Comparing Kant And Aristotle's Difference Over The Nature Of Will

The difference between Kant and Aristotle here can be traced to a difference over the nature of the will. For Kant, the will seems to be something that can be insulated completely from natural influences and inclinations. It is the only thing for which a person can be said to be completely responsible. And this isolated point of pure responsibility is the only proper subject of moral evaluation and hence esteem. Aristotle, on the other hand, has no notion of a point (or realm) of pure responsibility (if, indeed, such a notion makes sense). He is happy to discuss responsibility, which he does extensively, but not in the purified sense that concerns Kant. He praises continence (as well as virtue: NE VII, 1), but he cannot follow
Given Kant's pessimistic view of the human condition, such opportunities might be thought inevitably to present themselves. (Even Aristotle, with his optimistic view, would admit that opportunities inevitably present themselves--during the acquisition of virtue, though not during the exercise of virtue.) But how frequent and how challenging the opportunities are is still a matter of luck. Furthermore, the fact that actual victory, as opposed to the capacity for victory, over the passions is something external to the notion of the good will itself convinces me that it cannot be the exercise of the capacity that Kant esteems--it must be the capacity itself.
Perhaps, finally, Kant is more impressed by the continent person than by