Ronald got a job as a sales representative in a phone company. He has been told to dress in a representative way and the company policy can be found from their company website. Ronald is full of passionate about his new job. In addition, he does not like the existing political and world order very much.
On the first day on work, Ronald showed up at work in a suit and tie. The tie depicts the anarchy symbol. His boss complimented him on the choice of his tie, and made a joke about it. After two weeks, Ronald wore the same suit and …show more content…
The Court considers (1) whether the boss's actions constituted an interference with the right to freedom of expression; (2) whether that interference was prescribed by law.
As to the first issue, interference, I found the dismissal constituted an interference with Ronald's Article 10 rights, noting that Ronald has absolute right to choose the way of his wearing, such as the tie depicts the anarchy symbol, and include political views. Therefore, it would be unlawful unless law prescribed it.
As to the second element, prescribed by law, I found that the internal rule interpretation of that rule, which is not allowed wearing of religious and political statements, did indeed serve as a sufficient basis for Ronald's …show more content…
This approach, borrowed from the two cases are very similar to this case, which to support my arguments. Firstly, Rubins vs Latvia; the Court held that the case of dismissal in the light of the infringement of the freedom of expression. The estimation of the severity of the employee’s violation of ethical norms. The dismissal of the applicant was held to the harshest sanction available. The Court decided that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society and found a violation of Art. 10 ECHR .
Lastly, Achbita vs G4S Secure Solutions; the Court held that there was no direct discrimination, however, the Court found that there may be a cause of action for indirect discrimination, if a neutral obligation results in putting individuals of a particular religion at a disadvantage when it is applied to them. Accordingly, the Court found that it could constitute indirect discrimination if it puts members of a certain religion at a particular disadvantage unless it is justified by a legitimate aim that is appropriate and necessary