Civilian Control of the Military

Marylou Fulton

Civilian Control of the Military
The United States military is one of the most important and celebrated institutions our country has. Opinion surveys have shown that Americans have more confidence in the military than in any other institution. Former rampant hostility toward the armed services during the Vietnam era, as well as periods earlier in American history, has faded. The courageous “can do” military has won the empathy and hearts of our nation far and wide, especially in light of the recent assassination of the professed mastermind behind the 9/11 World Trade Center terrorist attack, Osama Bin Laden. A June 2011 Gallup poll found that 78 percent of Americans have a great deal/quite a lot of confidence in the military, 35 percent have faith in the presidency and only 12 percent have any confidence in Congress (in a December 2010 Gallup survey, Americans ' assessment of Congress had hit a new low, with only 13 percent saying they approved of the way Congress was handling its job. The 83 percent disapproval rating was also the worst Gallup had measured in more than 30 years of tracking congressional job performances). Inasmuch as the U.S. military is highly esteemed, it should be understood that ultimate military authority rests in the civilian chain of command. Civilian-military relation is a concept the framers of the Constitution knew was fundamental to democracy. Therefore, it is important to understand the role of the military in democracy. Consequently, there are dangers to the erosion of civilian control over the military.

Most Americans don 't realize how special the civilian-military relationship is and how it has contributed to the country. The framers of the U.S. Constitution labored to make sure the military would be under civilian control. The colonies had just fought a war for freedom from Britain where the king controlled the British military, and the framers did not care to duplicate that system. When they wrote the Constitution they divided the responsibilities for the military, strongly placing the responsibilities in civilian hands.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "to raise and support Armies …" and "to provide and maintain a Navy." In addition, Congress must provide for the state militias when they are called to federal service. Article II, Section 2 states, "The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the actual Service of the United States." Hence, the civilian chain of command has ultimate military authority. The president is the highest in the chain of command and is known as the Commander in Chief. The president oversees many matters of national policy therefore the Secretary of Defense has an essential responsibility in the oversight of military actions. The Secretary of Defense answers to the president. These two lines of authority guides military action.

The U.S. Department of State says, “Democracy is government in which power and civic responsibility are exercised by all citizens, directly or through their freely elected representatives.” Americans are fortunate to live in a democracy and an important facet of democracy is leadership. It is paramount in any democracy to understand where the power lies. The military must understand its role in a democracy. Its chief position is to defend society, not define it (Kohn). Military leaders advise our civilian leaders, however it is the decisions of our civilian leaders that are carried out by the military. It is not to determine policy from the cocoon of the Pentagon, but to do what any administration tells it to do (Smith). Civilian leadership ensures that our country 's values, institutions, and policies are the free choices of the people rather than the military.

In addition, the military is not purposed to represent or support any social or ethnic group, or especially, any political viewpoints. Its loyalty is to the larger principles of the nation, to the rule of law, and to the doctrine of democracy itself. This tenet of civilian control and authority over the military is rudimentary to democracy. Civilians must direct their nation’s military and make the important decisions on issues of national defense, not because they are in any way intellectually superior than military personnel, but specifically because they are the people’s agent and in being so, are designated with the responsibility for making these decisions and remaining accountable for them (Cincotta).

The president of the United States is in essence the CEO of the country. But, one of the most distinguished roles the president of the United States has is the role of Commander-in-Chief of the military. Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution says:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Office, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

The role of Commander-in-Chief places tremendous power and responsibility in the hands of the president. As Commander-in-Chief, the system of checks and balances is observed. Even though the president is leader of the military services, Congress actually has the power to declare war. Moreover, the president is never a member of the armed services. He is its civilian leader. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the top military commander under the president.

The nature of power granted to the president’s role in the military as Commander-in-Chief started out with a limited view by the early framers. The purely military aspects of the Commander-in-Chiefship were those that were originally stressed. In 1833, Joseph L. Story, the Chief Justice of the United States of America, wrote a commentary on the Constitution of the United States. In his commentaries he stated: “The propriety of admitting the president to be commander in chief, so far as to give orders, and have a general superintendency, was admitted. But it was urged, that it would be dangerous to let him command in person, without any restraint, as he might make a bad use of it. The consent of both houses of Congress ought, therefore, to be required, before he should take the actual command. The answer then given was, that though the president might, there was no necessity that he should, take the command in person; and there was no probability that he would do so, except in extraordinary emergencies, and when he was possessed of superior military talents.”

This is why the president is not an actual member of the military in uniform. The nation would otherwise be like the monarchy the framers worked so hard to get away from.

Consequently, there are dangers to the erosion of civilian control over the military. According to Professor Richard Kohn from the University of North Carolina, who is one of, if not the leading, American military historians on the issue of civil-military relations, “Military officers who feel contempt for their elected or appointed supervisors, or the voters who placed them in office, are unlikely to advise them wisely or carry out their policies effectively….If the trend toward increasing friction and hostility in civil-military relations during the last three [administrations]--those of Johnson, Carter, and Clinton--continues into the future, the national security of the United States will not be well served (Kohn).” In Professor Kohn’s essay, Civilian Control in the Military, he articulates, “The threat to civilian control have been unspecified but assumed in this essay. It bears repeating that any breakdown or erosion of constitutional process caused or used by the military or that permits the military to become independent represents a threat to democratic rule.” He develops his argument further by stating: Unitary control of the military, or control by one person or branch or institution of government that unbalances power, can permit the military to become the tool of tyranny and, quite possibly, the successor tyrant. A military establishment larger than needed, tasked with missions beyond national defense, strains the trust between soldiers and society that must underlie stable civilian control. Political or bureaucratic conditions periodically offer armed forces limited opportunities to disobey, circumvent, ignore, or defy civilian authority. And of course last, and most dangerous, a military leadership willing to intervene improperly in politics and governance always threatens military subordination.
The history of civil-military relations has not been without its own setbacks. The most recent example occurred last year, 2010. General Stanley McCrystal was the commander of troops and operations in Afghanistan. He was highly respected and thought to be effective in strategies of counter-insurgency. However, after an interview with and embedded report, Michael Hastings, a contributing writer for Rolling Stones Magazine, McCrystal ended up resigning his prestigious position. In other words, he was fired by President Obama. McCrystal’s statements in the article were not flattering of the president to say the least; his comments were viewed as offensive and belittling to President Obama, Vice-President Biden, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Was Obama justified in firing this Four Star general? Was McCrystal’s banter, and, no less, in front of a worldly reporter for Rolling Stone Magazine, appropriate? Is this really an issue of military insubordination of a general with thirty-four years experience in the military, to a former lawyer turned Commander-in-Chief? General McCrystal, a legendary leader in combat, deserved some sort of punishment. He should have been reprimanded. But, fired? This lose-lose situation was a clear political victory for President Obama. McCrystal noted in his first meeting with the president that President Obama seemed disengaged and uninformed. How could the general not be appalled at the president 's conduct? As tactless as the General’s comments were, his comments spoke to an understandable deep-seated frustration within the U.S. military in Afghanistan and possessed a level of truth about Obama 's civilian officials that made the President decidedly uneasy. Perhaps General McCrystal’s frustrations should not been voiced in front of a reporter whose main goal and interest is to serve the sales and notoriety for his publication. Likewise, perhaps President Obama took political strides to create powerful limitations on future options by replacing McCrystal with General Petraeus.
Dr. Mackubin Owens is Editor of Orbis, the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s quarterly journal of international affairs, and Senior Fellow at its Program on National Security. In addition, he is Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He keenly communicates, “There is no more important question facing a state than the place of its military relative to civil society and the roles that the military exercises. The reason is simple: on the one hand, the coercive power of a military establishment, especially a strong and effective one, makes it at least a potential threat to the regime. On the other, a weak military establishment also threatens the regime because of the likelihood that the former will fail to protect the latter. This is the central paradox of civil-military relations.”
It has been determined that the role of our military establishment is to carry out the policies of our civilian leadership. But, like every relationship, success in civil-military relations depends on trust and respect from both sides.

Works Cited
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