Case Complexity

Case Salience. “Certain cases will attract a greater number of amicus brief filings if it poses an extensive economic, legal and or political impact” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin, 2011). As presumed, “interest groups whom participate as amici, desire to achieve long-lasting, far-reaching policy, despite the venue of which the group is in favor of;” (Bentley, 1908; Gerber, 1999; Walker, 1991) case  salience particularly signals to interests of policy implications which may be considered far-reaching (Solowiej and Collins, 2009). Incomplete Information. It is also postulated that “the Court operates under a relatively low level of knowledge environment” (Collins, 2007; Esptein and Knight, 1998; 1999; Maltzman, Spriggs,
The complexity of case may be perceived to interests groups as a lack of knowledge on the Supreme Court justices’ end. Justices do not obtain proficiency of all facets of the issues presented to the Court due to the fact that they are not experts in all subjects of which they are presented with by amici. The circumstance of extremely complex cases frequently creates uncertainty among the justices of the Supreme Court. With the lack of information and or knowledge of presented matters, “the Court may be ambivalent in concerning which legal principle is the correct one to apply in a case containing multiple legal issues” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin, 2011). Due to such an insufficient information environment, “interests groups will seek to provide information to the  justices in complex cases in the desire of affecting a justice’s decision, and in turn, affecting policy” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin, 2011). In result, the complexity of a case has an overall influence of the number of amicus briefs that are filed as it is anticipated that the justices of the Court essentially “require greater information to come to a coherent decision. It is expected that a greater number of amicus curiae briefs will be filed in litigation that is complex” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin,
It is also presumed that “interest groups will target the Supreme Court when they are less certain about how each justice will vote in a case” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin, 2011). Interests cannot be fully positive whether the justices will be persuaded by the organizations’ argument. This “uncertainty also adjusts the Court’s membership, as well as the variation in the ideological distribution of the Court” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin, 2011). Although, under the circumstances, “there are instances where presumed outcome certainty may prompt interest groups to file amicus curiae briefs. As an instrument of persuasion, amicus curiae briefs are seen to be more effective in more uncertain Court environments than vice versa” (Salzman; Williams; Calvin,