Civilization process

Table of contents

1. Introduction to Norbert Elias as a sociologist

Norbert Elias is one of the few twentieth-century sociologists ranking among the truly great and classical social thinkers. His writings “The Court Society” and “The Civilizing Process” are now acclaimed as modern classics. He developed a unique approach to social theory known as process sociology. Since the translation of his work into English began to accelerate in the 1980s, a growing number of books and articles on topics including health, sexuality, gender, crime, national and ethnic identity and globalization, in a variety of disciplines, utilize Elias as an authority on the history of emotions, identity, the body, violence and state formation
His sociological analysis stresses the ‘civilizing process’ by which modern European societies have pacified over the last five centuries. The emotional identification between the inhabitants of each society has increased to contribute to historical–sociological approaches to International Relations. Elias analyzed dominant attitudes towards cruelty and suffering in different phases of human history in his study of the civilizing process, his central purpose being to demonstrate the existence of a long-term trend to lower the ‘threshold of repugnance’ against public acts of violence within modern states. His observations about international relations were principally Hobbesian in nature, although Grotian and Kantian themes also permeated his writings. The latter are evident in his reflections on whether cosmopolitan emotions are stronger in the modern era than in earlier epochs. An empirical analysis of dominant global attitudes towards cruelty in world politics and an investigation of levels of emotional identification between different societies can extend Elias's study of the civilizing process. This form of inquiry can also contribute to the development of Martin Wight's pioneering essays on the sociology of states-systems and enlarge the English School's analysis of ‘civility’ and the ‘civilizing process’ in international relations. More broadly, new linkages between historical sociology and International Relations can be developed around an investigation of the dominant responses to cruelty and suffering — and levels of cosmopolitan identification — in different states-system

2. Norbert Elias Major Works with reference to Sociology

The Civilizing Process (1994) The Court Society (1983)

In his book The Court Society, Norbert Elias took on the ambitious task of explaining both the rise of state power and the genesis of modern emotions. In particular, Elias wondered how it had been possible for European monarchs to 'domesticate' the nobles who were formally subject to their rule; Elias also wondered how it happened that Europeans acquired the ability to restrain their basic emotional impulses to resist the urge to strike with deadly force when insulted, and so forth. Elias believed that these two transformations were closely related to one another and linked by the institution of the royal court.
3. Elements of Elias Approach to a social transformation
His thesis had two elements:
1. Court an instrument of social control
The first element had to do with court as an instrument of social control. Elias noted that Europe experienced a long-term shift, beginning in the high middle Ages and continuing through to eighteenth century, in the balance of power between nobility and monarchy to the advantage of the latter. For a variety of reasons, this process accelerated in the sixteenth century -- among the causes of this acceleration were bureaucratization of government and changes in military technique that required greater regimentation of field commanders and the soldiers they commanded. Taken together, these transformations diminished the autonomy and intensified the subordination of noble families that had previously a high degree of independence from any sort of central, controlling agency. Naturally, these transformations also provoked resistance. In France, the Fronde was the final death spasm of the independent French nobility; from then on French nobles were dependent on the King for income and prestige.
As the principle instrument for dispensing income and prestige, the royal court enabled kings to exercise power over their nobles. In France, especially, Louis XIV transformed his court into an instrument for exercising his power over the nobility. Pressure to attend the king at court was great; once at court, however, nobles faced the ruinous cost of conspicuous consumption; all this made them more and more dependent on the king’s favor. Louis, in turn, used these demands to tighten his grip over them. As a result of these new circumstances, the measure of noble status changed: in earlier centuries, nobles had measured one another by the age of their lineages, their wealth and their ability to wield power in the provinces where they lived. Now proximity to the king was all important. Hence the importance of court ritual: Louis used the ceremonies of Versailles—his lever, his strolls in the park, his coucher—to show who was in and who was out; from Louis’ perspective, it was a system of divide and rule in which ceremony, not war, was the principal instrument of power. Elias therefore spoke of Versailles as a “gilded cage”.
2. Transformation of emotions
The second aspect of his argument had to do with the transformation of emotions. At issue for Elias was a shift from “social constraint toward self-restraint”. Prior to the sixteenth century, there were few instruments in place for controlling affect—the expression of emotion in behavior. If you were angry with someone, you attacked him; if you were please with someone, you embraced him; and so on. What few constraints existed were external, social: others constrained you from acting impulsively on your emotions. By the nineteenth century, Elias argued, people had no only learned to control their affect, they had also learned to internalize those controls, so that by the time they reached maturity, they no longer needed to be told that it was inappropriate to immediately stab someone who insults you. In between was a long process, in which the emotions were gradually domesticated, first by the imposition of external, social controls, then eventually by psychological ones.
4. Historiographical methods and analysis

Elias's work is quite fascinating. Basically, it theorizes that the process of "civilization" is largely the result of people subordinating their impulsive drives -- the repression of the id by the ego and superego. Elias says that this process is mutually reinforcing and not entirely rational. People demonstrate greater self-restraint as their social organization becomes more complex and interdependent. Likewise, increased levels of self-restraint propel a greater level of complexity and interdependence. Central to Elias's notion of "progress" along the scale of impulsiveness to self-restraint is the level of security under which people live. In societies that do not provide a high level of physical or material security, the impulsiveness of the id reigns. For those that achieve a high level of security, the restraint of the ego and superego keep the id in check.
5. Elias's theory of power
Elias centrally examined a figuration formed by two working class groups in ‘Winston Parva’, his pseudonym for a suburb of Leicester, a medium-sized city in the English East Midlands. One of these groups, ‘the established’, was clearly dominant. The other, ‘the outsiders’, was clearly subordinate. According to Elias, these groups were identical in terms of the conventional indices of social stratification – wealth, income, occupations, education, status/prestige – differing only in the fact that members of the ‘established’ group and their families had lived in the community for several generations, whilst the ‘outsiders’ and their families were relative newcomers. Yet a whole constellation of symptoms usually associated with class exploitation and social oppression was detectable in the relations between them. It is evident in the passage that follows that Elias was, at least in part, developing these observations in response to long dominant conventional Marxist and Weberian formulations of power. He wrote:
One could see here the limitations of any theory which explains power differentials only in terms of a monopolistic possession of non-human objects such as weapons or means of production and disregards the figurational aspects of power differentials due purely to differences in the degree of organization of the human beings concerned. The latter, especially differences in the degree of internal cohesion and communal control, can play a decisive part in the greater power ratio of one group in relation to that of another, the power-superiority of the old-established group was to a large extent of this type. It was based on the high degree of cohesion of families who had known each other for two or three generations, in contrast to the newcomers who were strangers in relation not only to the old residents but also to each other. It was thanks to their greater potential for cohesion and its activation by social control that the old residents were able to reserve offices in their local organizations … for people of their own kind and firmly to exclude from them people who lived in the other part [the ‘outsiders’] and who, as a group, lacked cohesion. Exclusion and stigmatization of the outsiders by the established group thus were two powerful weapons used by the latter to maintain their identity, to assert their superiority, keeping the others firmly in their place.
The power of the ‘established’ group in Winston Parva thus depended, according to Elias, on the fact that the ‘oldness’, that is, the length of time of their association, had enabled them to develop greater cohesion relative to the ‘outsiders’, many of whom started as strangers to each other, and this, in turn, enabled them to monopolize official positions in local associations. Such greater cohesion of ‘established’ relative to ‘outsider’ groups, Elias suggested, is a common, ‘purely figurational’ aspect of dominance-subordination relations, that is, of figurations in which some are dominant and others subordinate. The criticism implied here of the Marxian and similar approaches was later taken up by Elias explicitly. He recognized the sociological value of what he called Marx's ‘great discovery’, namely the idea that ownership and control of the means of production constitute the key determinants of class relations, but was critical of what he regarded as the tendency in some sociological circles – it was probably at its strongest in the 1960s and 1970s – ‘to see in it the end of the road of discovery about human societies’. ‘One might rather’, he added, ‘regard it as one manifestation of a beginning’. In other words, Elias considered Marx to have developed an important and significant insight in uncovering a fundamental inter-relationship between the asymmetrical distribution of the means of production and a correspondingly uneven distribution of the means of satisfying human material needs. However, Elias considered this to be only partially correct since Marx presented the struggle over ‘economic’ goals as the ‘root source’ of conflict between dominant and subordinate groups such that, ‘to this day the pursuit of “economic” goals, elastic and ambiguous as this use of the term “economic” is, appears to many people as the “real”, the basic goal of human groups by comparison with which others appear to be less “real”, whatever that may mean’
Elias would not have sought to deny that Marx's theory of class formation deals with the generation of a particular form of social cohesion, namely that involved in the transformation of disunited ‘classes in them’ into united ‘classes for themselves’. What he would have denied is that such processes are to be universally understood solely intra-societal and in relation to modes of production. ‘Economic’ forms are socially structured and socially structuring but, Elias contended, they are not alone in that respect: other aspects of figurations which, especially in an age of increasing and increasingly rapid globalization, have to be understood inter-societal and not simply intra-societal such as state-formation which is influenced, among other things, by war, the length and density of interdependency chains which have long since been spreading beyond national borders, and the relative cohesion of and balance of power between groups, all of which are equally structured and structuring and no less ‘real’. Under specific circumstances, these other aspects enjoy degrees of autonomy in relation to and even dominance over modes of production. That is, in this as in other aspects of his work, Elias rejected the notion of universal ‘law-like’ relations between supposedly constituent social ‘parts’ such as ‘the economy’, ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’. Consistent with this, he suggested that the degree to which ‘economic’ conflicts are paramount in a society is partly a function of the balance of power between its constituent groups. He wrote:
The supremacy of the economic aspects of established-outsider relationships is most pronounced where the balance of power between the contenders is most uneven. The less that is the case, the more recognizable become other, non-economic aspects of the tensions and conflicts. Where outsider groups have to live at a subsistence level, the size of their earnings outweighs all their other requirements in importance. The higher they rise above the subsistence level, the more does even their income serve as a means of satisfying human requirements other than that of stilling their most elementary animalistic or ‘material’ needs and the more keenly are groups in that situation liable to feel the inferiority of power and status from which they suffer. And it is in that situation that the struggle between established and outsiders gradually ceases to be, on the part of the latter, simply a struggle for stilling their hunger, for the means of physical survival, and becomes a struggle for satisfying other human requirements as well.
According to Elias, in other words, the phase of development of the shifting balance of power between established and outsider groups plays a key part in shaping the aims and demands of the outsiders and in the responses of the established to them. This insight has more fundamental implications for Elias's discussion of power per se. He offered the following variation:
‘Power means any chance within a social relationship to realize one's own will, even in the face of resistance, regardless of the basis on which this chance rests’. It was this idea of the relational character of power that was seized upon by Elias. Thus he wrote of ‘power-balances’ or ‘power-ratios’ and suggested that: From the day of its birth, a baby has power over its parents, not just the parents over the baby. At least the baby has power over them as long as they attach … value to it. If not, it loses its power. Equally bi-polar is the balance between a slave and his master. The master has power over his slave, but the slave also has power over his master, in proportion to his function for his master – his master's dependence on him. In relationships between parents and infants, masters and slaves, power chances are distributed very unevenly. But whether the differentials are large or small, balances of power are always present wherever there is functional interdependence between people … Power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of a relationship – o
Elias went on to tie the concept of power more explicitly to that of interdependence. A solution to the problems of power depends on power being understood unequivocally as a structural characteristic of a relationship … We depend on others; others depend on us. In so far as we are more dependent on others than they are on us, more reliant on others than they are on us, they have power over us, whether we have become dependent on them by their use of naked force, or by our need to be loved, our need for money, healing, status, a career or simply for excitement
It is noteworthy that Elias wrote this in the late 1960s for publication in a German book which appeared in 1970, for the seemingly straightforward diagnosis that he offers is arguably sociologically profound. What Elias was suggesting is twofold:
(i) Power is ‘polymorphous’, that is, many-sided and inherent in all human relationships; and (ii) that the key to understanding power lies in the interdependency of people. The examples
(ii) Elias gives in the passages we have quoted all refer to ‘bi-polar’ or ‘two-person’ relationships but he was clear that power balances in the wider society and in the relationships between societies are always multipolar; that is, they involve large, complex and dynamic figurations of interdependent individuals and groups.
Elias's theory of what he called ‘functional democratization’ is inherent in his concept of power as deriving mainly from interdependence. He contended that the social transformation usually referred to by terms denoting specific aspects such as ‘industrialization’, ‘economic growth’, ‘urbanization’, ‘bureaucratization’ and many others, in fact involves a transformation of the total social structure. And, he suggested, one of the most significant aspects of such a total social transformation consists in the emergence of larger, more differentiated, and denser ‘chains of interdependence’. Concomitantly with this, according to Elias, there occurs a change in the direction of generally decreasing power differentials within and among groups, more specifically an equalizing change to some degree in the balance of power between rulers and ruled, social classes, men and women, parents and children, and the generations more generally. At the most general level, Elias maintained, such a process of ‘functional democratization’ occurs when increasing specialization takes place. That is the case because the performers of specialized roles gain from their specializations chances of exerting varying degrees of reciprocal influence and control, for example, by withdrawing their services or, in the case of the purchasers of these services, refusing to pay for them. The power chances of specialized groups are further enhanced if they manage to organize since they then become able by collective action to disrupt the wider chains of interdependence on which a modern society depends. It is in ways such as these, according to Elias, that increasing division of labor and the emergence of larger chains of interdependence lead over time to greater, more even forms of reciprocal dependency and, hence, to patterns of multi-polar influence and control within and among groups. It is important, however, to stress that we have said here ‘more even forms of reciprocal dependency’, not ‘even’ forms. The comparative is significant. Elias's hypothesis is about processes of equalization which can be demonstrated empirically to have occurred but is not intended to deny the vast inequalities which remain in Western societies and the world at large, and which have increased in certain respects in recent years.
It is noteworthy that our discussion above of Elias on power commenced in relation to an exposition of some of his other key ideas, and continued via an empirical analysis of established–outsider relationships, before moving on to a consideration of some of the long-term social processes involved in ‘functional democratization’. We stress this because it serves once more to demonstrate, firstly, the theoretical–empirical character of Elias's approach, secondly, the fundamental ‘interdependence’ of Elias's key concepts, and thirdly, the primacy of process in his sociological models. In the next part of this chapter, we shall explore more centrally the underpinning diachronic orientation of Elias's approach, with a specific discussion of his work on time, and a more general examination of some of his observations regarding the relations between history and sociology.

6. System Transformation from feudal society to a court society

Elias cites the changes in human behavior as Western Europe changed from a feudal society of warrior-nobles and knights into the court society of absolutist kings and aristocratic nobles. In the former, the use of violence was highly decentralized. Most people did not have adequate levels of security. To venture on the roads outside of town was to invite the certain predations of highwaymen or rival soldiers. Disputes between nobles were settled by violent confrontation. By contrast, in the society of absolutist kings, the use of violence was monopolized by the monarch. Nobles could no longer settle their disputes through violence, so the court society with its emphasis on manners, fashion, elaborate titles and intrigue evolved instead as a forum for noble competition and a means of differentiating the aristocracy from the commoners. The latter was also a much more complex and interdependent society than the former. Finally, the former had a general world view largely characterized by fear and emotion (superstition and religion), while the move toward "civilization" appealed increasingly to empirical rationalism

As far as historical reference goes, Elias provides a decidedly Marxist superstructure for his theories. Basically, his history begins in medieval Europe and proposes a rather linear view of civilization's development, as well as describing Western Europe as the vanguard of civilization's progress. It is wondering how Elias would describe the notion of a society moving away from "civilization" -- from a highly complex, centralized, interdependent society.
Central to any analysis of collapse through Elias's lens is the loss of material or physical security. Also, the relationship between changing social organization and the loss of security must be viewed as a mutually reinforcing process.
The collapse of the Roman Empire was certainly predicated by internal problems like declining harvests, political intrigue, etc. However, these internal problems greatly contributed to the rolling back of the frontier by Germanic barbarians. When the highly complex society of Rome lost steam, it lost its cohesive force among its populace. The citizens of Rome were willing to sacrifice for her but they involved themselves with the circuses of the Colosseum even as the empire crumbled around them. A substantial internal proletariat -- people who lived within Roman borders but felt no affinity or allegiance to Roman ideals -- swelled in number. A fine example of this proletariat is offered by the rapid spread of Christianity through Rome, in spite of its initial criminalization by the Roman authorities.
So, the short version is that eventually complexity imploded, the "barbarian" conquered the "civilized," and Europe plunged into the Dark Ages. However, traces of the "civilized" still remained after 476 A.D. -- namely the Catholic Church. It is strange that what initially was a proletarian movement within Rome (Christianity) became its vehicle for the preservation of classical culture as society became less complex, less secure, less rational and more violent. What this demonstrates, however, is that the move either forward or backward on the scale of "civilization" is often a process of negotiation between the old and the new, the more and less "civilized." Even as Rome fell, it planted the seeds of what would eventually bloom after the Dark Ages had passed. Many ideas of the Renaissance, scientific revolution and Enlightenment found their genesis in the work of classical Greek and Roman scholar.

7. Critical Analysis of Elias’ Court Society as a step towards transformation process
In short, Elias was describing the evolution of manners. In his view, court society played a crucial role in this transformation, too. It was school of manners in Europe, after all, and its influence on conduct rippled throughout European society. For evidence of the transformation, Elias turned to advice books—manuals written for untutored non-nobles on how one should behave at court among courtiers. In these manuals, Elias detected a shift in what he called the “threshold of disgust”. In the late medieval manuals, Elias found that behaviors such as blowing one's nose were described much more frankly than would be the case later on. He also found that the manuals recommended behaviors that in later centuries would be rejected as impossibly boorish. Behind these transformations lurked the court society, whose inhabitants were constantly elaborating new rules of behavior in order to distinguish themselves from newcomers—the sort of people who needed manuals to know how to conduct themselves. Eventually, the manners developed at court percolated down through society. Thus a social dynamic stimulated the formation of psychological structures on a societal scale.
8. Critical Analysis of Elias’ ‘Civilizing process’ as a step towards transformation process
Norbert Elias's sociological analysis of ‘the civilizing process’ — the process by which modern European societies have been pacified over the last five centuries and emotional identification between the inhabitants of each society has increased — has much to contribute to historical–sociological approaches to International Relations. Elias analyzed dominant attitudes towards cruelty and suffering in different phases of human history in his study of the civilizing process, his central purpose being to demonstrate the existence of a long-term trend to lower the ‘threshold of repugnance’ against public acts of violence within modern states. His observations about international relations were principally Hobbesian in nature, although Grotian and Kantian themes also permeated his writings. The latter are evident in his reflections on whether cosmopolitan emotions are stronger in the modern era than in earlier epochs. An empirical analysis of dominant global attitudes towards cruelty in world politics and an investigation of levels of emotional identification between different societies can extend Elias's study of the civilizing process. This form of inquiry can also contribute to the development of Martin Wight's pioneering essays on the sociology of states-systems and enlarge the English School's analysis of ‘civility’ and the ‘civilizing process’ in international relations. More broadly, new linkages between historical sociology and International Relations can be developed around an investigation of the dominant responses to cruelty and suffering — and levels of cosmopolitan identification — in different states-systems.

The End