Cold Start 2013
The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013 Vol. 36, No. 4, 512–540, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.766598
India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn
SHASHANK JOSHI
Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Downloaded by [Harvard College] at 13:28 22 July 2013
ABSTRACT For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine’s architects. KEY WORDS: India, South Asia, India-Pakistan, Indian Army, Cold Start, Limited War, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism
South Asia remains one of the last holdouts of symmetric, conventional warfare.1 The armoured formations that would dot the border in the event of major war are redolent of the Soviet columns once envisioned on the plains of Europe;2 the Indians once seeking to reach the Indus River and the erstwhile Red Army thrusting toward the Rhine, both on a high-intensity, nuclear battlefield. This is neither an inapt parallel, given the Russian and American origins of older Indian and Pakistani weaponry,3 nor unduly speculative, since war has indeed broken out in the nuclear age (in 1999) and was waged for a full 20 weeks.4 Two decades ago, this juxtaposition may have flattered the Indian military. However, over the last decade,
Michael Carver, ‘Conventional War in the Nuclear Age’, in Gordon Alexander Craig, Felix Gilbert and Peter Paret (eds), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986), 798–803. 2 Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: OUP 1994), 19–21.
India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn
SHASHANK JOSHI
Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Downloaded by [Harvard College] at 13:28 22 July 2013
ABSTRACT For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine’s architects. KEY WORDS: India, South Asia, India-Pakistan, Indian Army, Cold Start, Limited War, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism
South Asia remains one of the last holdouts of symmetric, conventional warfare.1 The armoured formations that would dot the border in the event of major war are redolent of the Soviet columns once envisioned on the plains of Europe;2 the Indians once seeking to reach the Indus River and the erstwhile Red Army thrusting toward the Rhine, both on a high-intensity, nuclear battlefield. This is neither an inapt parallel, given the Russian and American origins of older Indian and Pakistani weaponry,3 nor unduly speculative, since war has indeed broken out in the nuclear age (in 1999) and was waged for a full 20 weeks.4 Two decades ago, this juxtaposition may have flattered the Indian military. However, over the last decade,
Michael Carver, ‘Conventional War in the Nuclear Age’, in Gordon Alexander Craig, Felix Gilbert and Peter Paret (eds), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986), 798–803. 2 Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: OUP 1994), 19–21.
Bibliography: Ahmed, Ali, ‘Ongoing Revision of Indian Army Doctrine’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 6 Jan. 2010, . ‘Armed Conflicts Report: India – Maoist Insurgency’, Ploughshares, Jan. 2009, . 539 Malik, V.P., Kargil from Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, a joint venture with the India Today Group 2006)