INTRODUCTION
Consequentialism is usually defined with the formula "one should always do that to bring best consequence: the value of an action derives solely from the value of its consequences". Consequentialism is thus the idea that people perform the action that provides the best consequences. Why demand that theory? Because for consequentialist theories, this determines what will be considered as the best possible actions. Some philosophers have criticized those demands too, and this is one of the major criticisms that have been made about Consequentialism, because to understand it well, it requires that every action possible is put into play and considered from a moral approach, calculating possible consequences that could provide the performance or non-performance of the action. But is that really so? Regarding this concept of Consequentialism in the brief sketch I have drawn, it could be considered such that well presented, consideration is being given to it rather than merely an abstraction or reduction of Consequentialism which is utilitarianism.
As many authors have already presented, and what in my opinion Shaw (1998) has done in a very proper discussion of ethics, Consequentialism, is the general idea that according to states, the right action is the action that brings good consequences, in fact, the best of all possible consequences that fit. Reports that, the best consequences, are what really count in ethical judgment in determining the nature of an action, and can sometimes lead to promote these good consequences, at times permitting actions that affect, or violate certain rights, principles, or "inviolable" people.
THE CONSEQUENTIALIST
Bibliography: * Bentham, J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Dover Publications Inc, 2009). * Brandt, R. Towards a Credible Utilitarianism, in H. Castaneda (ed.), Morality and the Language of Conduct, Detroit, (Wayne State University Press, 1963). pp 107-143. * Brandt, R. Utility and the Obligation to Obey the Law in S. Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy, New York, (New York University Press, 1964). pp 43-55. * Darwell, S. ‘Consequentialism’, Vol 7 of Blackwell Readings in Philosophy, (Wiley, 2002). * Horton, J. Political Obligation, (Macmillan press, 1992). * Hurley, P. Beyond Consequentialism, (Oxford University Press, 2011). * Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica. (Prometheus Books UK, 1903). * Mulgan,T. ‘The Demands of Consequentialism’, (Clarendon Press, 2005). * Portmore, D.W. Commonsense Consequentialism : wherin Morality Meets Rationality: Oxford Moral Theory, (Oxford University Press, 2011). * Sartorius, R. Individual Conduct and Social Norms. (Encino (CA), Dickenson, 1975) JOURNALS * Norcross,A. (2009) Two dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights and the Separateness of Persons. Social Philosophy and Policy 26. * Shaw, W. (1998) Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism. Wiley-Blackwell. [ 3 ]. J. Horton, Political Obligation, (MacMillan Press, London, 1992), 51-79. [ 5 ]. R. Sartorious, Individual Conduct and Social Norms, (Encino (CA), Dickenson, 1975), esp. Chapters 5-6. [ 6 ]. Paul, Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism, (Publisher Oxford University Press, 2011). [ 8 ]. Paul, Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism, (Oxford University Press, 2011), and Shaw, W. Contemporary Ethics : Taking Account of Utilitarianism, (Wiley-Blackwell, 1998). [ 10 ]. Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica, (Prometheus Books UK, 1903). [ 13 ]. R. Brandt, Towards a Credible Utilitarianism, in H. Castaneda (ed.), Morality and the Language of Conduct, Detroit, (Wayne State University Press, 1963), 107-143. [ 14 ]. Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism, (Clarendon Press, 2005). [ 20 ]. Darwell, S. ‘Consequentialism’, (Vol 7 of Blackwell Readings in Philosophy, Wiley Press, 2002). [ 21 ]. Douglas W. Portmore, ‘Commonsense Consequentialism’: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, Oxford Moral Theory, (Publisher Oxford University Press, 2011). [ 24 ]. Norcross, A. Two dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights and the Separateness of Persons. (Social Philosophy and Policy 26, 1929).