Comparing Haraway And Latour's Ideas

Bruno Latour’s notion of nonhuman actors and Donna Haraway’s notion of the companion species are both concepts that are based around the view that humans are not alone in the creation and maintenance of society. They are unique concepts as animals are so often excluded from the sociological field. Jim Johnson states ‘the most liberal sociologist often discriminates against nonhumans’ (1988 p.1). Both Haraway and Latour seek to change this. Haraway has a background in science, with a PhD in biology. Despite being a sociologist of science, Bruno Latour has a background in theology. Their interdisciplinary perspectives mean their sociological approaches are noteworthy and unique. This essay will compare and contrast Latour’s idea of nonhuman actors
and Haraway’s notion of a companion species by looking at their sociological approaches. As well as comparing them to each other to see their strengths, weaknesses and how their backgrounds have influenced their theories, critiques from thinkers such as Marx will also be considered.
Their writing styles will be considered to see how it effects their presentation of nonhuman actors and companion species and if it makes it less or more convincing. Ideas that will be analysed are how animals contribute to society, but how Haraway and Latour differ in the way they see the relationship between animals and humans. How social constructionism influenced their arguments will also be considered, as well as their writing styles such as how many examples they use. How their sociological backgrounds influence their ideas will be explored in greater detail and finally their ideas regarding hybridity will be analysed. It appears that whilst both notions have their strengths and weaknesses, Latour’s is the most widely accepted and is also the most accurate portrayal of the human’s relationship with nonhumans, specifically animals, within contemporary
society.

Before dissecting the ideas of ‘nonhuman actors’ and ‘companion species’ it is key to understand exactly what it is Latour and Haraway mean by these terms. They will be delved into in greater detail within the body of this essay, however there can be many different interpretations of what they mean and therefore a solid definition should be outlined for clarity. The term nonhuman actor is not designated specifically to animals but is anything that identifies itself as not being human. Despite animals being one example, technology is another example of a nonhuman actor. The main example Haraway uses to demonstrate a companion species is the dog (Boulanger, 2004). The term ‘companion species’ specifically designated to animals.

Latour states that nonhuman actors and human actors combine to form a network, and this network forms culture. This theory is therefore called Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2007). The combination of human and nonhuman actors can be observed through the rise of newspaper stories mixing biology and society (Latour, 1991). A major theme of Latour’s work is therefore that without both human and nonhuman actors working together contemporary society would be completely different. Haraway states that human labor power is only part of lively capital and that animals such as dogs contribute to the economy hugely. Dogs in US are both ‘commodities and consumers of commodities’ (Haraway, 2008). The idea of a ‘companion species’ can be seen in patterns of consumerism such as dogs having just as much of a right to health as humans. Haraway also states that dogs play a role in the economy, an idea that Franklin agrees with. She states that ‘Australian sheep were used not only to displace indigenous people, but to ensure the nonreproducibility of the subsistence ecology supporting the Aboriginal way of life’, showing that sheep were pivotal to the development of a particular society. (Franklin, 2008 p.112) Therefore when comparing the ideas of the two academics it appears they are similar as they believe non human actors and companion species are a necessary part of a functioning society. They both deconstruct the Durkheimian theory of mechanical solidarity then twist it in order to include animals, stating that in order for society to function correctly both animals and humans must be present. This deconstruction of such a widely respected classical theory is hugely controversial. They both actively criticize Foucault’s species chauvinism (Haraway, 2003) and do not diminish the importance of nonhumans within society. This is also shown by Latour’s generalized symmetry that states that human and nonhuman agents are equal in importance in their place within the framework of society and should be spoken of in the same terms. This is something that Haraway strongly agrees with, shown when she states ‘the animals in the labs, including the oncomice, have face; they are somebody’ (2008 p.1). At a basic level their sociological approaches are therefore similar as they both state that a functional society contains both humans and animals.

The idea shared by Haraway and Latour that humans and non human animals come together with equal importance to form society is one which can be heavily criticized. It can be argued that whilst nature has its place within modern world the ever expanding metropolitan is pushing aside the natural, specifically animals, and their place is now irrelevant. Lawrence and Garne (2010) argue that the only place for animals in capitalism is in the commodity of food, insinuating that in their live state nonhuman animals is no use to humans. Some of the most established academics in history, such as Marx, would strongly disagree that animals have a place within capitalism. He states that society is defined by its level of production (Marx and Engels, 1848), and within societies such as the modern west animals produce nothing with use value independently and are therefore cannot contribute to the economy. His essentialist viewpoint (Fisk, 1988) is that humans possess a ‘uniqueness’ that creates the society that we know. It can therefore be said that both Latour’s notion of nonhuman actors and Haraway’s notion of companion species are simply unnecessary and their sociological approach contains no real basis as a nonhuman companion species should not be given any credit for present-day society. However, it can be said Haraway should be credited for recognizing the small contribution that dogs make to society. For example, dogs have been widely accredited in enhancing the lives of, and sometimes even curing, individuals with depression (Davis, 2002).

It has now been established that Haraway and Latour believe animal and human relationships are essential to the development of society via their theories of nonhuman actors within Actor Network Theory and companion species. However, Haraway believes that animals and society are one individual entity shown by her term ‘natureculture’ and Latour believes that they can be separate yet work together. Despite sharing the common ground that nonhumans are in the same network as humans, whether they are together or separate as entities is something the two academics disagree on. Latour created a schema to explain why a paradoxical society means that nature and culture are separate. In order for all possibilities of nature and society being transcendent and imminent to be covered, Latour produced a representation made up of the three paradoxes. The first of these is that nature is not our construction, it is transcendent and society is our free construction and is immanent. The second is that nature is our artificial construction and is immanent and society is not our construction and is transcendent. Because neither of these are independently logical, Latour added that nature and society should stay absolutely separate and then states that that if these two fields should connect it would be through the divine ‘crossed out God’ who in fact never actually intervenes. Because he never intervenes, nature and culture are separate and will remain separate entities. (Latour, 1991 p.128). Haraway counters this argument by stating that even things we describe as natural are in fact constructed by humans and therefore Latour’s constitution becomes futile. Latour’s paradoxical approach can also be referred to as too deductive, turning the complex relationship between nature and culture into a simple four-point argument that only takes the position that they can either be imminent or transcendent. This logical methodology has to be credited to Latour’s scientific background that informs his approach. Haraway’s view that nature and culture is unquestionably one unit can also be seen as over simplified. The sociological approaches of the theories therefore differ as Haraway believes nature and culture is intertwined and Latour states they are separate but work together.
When comparing the sociological approaches of Latour’s notion of nonhuman actors and Haraway’s notion of companion species it is key to consider that both academics employ a social constructivist mentality when analyzing them. Latour’s relationship with social constructionism is very complex. He states that the separation of humans, non-humans and a ‘crossed out god’ is constructed and by no means natural. This double separation produces the constitution outlined previously that validates the distinction between human and nonhumans. (Latour, 1991). Haraway agrees with Latour that animals and humans should be viewed under the same lens. There is a sense of togetherness for humans and animals throughout the entirety of Haraway’s work, hence the term ‘companion species’. Haraway therefore states that the separation between the ‘natural animal’ and the ‘cultural human’ is one that has been pushed by society. However, Haraway’s argument that humans and animals being separate is one that is created by society can be deconstructed via an almost reductio ad absurdum manner. If the social is also the natural, than surely a socially constructed way of thinking is also a natural way of thinking. The distinction between humans and animals can therefore be seen as a natural product and a construct of humans. As Latour does not see nature and culture as interchangeable but simply separate agents that work together, he does not run into this contradiction. Therefore Latour may take a social constructionist approach when looking at how nonhuman actors interact with human actors but for Haraway admitting that she takes a social constructionist view when looking at companion species arguably contradicts her entire argument.

Latour demonstrates his notion of nonhuman actors through metaphors and examples.
One example of this is that he references the Pasteurisation of France to describe how nonhuman actors heavily affect the social. If Pasteur had not conducted his studies on the prevention of diseases then French society would not have been transformed into the culture we know today. As Scientific knowledge is socially produced, the sociological approach of Latour is to use examples of societal production in order to demonstrate scientific advances (Lock, 2000). This most definitely has its advantages, but it has been criticised by many scholars as being ‘frustrating’. However, it can be argued that Latour’s idea of nonhuman actors within Actor Network Theory is one that needs examples and metaphors in order to understand. Haraway admits that her work uses ‘ironic metaphor’ in order to put forward her arguments. For example, her in her book ‘Primate Visions’ (1989) she focuses on how metaphors affect the studies of companion species. However, it has been argued that Haraway’s notion of companion species would benefit from more accessible examples like those used by Latour, as it is simply ‘detached from practicality’ (Sax, 2008). Although Latour and Haraway both use metaphors, the lack of practical examples in Haraway’s work means it can be hard to understand. However, it can be argued that the claim she is ‘detached from practicality’ is not due to her writing style, but because the concept
that nature and culture are so heavily fused together is something which when analysing in terms of normative, every day culture is incredibly hard to see. Therefore Latour and Haraway’s notions of nonhuman actors and companion species both rely heavily on metaphors in order to be explained. Despite the claims that Haraway’s examples are not practical, it is important to recognise that her ‘The Companion species Manifesto’ (2003) is incredibly example heavy. For example, it solely relies on the example of the ‘companion species’ of the dog, and then further uses examples of two specific dog breeds. These dog breeds are the Great Pyrenees and the Australian Shepherd. Therefore subjectively both Haraway and Latour use examples to illustrate their points.

One of the most frequently used criticisms to dissect Haraway is that she simply does not treat animals and humans as equally and interchangeably as she claims to and her idea of a ‘companion species’ is underdeveloped. Sax (2008) states that the division of dogs into different breeds perpetuates social class divisions. Additionally, the celebrated ‘pedigree’ is eerily familiar to the Nazi party’s eugenic regime of only breeding an Aryan race. Surely if Haraway believes that humans and the companion species should be held to the same standards, then splitting off of animals into breeds should not be celebrated. However, she does celebrate this. Dogs are therefore allowed to be categorized in a way that humans aren’t. Latour can be criticised equally as he believes that both human and nonhuman actors can be described using the same terms employing. However, within society the idea of equality within humans is so strong yet it is engrained within us that a purebred dog is better than a mongrel. Humans and animals are therefore not being described in the same terms and Latour’s approach of generalized symmetry is not used correctly. Haraway’s companion species and Latour’s nonhuman actors can therefore both be criticised as they lack practicality. In reality, the terms used to describe humans and the terms used to describe nonhumans differ considerably. A major criticism of Actor Network Theory is that inequality between species is not addressed and that if this was addressed then power balances could be adjusted in order to achieve equality.

The difference between Haraway’s companion species and Latour’s notion of nonhuman actors and companion species is due to their backgrounds within general sociological theory. While Haraway has a background of feminism, Latour was heavily influenced by the idea of ethnomethodology. Despite Latour showing very little to no interest in feminism, both scholars have an interest in science and primatology, which is why Latour’s notion of nonhuman actors and Haraway’s notion of the companion species share so much common ground. Haraway’s background in feminism means she believes that women ‘should consider creating coalitions based on "affinity" instead of identity’ (1991 p.155). This idea of affinity is reflected within her theory that companion species, for example Dogs, are at one with human beings. It is clear that her feminist background has influenced her thoughts of equality among all beings. However, this can be criticised as Haraway states that ‘there is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds women’ (1991 p.155). The idea of a united femininity is one that arguably defines feminism. If she is not considered to truly be a feminist then this can be argued to not have influenced her work as much as it would be thought at first glance. Similarly, Latour’s interest in ethnomethodology meant that he could look at the context of the science he was studying. Despite ethnomethodology leading to his belief that human and nonhuman actors work together, it still holds them as separate entities. This is where his difference from Haraway who believes nature and culture are the same entity stems from. When looking at the similarities between the academics, it appears that their studies of nonhuman actors and companion species are solidly rooted in scientific theory, specifically primatology. The notion of humans being as equally important and as worthy of study as humans is something that has been heavily criticised but that their scientific backgrounds mean they believe it is unquestionable.

As previously stated, it is impossible to look at nonhuman actors without considering their relationship with human actors. Similarly, it is impossible to look at the ‘companion species’ without contemplating their connection with the species they are a companion of. This species is, of course, humans. Both Haraway and Latour have made it clear that the line between nonhumans and animals is blurred not only due to them being interconnected or the same thing but because modern society is presenting, even if it is not actually reached, an idealized hybrid which means even if there was once a socially constructed difference between humans and nonhumans that line has become increasingly blurred. Latour calls hybrids ‘new types of beings’ that emerge from a mixture of nature and culture (1991 p.10). Latour states that the modern social structure means that the existence hybrids is impossible, yet paradoxically modernity depends on hybridization. We have ‘never been modern’ as we cannot remove the hybrids. These hybrids can be described as mixtures of actors and nonhuman actors to form a new type of actor. These simply cannot be created. However, Haraway disagrees with this. Haraway believes we are all cyborgs, breaking down boundaries between human and nature. She believes that hybridity is a concept that has been present since the twentieth century (Bell, 2009). Haraway states that hybrids can be seen in many different forms, such as between the natural and artificial, but the main idea of hybridity which can be compared to Latour is her belief that hybridity exists between humans and animals (1991). For Latour, a hybrid represents moving into the future and finally reaching modernity, with the connection between the opposing nature and culture finally being made. In her ‘cyborg manifesto’ Haraway writes that hybrids are also a sign of modernity, with them being a product of the industrial revelution. Therefore for both academics hybrids are equal to modernity, but Haraway believes hybrids of nonhuman animals and human animals have already been reached and Latour believes that this hybrid has not been reached.

When looking at some of Latour’s later works, the term ‘hybrid’ is dropped. It is frequently used within ‘We have never been modern’, but within his text whether or not Latour is arguing for or against the hybrid in modern society becomes incredibly confusing. This can undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that ‘Latour's approach is notoriously difficult to capture in a few simple characteristics’. However, the fact that the idea of the ‘hybrid’ was not included in all of his works about nonhuman actors creates doubt in the mind of the reader of Latour of whether he felt this idea was one that was worth fully developing. On the other hand, the idea of the ‘cyborg goddess’ is one of Haraway’s most celebrated creations and therefore her work on hybrids was continued. Latour’s approach towards the representation of hybridity can be seen as less sound than Haraway’s because whilst she has a very solid sense that hybrids exist today, Latour seems to be unsure. He says they cannot exist, yet in modern society we are seeing mixtures of nature and culture, a prime example being ‘Dolly the sheep’. Dolly was a cloned sheep, created in a lab. This scientific breakthrough arguably created a hybrid between nature and culture. (Franklin, 2008) This is just one example of how even though Latour says there is still a separation of nature and culture we can observe this is not the case.

To conclude, when comparing and contrasting the sociological approach of Latour with his notion of nonhuman actors and Haraway with her companion species it emerges that the both notions have some strengths and weaknesses. To some extent, Haraway can be described as simply too far removed from reality. It can be concluded from the themes outlined within this essay that the idea of a companion species and humans being at one is simply too farfetched. However, when her scientific background is delved into one begins to understand why she would believe this. Her approach can also be seen as too vague and heavy with impractical examples. However when analyzing Latour’s idea of hybridity between humans and nonhumans, for example, a similar conclusion can be reached. It can be said the concept is not developed throughout his work. The key parts of their sociological approaches with regard to their notions of nonhuman actors and companion species can be criticized by those who believe animals simply do not hold a place within society. Their approaches can both be seen as influenced by their backgrounds. The idea that there is not something inside of individuals that makes them identify with one specific gender is incredibly controversial. Their difference in background is reflected by their difference in theory. The implications of the two theories are that nonhumans will now be considered in sociology in ways they have not before. It has been highlighted that many of the classical thinkers never spoke of nonhumans, hybrids or a companion species for human beings existing. However, now innovative thinkers can create works that these ideas will be included in. Whilst Haraway’s writing is too widely criticized and too vague to heavily influence the future of sociology, Latour’s idea of nonhuman actors is one that seems incredibly solid and innovative, although difficult to understand at times.