Central Intelligence Scenarios

Abstract
As the United States wages a war on terror many people will argue that we are creating more terrorists. My hypothesis is that our tactics since September 11, 2001 are actually acting as a deterrent to future terroristic activity. Throughout this paper there are descriptions of how terrorist cells are disrupted by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This disruption of abilities is brought on by a number of agencies with the coordinated intelligence of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) established through recommendations made in the 9/11 commission report. The establishment of a central intelligence pool to be analyzed by experts from all of the major agencies was a seismic shift that allowed forces to be directed properly.
Furthermore we discuss the new global strategies of the government and its new adaptability.
Overall, the information provided through multiple civilian and military forces strongly supports the hypothesis that the United States Counter Terrorism tactics that have been adopted have been wildly successful. How do US counterterrorism tactics act as a deterrent?
Since September 11, 2001 the United States has seen itself on the frontlines in the war on terror. This is real and deluded at the same time. The war on terror exists on multiple fronts; this is why counterterrorism is so vital to the country’s interests. The United States (U.S.) Military (2012) defines counterterrorism as actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks (p.73). Prior to September 11th the U.S. and most of the world left counterterrorism operations to special military units (Delta Force or Seal Team 6) so that they could be taken care with limited visibility, but now that the beast has been brought to the country’s door step more and more law enforcement are involved at the local level.
What is Counterterrorism? Since the French revolution terrorism has developed into the preferred tactic for extremists around the world. During most of the 20th century terrorism investigations were seen as a law enforcement problem due to their extreme lawlessness of the suspect’s actions. That all changed in 1972 during the Munich Olympics when a Palestinian terrorist organization “Black September” kidnapped and killed 11 Israeli athletes and a combination of German and Israeli special operation units went in and killed/captured the members of the terrorist group. Fast forward to September 11, 2001 (aka 9/11) when the U.S. felt the full force of a determined enemy and the country was never the same again. The sad part is the attack could have been avoided if a stout counterterrorism policy had been adapted according to the findings published in “9/11 Commission Report” (2004). The big precursor according to the commission report (2004) that signaled an escalation of action was the World Trade Center truck bomb on 26 February, 1993 (p.72).
Establishing the NCTC A key implementation as a result of the 2004 9/11 commission was the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
The goal was to create a joint center for operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies and partner organizations that include: Central Intelligence Agency(CIA); Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation(DOJ/FBI); Departments of State, Defense(DOD), and Homeland Security (DHS); and other entities that provide unique expertise such as the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the U.S. Capitol Police. The mission released in November 2012 is: “Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.” The lack of a single organization coordinating counterterrorism intelligence had subjected the United States to a hard lesson, but with a central core of established experts from all over the intelligence and law enforcement fields produced what was once a weakness into overwhelming strength. With this organization established the sharing of data across agencies increased exponentially. By being the primary hub for analyzing and integrating
all intelligence the NCTC is now able to produce integrated and coordinated analysis drawn from multiple sources. This allows separate agencies the freedom of centralized and timely information and the flexibility to plan multiple supporting missions. Not anchored each agency can have different priorities befitting their missions to support the global strategy.

Priorities and Strategies a Global Take Since the attack of September 11, the U.S.
has moved from a defensive posture to a more aggressive one. Previous to the attack the policy was one of deterrent; Uri Fisher cites (2007) a 2002 RAND report that stated, “Deterrence is both too limiting and too naïve to be applicable to the current war on terrorism” (p.1). The attacks lead to a re-defining of the issues and to establish new protocols that reorganized the U.S. Governments (USG) strategic national goals. According to LTC (Ret.) Morningstar (2009) as cited in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006; US counterterrorism strategy is built on four “Ds”: defeat, deny, diminish, and defend. It defeats “terrorist organizations of global reach” by attacking “their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances” (p.18). With completion of 9/11 Commission report to Congress in 2004 a reallocation of funds also took place as national security became the number one priority. A policy of preemptive action began to form. This changed the face of counterterrorism as it brought the fight to the terrorist in their home countries; no more would the U.S. wait for an incident to happen before they acted. Furthermore the internal security and domestic defensive policies were strengthened and better funded, adding an additional layer for terrorists to navigate. According to LTC (Ret.) Morningstar (2009) an effective counterterrorism strategy will seek to undermine confidence
in the terrorists and separate them from their cause (p.21). The new strategy caused a seismic shift in how the world would now deal with global terroristic threats. No more would the free countries of the world sit back and take the threat of terrorism. Now the U.S. and its allies would bring the fight to the terrorists on a global scale.

A Good Offense-The Global War on Terrorism
As stated by the DOD (2009) after September 11, 2001, the U.S., along with multinational partners, embarked on what was characterized as a “global war on terrorism (GWOT)” (p.I-2). With the attacks of that September day in 2001 Al Qaeda severely over estimated the consequences of their action. Based on their own distorted views they believed that they could defeat the U.S. because of previous actions in Somalia. What they did not count on was the amount of resources and determined manpower that the United States Military could field in a short amount of time. At the time of execution Al Qaeda fully believed that they could compete with the U.S. Military. Since the invasion of Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban, the DOD has mounted multiple campaigns in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, the Philippines and drone attacks over the Pakistan border in order to eradicate the presence of violent extremists. According to the US Army (2005), organizations that are experiencing difficulties may tend to increase their level of violence. This increase in violence can occur when frustration and low morale develops within the group due to lack of perceived progress or successful counterterrorism measures that may limit freedom of action within the terrorist group (p.2-6). The increase of the use of suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Iraq points to a high level of despondency and lack of confidence in the possibility of any success for the Taliban, Al-Qaida or Haqqani networks.
Working with partner nations
Working with Muslim partner nations additionally allows the U.S. contact to a world that until this time was inaccessible to the American intelligence community. The regular participants are Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Qatar. There are others involved but their support is tacit at best. With the help of these nations it allows the USG the ability to exercise one of the main tenants of its global strategy to eliminate terrorist safe havens through indirect support. According to the DOD Joint Publication on Counterterrorism (2009), the goal of the indirect approach is to influence the global environment by shaping and stabilizing it to deny terrorists safe havens, access to population bases that are ripe for terrorist recruiting operations and erode support for terrorist ideologies (p.III-6). Though the partnerships with participating nations the USG is able to limit financial and logistical support to the various terrorist organizations; all the while presenting the USG in a more positive light by not acting arbitrarily; thus presenting a more positive image.
Winning the IO Battle Terrorists have used Information Operations (IO) to disrupt popular support for coalition forces and to garner regional and international sympathy and support for insurgent forces since the beginning of hostile actions. The fight to have the USG displayed in a positive light is a continuous and ongoing conflict. Terrorist have long employed IO in support of attacks; sometimes to purport a task other times as a method of counter intelligence to sway the public forum. In the world of counterterrorism IO is everything and a basis for operations. The importance of portraying a positive image can decide whether or not an area will be hostile, indifferent or pro to US forces. The DOD has taken IO serious enough to assign specific officers who do nothing but handle IO and counter IO messages. Additionally the DOD has used education as the venue of choice for this clash as it is a battle for the youth of a given country. The feeling of the DOD is through education the recruit pool for terrorist organizations will be limited and support for extremist ideology will eventually dry up.

Conclusion Prior to September 11, 2001 the United States Government practiced a policy of deterrence; afterwards the Government did an about face and took the fight to the terrorists. By doing this the enemy was disrupted and forced into an environment where they were not as protected or comfortable. According to LTC (Ret.) Morningstar (2009) deterrence begins in the temporal dimension of operations (p.22). The magnitude by which the United States Government changed its philosophy will forever go down as a turning point in the war on terror. Terrorist now must factor in the aggressive nature of the change and plan accordingly. As intelligence sharing travels at the speed of the World Wide Web the shadows for terrorists to hide in are reduced. Since Al Qaeda awoke the United States of America from its false sense of security we have changed how the fight is fought forcing terrorist into the light consequently deterring their most dangerous courses of action.

References
Fisher, U. (2007). Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values. Homeland Security Affairs III(1), 1-17.
Morningstar, J.K. (2009). Deterring Terror: A strategic approach. The Guardian, 11(2), 17-26.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
United States Army (2005, August 15). A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century TRADOC Handbook No. 1, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of Defense.
United States (2010, November). DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of Defense.
United States (2010, November). Antiterrorism: Joint Publication 3-07.2, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of Defense.
United States (2006, February). Information Operations: Joint Publication 3-13, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of Defense.
United States (2009, November). Counterterrorism: Joint Publication 3-26, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of Defense.