Congress: The Senate Filibuster Model

Supreme Court justices are aware of the fact that Congress is in the position to overturn or modify one of their rulings, and in order to preemptively prevent that, they are working in a way that moves their decisions closer to Congress without upsetting their own preferences, while simultaneously, not to garner hostile action. Justices should pick battles in accordance with the political conditions that are most favorable to their desired outcome, and not whether an individual litigant chooses to challenge the political statute at the time. The Court has to take into account, when they are deciding on cases as far as aggravating Congress, whether they will elect to take up severe punishments that will more or less affect the entire institution
The Senate Filibuster Model takes into consideration of the preferences of senators who represents filibuster point, which constitutes pre-1975, the 67th most liberal or conservative Senator, and post-1975, the 60th most liberal or conservative Senator. According to the results, the Senate Filibuster Model is the one that works best for accurate reflection of the actual legislative process, “The BIC s a model fit statistic, the models are in order of best to worst fit: Senate Filibuster (-682.492), Party Pivot (-681.511), Committee Gatekeeper (-680.242), and Floor Median (-678.726)”. The BIC score is the Bayesian Information Criterion (statistic to determine which model is the
In the heart of the institutional maintenance, the reason why justices constrain themselves is the fear of non-implementation. Matthew E. K. Hall looks at two paths of Supreme Court constraints: rational anticipation and the institutional maintenance model. They do not fear non-implementation in vertical cases as they do not have to rely on outside sources to implement their decisions. However, they do have to rely on outside sources to implement their decisions in horizontal cases. The court’s institutional integrity is the source of influence: they are not elected, and they have to rely on public diffused support for this. The fear that stems from this is that if the court is seen as constantly not being taken seriously by Congress, then, what Hall argues: salient cases are the most significant, and will begin to damage the Court’s diffuse support. Instead of being more worried about, as the rational anticipation model specific cases being overturned specifically in statutory cases, they are more concerned with maintaining institutional integrity in constitutional