Coal Mining Act

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 – Safety Issues The UMWA, though unsuccessful in including its high-risk population in the reform movement, led to the signing of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, often called the “Coal Act”, under President Richard Nixon’s administration. This act acknowledged that coal mining placed workers in dangerous situations, and that it was the nation’s responsibility to prevent the death and serious injury of coal miners. Under this act, extended power was granted to the Bureau of Mines, a department in the Interior, which in years prior did not have the regulatory power to inspect mines or enforce the mine safety recommendations.2 The act required coal companies to conduct inspections twice
a year of surface coal mines, and four times a year for underground mines, specifically limiting coal dust levels in underground mines. Among these regulations, monetary and criminal penalties were established as consequences.3 However, the Bureau of Mines still did not use the powers they were granted to enforce coal company regulations to protect their workers.
The Bureau did not impose the sanctions that violated the terms stated by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. In April of 1970, 1,000 violations found in 108 mines were left unsanctioned due to lack of inspectors. Also, non-unionized coal mines were either avoided or unaddressed by the Bureau for inspection, contributing to the continued mistreatment of miners who risked their lives to work in the dangerous conditions of uninspected coal mines. In fact, a non-unionized mine, Hurricane Creek in Kentucky, had multiple health and safety violations from the Bureau. None of these violations were followed up on. In December of 1970, an explosion happened due to excess coal dust and inappropriate explosive use, which killed 38 men. The Bureau of Mines declared itself as innocent, not taking responsibility for the tragedy, but coal miners knew that the Bureau was guilty.
2
While this section of the congressional act largely focused on the inspections of coal mines and coal companies for safety violations to prevent death or serious injury on the job, this example of governmental aid failing the miners adds to their distrust in the system. If miners could not expect the government to help them improve their working conditions, they could not expect to be adequately compensated for their black lung disease. The continued mistakes only made the miners and their families unsure of governmental aid, and unsure of whom they could and could not trust.
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 – Disparities in the Compensation The regulations that this act placed on coal companies to monitor coal dust levels was largely to protect miners from developing black lung disease, as the more exposure to coal dust, the more likely the miner is to suffer from the disease. The act also had a second goal: to mandate compensation for those individuals who were completely and irreversibly disabled by pneumoconiosis. This compensation was funded by the federal government for the first three years under coverage, and then by the associated states thereafter. In section 203 of the Coal Act medical examinations in effort to prevent the development and progression of black lung were addressed. To be eligible to receive benefits, miners had to have chest X-rays within 18 months of the enactment, and another three years after if still employed in the coal mines. If a miner displayed evidence of developing pneumoconiosis in the second examination, he must have a second chest X-ray two years later. The Coal Act also stated that miners who displayed evidence of developing pneumoconiosis had the opportunity to transfer his position to another area of the mine with less coal dust exposure, specifically under 2.0 milligrams per meter of air, and still receive the same rate of pay. Also, the examinations were not to be paid for by the miner, and instead was charged to the coal company. If there were inadequate resources to receive the exams, coal companies were required to arrange for the miners so the examinations could be conducted appropriately. Companies were also required to cover all charges to the miner, and to reimburse the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, if they had to handle arrangements of examinations.3
The Coal Act made a substantial difference in the conversation about coal mining and worker’s compensation in that it defined the issue for what it was, and made the step to provide miners with the resources they needed to receive care for their disease.
However, this act suffered from critical disparities that made it difficult for all coal miners who were faced with black lung disease. The act only briefly mentions that examinations should be kept uniform “to the greatest degree possible.” 3 This creates a large disparity in the execution of the examination policy, as the act does not specifically state how the exams should be treated, and what actually counts as developing black lung. There have been numerous cases where miners have felt that they were unfairly treated under this act. In these instances, miners have been told that their disease was not “good enough” to receive compensation, but under whose terms? The act does not clearly state what classifies pneumoconiosis as onset, as there are many stages to developing the full, complicated
CWP.
Coal companies could pay any local, certified facility to conduct the examinations. These facilities would send the radiograph results to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to be evaluated by at least two, sometimes three, readers. Trout et. al looked into how this process worked, and found a large variation in how the readers determined what exactly qualifies as pneumoconiosis. Since these readers often came from different institutions, there was a range of interpretation of the disease, causing many cases to be rejected due to the lack of a common denominator. Ironically, readers were not allowed to state their reason for rejection of cases.4
Not only did the interpretation of the disease vary among those evaluating the exams, but it also differed from the way coal miner’s viewed their disease. A study conducted by Donald Rasmussen found that many miners were incapable of work, even though their X-rays did not pass the Coal Act’s compensation requirement. The Coal Act requires those compensated to be in full stage, complicated CWP. However, there are varying stages to developing the disease that are debilitating to the worker, causing difficulty working and living a normal lifestyle. Rasmussen also argued that simpler forms of black lung disease were believed by authorities in coal companies and examination facilities to have little to no impact on the coal miner. 5 It is