Cognitivism in Philosophy

In this paper I will provide both sides of cognitivism and non-cognitivism and argue that non-cognitivism is superior to cognitivism and that it is also more believable. I will first explain cognitivism and non-cognitivism and break them down into smaller sections and describe the arguments for and against both. Next, I will go over the points on which cognitivism and non-cognitivism agree and disagree upon. Then, I will go over some positive and negative arguments that go along with cognitivism. After that I will talk about some positives and negatives of non-cognitivism. Finally, I will tell you where I stand on the meta-ethics argument of cognitivism and non-cognitivism and why I agree with that theory.
First thing I will go over, and break down cognitivism and non-cognitvism in meta-ethic philosophy. Cognitivism in philosophy is the meta-ethical theory that moral judgments state facts and are either true or false. Moral judgments are, or express states of beliefs. A strong cognitivist theory is one which holds moral judgments apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity, and can be the result of cognitively accessing the facts which makes them true. Cognitively assessing is of or pertaining to the mental processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning, as contrasted with emotional and choices made by will. Cognitivist theories can be naturalist or non-naturalist. A naturalist believes that moral judgments are true or false by a natural state of affairs. A natural state of affairs is a state of affairs that consists in the instance of a natural property. Natural properties are properties of natural sciences or in psychology. Non-naturalist think that moral properties are not linked to natural properties. Non-naturalism stands in opposition to naturalism, which claims that moral terms and properties are reducible to non-moral terms and properties. Non-Cognitivism states that moral judgments express non-cognitive states such as emotions or desires.