 and then again in April 1941, a month before Operation Barbarossa, asked whether you would like to see Great Britain and Soviet Russia be more friendly towards each other? The first response, which was directly after the Soviet attack on Finland, had 41% say yes and 47% say no. The seconds response, which came during rising tensions between Germany and Russia, as well as France being taken and the Allied forces being pushed back, had 70% say yes and only 13% say no. So clearly the public opinion of the Soviet Union depended on the nations actions during the war. If it was beneficial to the British and Allied forces, people had a lot of support for the country and tightening ties with the country, but when the Russians did things that hurt or hindered the Allied forces they were despised by most of the nation. With all that being sad though, the feelings towards the Soviet Union may have constantly been changing, but the discussions about the nation were kept to a minimum. In the Times Newspaper, the word “Russia” and “Russian” only appeared in editorials seven times from January 1st, 1940, to June 21st, 1941, the day before Operation Barbarossa. The word “Russia” and “Russian” appeared five times just from June 25th to June 28th, the week right after the German attack on Russia, which is when the idea of having Russia as an ally came back in discussion.
When the German attack on the Soviet Union occurred on June 22nd, 1941, the mentality of the public changed, not just towards the Soviet Union but towards the war as a whole. It came at a time in which the public morale was low, and the thought of victory was slowly dissolving, so the news of a Russian ally brought hope and optimism to the public. The articles written to the editor in the Times magazine in the week following Operation Barbarossa echoed this sentiment and the ideals given by Churchill in his speech on June 22nd. One such article, titled The Attack on Russia, on June 26th, 1941, written by Barbara Ward says “...Germany has attacked not communism but Russia; a national state which bard Hitler’s way to world power...the British Government abates nothing of its condemnation of Communism and lends its aid not to communism but to the Russian victim of Nazi aggression...” The message is clear that the British people, while happy about the idea of Russia as an ally, did not really alter then views from a political and ideological point of view but rather understood the situation and “shows a very high degree of common sense”. A lot of credit for this welcoming, yet skeptical at first, stance of the Russians is greatly credited to the fantastic speech given by Sir Winston Churchill. His strong stance that the British government is not changing its views or ideologies on Communism or the Soviets themselves, but the war is not against these political stances or parties but against the Nazi regime and the Axis forces. The reaction to the Russian involvement also spanned over every political party and stance in the nation, which helped to bring about a new sense of national optimism and a rise in morale, as hope that the Russians could keep the Germans occupied in the East, the safer the West was bound to be. As the war waged on as well, the opinion on the Soviet Union on intensified as news of the great battles and sacrifices being made by the Russian people reached Britain. Just in the second half of 1941 there were nine times more broadcasts about Russia, there were pro-Russia books and journals being published regularly, and “Aid for Russia” societies, even one set up by Mrs. Churchill herself called the Help Russia Fund, began to spring up throughout the country. The overall sentiment of the British people towards the Soviets can be summed up by one Times article on June 25th, 1941. Written by a refugee from Russia living in Britain, he said “As a refugee from Russia, I have enjoyed the hospitality of this country for many years, and I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister in his speech. We are fighting a common foe and whatever our differences in the past have been I feel that all Slav races should now unite to rid the world of Nazism”.
The British-Soviet relations were nothing short of a rollercoaster in the years surrounding the Second World War. From ideological opposition and an end to all talks between the two nations, to reuniting once again to fight against the greater evil that was the German and Axis powers. The views throughout this time varied within the politicians themselves, and between the government and the public, but the same sentiment stayed with all of them throughout the entire ordeal. The social and ideological differences between these two great nations were evident, but the idea of being allies and defeating the German forces exceeds these differences. The politicians believed it and knew the importance of rekindling lost negotiations, and the public knew it and hoped for it to ensure an Allied victory. Operation Barbarossa completely changed the outlook of the war for both the Allied and Axis powers, and completely changed the attitudes of those involved, but it did not change the moral, cultural, and political beliefs of any of those great nations or their people.

The Soviet Union and British Relations in the Second World War

Ryan McKee
HIST 2801
Professor Bennett
100802318
April 17th, 2012

Bibliography
Eden, Anthony. “German Invasion of Russia” Edited Hansard. Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Vol 372. No. 971. June 24, 1941. Hansard-Millbank Systems. Web. 14 Apr. 2012
Bell, P. M. H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. London: E. Arnold, 1990. Print.
Churchill, Winston. "The Fourth Climacteric." Speech. The Fourth Climacteric. The Churchill Centre and Museum, 15 Apr. 2010. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/809-the-fourth-climacteric
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Ward, Barbara. "The Attack On Russia." The Times [London] 26 June 1941, 48962nd ed., sec. E: 5. The Times Digital Archive. http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/itw/infomark/217/931/185985711w16/purl=rc1_TTDA_0_CS85014746&dyn=21!xrn_3_0_CS85014746&hst_1?sw_aep=ocul_carleton
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"HANSARD Sittings in the 20th Century." Hansard 1803-2005 . Hansard-Millbank Systems. Web. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com
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[ 2 ]. Bell, P. M. H. John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. 1990
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