Comparing Chapters 8 And Nine Of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Within book 8 and 9 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he proposes friendship is one of the most choice-worthy goods an individual can have (Aristotle 149, 1170a, section 7). However, in chapter 3 of book 8, Aristotle asserts the finest friendships are enduring insofar it is good, and the virtues remain the same. However, his proposal about the similarities of virtues doesn't seem entirely correct since people gradually change over time, but the relationship can continue to be good and individuals remain close friends. Problematically, Aristotle asserts if the characteristics of the friend were to change, the friendship ought to be dissolved since the peer can potentially become bad; unless the agent can return their friend to their original
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state. However, this essay aims to argue that friendships become enduring through the means of gaining/building confidence in our friend, rather individuals being similar in virtuous characteristics. Firstly, Aristotle asserts the friendship based on the love of virtue is the most complete type of friendship, compared to two other types (122, section 6). The two other types of friendships are pleasure, and utility. However, Aristotle asserts these types of friendship are not lasting, because they are created for the sake of obtaining a good generated from their peer. Insofar the individuals in the relationship generate pleasure, or provide a service of utility to each other (121 section 2 line 15-17). Problematically, once that pleasure/utility has ceased, the friendship will likely dissolve since the advantageous goods have stopped being provided (122 section 2 line 15-17). He does propose that a friendship based on pleasure resembles the virtuous friendship, because the individuals in these relationships aim to be pleasant to each other (126, section 4). However, a friendship based on the goods an agent has to give, is considered a lesser friendship in comparison to the virtuous friendship. Arguably, it is because the agent has a qualification that makes them become disable, and there is no mutual desire/awareness of generating goodwill for the friend themselves (121, 1156). Furthermore, friendships structured solely on the qualifications of utility and pleasure would be considered objectifying by Aristotle, because these relationships can reduce the agent to becoming an object that generates pleasant goods (121). Similarly, of how it is possible to perceive that certain objects are lovable, because they are an entity that appear to provide some source of good (120 section 2 line 26-27). Nonetheless, the objectification of an individual can occur, only if there is no mutual desire to wish/cause goodwill upon the individual who provides the good. The relationships based on qualification are coined negatively, because they are ultimately aimed at a self-gain.
Consequently, the good generated in the relationship is for the sake of the agent, not their peer. Furthermore, the friendship of utility is considered a lesser friendship, because it would be coined as a fellowship. Arguably, because the individuals involved share an equal interest towards obtaining something of benefit, and the individuals see one-another as a useful resource for attaining their desired end (123 section 2, line 15). Nonetheless, Aristotle reduces friendships based on utility and pleasure, because it runs parallel with the intentions of base people who seek- others out for self-gain. As Aristotle quotes, “base people will be friends for pleasure or utility, since they are similar in that way. But good people will be friends because of themselves” (124 section 6). Ideally, the choice-worthy friendship to Aristotle “is the friendship of good people similar in virtue” (122, section 6). This is because it is a friendship where both agents unconditionally wish goodwill mutually, and the relationship is built without ‘qualifications’. A friendship without ‘qualifications’ can be understood as a relationship that is sought out not for the sake of pleasure or utility, rather it is sought out for the individual themselves. Furthermore, if both agents possess the same virtues, then they are likely to become friends since they share characteristics that will be considered lovable amongst one-another. In effect, Aristotle asserts the state of friendship is one where peers seek one-another out for the good of the individual, and together aims to flourish in their ideal virtuous behaviour. Ideally, individuals who desire to reach the intermediate state of the virtue(s), should consider surrounding themselves with others who are similar in character since they will also desire to reach the highest of goods. However, this friendship seems to be considered excellent, insofar the virtues amongst our friends will remain to the agent’s. However, this cannot be entirely correct.
This because Aristotle emphasizes that a friendship is enduring, insofar the virtuous similarities remain the same. However, if the virtues of character were to gradually change over time in one of the individuals, Aristotle would propose this would entail the dissolution of the friendship. Arguably, it is because the conjunction of the good, and virtuous similarity falter. Problematically, Aristotle doesn't allow that good people can become friends, rather they must be similar on the account of his proposal. Furthermore, a problem that arises is that there is no clear concept of what similarity between individuals means. An idea that can be proposed is that the similarity can be based on a unit scale from 1.0 to 10.0 (1.0 is deficient, and 10.0 is excessive). Ideally, the closer individuals are on the scale to one-another, the more likely they could become potential friends. Arguably, this similarity can be the potential factor that starts a friendship due to an appeal in similar character, however it could not be the key element that makes a relationship enduring. Arguably, as the friendship matures, the individuals will come to discover other characteristics/traits about their peer that was not be explicitly presented by virtuous behaviour alone. These subjective characteristics are additional traits that make the individual appear far more lovable, which gives the agent further evidence their peer is a choice-worthy friend since there is a deeper appeal of character (125, section 4.). However, it is significant to note that these subjective characteristics can only be discovered through the means of time. In effect, virtuous similarity would inarguably be a significant aspect to creating a friendship, however the problem that arises is that people and their characteristics are susceptible to
change.
Problematically, if there were to be a significant change in the choice-worthy friend, it would arguably be wrong in choosing to dissolve the friendship, without comprehending what has brought about the change in the individual. However, Aristotle would assert that the agent ought to help return their friend to a state of similarity. Problematically, if this is not possible, then A has a right to leave the friendship since it could become disadvantageous to them (141). Problematically, the friendship is meant to be aimed at unconditionally producing goodwill for one-another; the agent has a special obligation to their friend to comprehend what caused the spontaneous change. An example is a friendship based on courage, where both individuals are similar at first; person A is a 5.9, and person B is 6.5 on the courage scale. However, suppose person B becomes spontaneously grows brasher, and reaches unit 9.1 due to a variety of personal experiences that person A does not know of. Consequently, this can cause person B to appear significantly different to person A. However, Person A ought to recognize they have a special obligation to understand what caused the change in their friend’s behaviour, rather leaving the friendship. Nonetheless, it seems the weaker the friendship is (the time and experiences the individuals have spent with each other makes the friendship stronger), the more permissible it would be to dissolve the friendship. Problematically, if we were to dissolve a stronger friendship due to a change of virtues, then this could propose that there is a form of qualification in the virtuous friendship.
state. However, this essay aims to argue that friendships become enduring through the means of gaining/building confidence in our friend, rather individuals being similar in virtuous characteristics. Firstly, Aristotle asserts the friendship based on the love of virtue is the most complete type of friendship, compared to two other types (122, section 6). The two other types of friendships are pleasure, and utility. However, Aristotle asserts these types of friendship are not lasting, because they are created for the sake of obtaining a good generated from their peer. Insofar the individuals in the relationship generate pleasure, or provide a service of utility to each other (121 section 2 line 15-17). Problematically, once that pleasure/utility has ceased, the friendship will likely dissolve since the advantageous goods have stopped being provided (122 section 2 line 15-17). He does propose that a friendship based on pleasure resembles the virtuous friendship, because the individuals in these relationships aim to be pleasant to each other (126, section 4). However, a friendship based on the goods an agent has to give, is considered a lesser friendship in comparison to the virtuous friendship. Arguably, it is because the agent has a qualification that makes them become disable, and there is no mutual desire/awareness of generating goodwill for the friend themselves (121, 1156). Furthermore, friendships structured solely on the qualifications of utility and pleasure would be considered objectifying by Aristotle, because these relationships can reduce the agent to becoming an object that generates pleasant goods (121). Similarly, of how it is possible to perceive that certain objects are lovable, because they are an entity that appear to provide some source of good (120 section 2 line 26-27). Nonetheless, the objectification of an individual can occur, only if there is no mutual desire to wish/cause goodwill upon the individual who provides the good. The relationships based on qualification are coined negatively, because they are ultimately aimed at a self-gain.
Consequently, the good generated in the relationship is for the sake of the agent, not their peer. Furthermore, the friendship of utility is considered a lesser friendship, because it would be coined as a fellowship. Arguably, because the individuals involved share an equal interest towards obtaining something of benefit, and the individuals see one-another as a useful resource for attaining their desired end (123 section 2, line 15). Nonetheless, Aristotle reduces friendships based on utility and pleasure, because it runs parallel with the intentions of base people who seek- others out for self-gain. As Aristotle quotes, “base people will be friends for pleasure or utility, since they are similar in that way. But good people will be friends because of themselves” (124 section 6). Ideally, the choice-worthy friendship to Aristotle “is the friendship of good people similar in virtue” (122, section 6). This is because it is a friendship where both agents unconditionally wish goodwill mutually, and the relationship is built without ‘qualifications’. A friendship without ‘qualifications’ can be understood as a relationship that is sought out not for the sake of pleasure or utility, rather it is sought out for the individual themselves. Furthermore, if both agents possess the same virtues, then they are likely to become friends since they share characteristics that will be considered lovable amongst one-another. In effect, Aristotle asserts the state of friendship is one where peers seek one-another out for the good of the individual, and together aims to flourish in their ideal virtuous behaviour. Ideally, individuals who desire to reach the intermediate state of the virtue(s), should consider surrounding themselves with others who are similar in character since they will also desire to reach the highest of goods. However, this friendship seems to be considered excellent, insofar the virtues amongst our friends will remain to the agent’s. However, this cannot be entirely correct.
This because Aristotle emphasizes that a friendship is enduring, insofar the virtuous similarities remain the same. However, if the virtues of character were to gradually change over time in one of the individuals, Aristotle would propose this would entail the dissolution of the friendship. Arguably, it is because the conjunction of the good, and virtuous similarity falter. Problematically, Aristotle doesn't allow that good people can become friends, rather they must be similar on the account of his proposal. Furthermore, a problem that arises is that there is no clear concept of what similarity between individuals means. An idea that can be proposed is that the similarity can be based on a unit scale from 1.0 to 10.0 (1.0 is deficient, and 10.0 is excessive). Ideally, the closer individuals are on the scale to one-another, the more likely they could become potential friends. Arguably, this similarity can be the potential factor that starts a friendship due to an appeal in similar character, however it could not be the key element that makes a relationship enduring. Arguably, as the friendship matures, the individuals will come to discover other characteristics/traits about their peer that was not be explicitly presented by virtuous behaviour alone. These subjective characteristics are additional traits that make the individual appear far more lovable, which gives the agent further evidence their peer is a choice-worthy friend since there is a deeper appeal of character (125, section 4.). However, it is significant to note that these subjective characteristics can only be discovered through the means of time. In effect, virtuous similarity would inarguably be a significant aspect to creating a friendship, however the problem that arises is that people and their characteristics are susceptible to
change.
Problematically, if there were to be a significant change in the choice-worthy friend, it would arguably be wrong in choosing to dissolve the friendship, without comprehending what has brought about the change in the individual. However, Aristotle would assert that the agent ought to help return their friend to a state of similarity. Problematically, if this is not possible, then A has a right to leave the friendship since it could become disadvantageous to them (141). Problematically, the friendship is meant to be aimed at unconditionally producing goodwill for one-another; the agent has a special obligation to their friend to comprehend what caused the spontaneous change. An example is a friendship based on courage, where both individuals are similar at first; person A is a 5.9, and person B is 6.5 on the courage scale. However, suppose person B becomes spontaneously grows brasher, and reaches unit 9.1 due to a variety of personal experiences that person A does not know of. Consequently, this can cause person B to appear significantly different to person A. However, Person A ought to recognize they have a special obligation to understand what caused the change in their friend’s behaviour, rather leaving the friendship. Nonetheless, it seems the weaker the friendship is (the time and experiences the individuals have spent with each other makes the friendship stronger), the more permissible it would be to dissolve the friendship. Problematically, if we were to dissolve a stronger friendship due to a change of virtues, then this could propose that there is a form of qualification in the virtuous friendship.