Counterinsurgency In Vietnam War Research Paper
United States Counterinsurgency Operations in Vietnam from 1961 to 1968
The United States policies of counterinsurgency throughout the Vietnam War have largely been criticized by historians, government officials, and the U.S. population ever since the escalation of occupation the U.S. had in South Vietnam starting in 1961. The Geneva Accords of 1954 stated that there was to be no foreign military presence in North and South Vietnam, however the U.S. ignored the accords because of their belief in the Domino Theory.1 The U.S. was scared that if one country fell to communism then all of Southeast Asia would be susceptible to falling to communism. The National Liberation Front was gaining support in South …show more content…
Vietnam, and was starting to cause problems within its borders starting in 1959-1960.2 With the insurgency growing the U.S. knew that it had to take action in Vietnam, or fear losing the South to the insurgent communists. The U.S. counterinsurgency programs started to take form in South Vietnam starting in 1961 under the direction of the Kennedy Administration.3 The programs continued to gradually escalate under the Johnson Administration, until his tenure in office came to an end in late 1968. These counterinsurgency programs were created with the idea of separating and eliminating the Vietcong communists that were all over the Southern Vietnam population throughout the years of 1961 to 1968. The programs created focused on winning over the Southern population from falling to the National Liberation Front, however, these plans failed to succeed.4 This paper is going to analyze and discuss the U.S. counterinsurgency tactics used throughout the 1961 to 1968 time period, and show why the U.S. counterinsurgency plans in Vietnam were mostly unsuccessful and really did little to obstruct the Vietcong insurgency.
The Geneva Accords of 1954 were entirely ineffective in creating a lasting peace in Vietnam. The U.S. did not abide to the accords, and claimed that they did not have to because they never officially signed them. The accords said that there was to be no foreign military presence in Vietnam, and that all North Vietnam troops had to return back to the North.5 The North troops returned back north of the 17th parallel, but a Southern insurgency was created with the National Liberation Front.6 Hanoi was controlling this insurgency from the North and was helping them militarily through planning, supplies, and aide.7 The Vietcong were growing rapidly in the South, and the U.S. knew that it had to get involved if it wanted to safeguard South Vietnam from communism. Starting in 1954 the U.S. succeeded the French in Vietnam, and began offering money and aide to the Government of Vietnam.8 This would be the main way the U.S. helped South Vietnam until the insurgency began to gain ground throughout 1959 to 1961.9 In 1961 the U.S. counterinsurgency policies started, and U.S. involvement in Vietnam continued to gradually increase until 1968. Some aspects of the counterinsurgency programs that were first implemented included: the use of psychological warfare, political and social reforms in rural villages, intelligence campaigns to gain knowledge on where the Vietcong were stationed, and increased security measures on villages in areas that were more susceptible to Vietcong infiltration and attacks10. These would be the counterinsurgency strategies that would predominantly be used throughout the 1961 to 1963 time period under the direction of Paul Harkins, who was the Military Assistance Commander in Vietnam (MACV) during this period. At the start of 1964 the U.S. started to change its policies, as the Vietcong were causing many problems within the Southern Vietnamese population.11 This change of policy was headed by MACV William Westmoreland, and was used until the end of the Johnson administration in late 1968. The U.S. came to the conclusion that it needed to up its military campaign in Vietnam in order to ensure the South did not fall to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. did this by dramatically increasing their troops in South Vietnam. After the troops were increased, the U.S. started to conduct search and destroy missions against the Vietcong, and bombing campaigns were started to destroy communist supply lines in the South.12 Another vital aspect of U.S. policy during this time period was the training of South Vietnam’s army. The U.S. wanted the South to be able to fight it’s own war, and in order to do so the troops needed to have proper military training to be able to fend off their communist counterparts effectively.13 In 1961, the U.S. began to analyze what the best strategies would be to locate the Vietcong in South Vietnam; it came to the conclusion the best way to do this was to examine South Vietnam’s rural villages, and decide which villages were most susceptible to Vietcong attacks and infiltration. The U.S. did this by assigning each village into one of three different areas, white, pink, or red.14 White areas were zones that the U.S. believed were mostly under the control of the Government of Vietnam, and had little Vietcong present inside its population to cause uprisings and attacks.15 Pink areas were zones that were believed to have Vietcong present within the population, but were still under the control of the Government of Vietnam.16 Within these areas fighting occurred between the Vietcong and the Government of Vietnam over control of the area.17 Red areas were zones considered to have a large percentage of the population under Vietcong control, and were established to be the areas most vulnerable to Vietcong uprisings.18 The U.S. wanted to maintain peace in white areas and keep it under the control of the Government of Vietnam. They believed that if white areas fell to Vietcong control then all of South Vietnam would be susceptible of falling to communist aggression.19 Pink and red areas had continuous counterinsurgency campaigns being conducted within them to attempt to win the population back over to the Government of Vietnam.20 Psychological warfare was one of the first counterinsurgency policies implemented by the U.S. in South Vietnam. These operations were directed with the idea of persuading the Vietcong that they could not match the firepower of the U.S. The U.S. believed if they showed the insurgents the advanced technology they had, then the Vietcong would be intimidated and scared to fight against them. These operations were mainly conducted in pink and red areas, where the Vietcong were more dominant in the population.21 Some of the most common psychological procedures the U.S. used in South Vietnam were helicopter and fighter-bomber flyovers, radio broadcasts, and distribution of leaflets to the population to persuade them to support the Government of Vietnam instead of the National Liberation Front.22 These psychological practices were predominantly ineffective in hampering the will the Vietcong had in fighting. The flyovers did not intimidate the insurgents, and the communication aspects of the plans did not win the population over to the Government of Vietnam’s side.23 Intelligence operations were imperative for the U.S. in the early years of their counterinsurgency operations. Gaining reliable intelligence on the Vietcong whereabouts was important for the U.S. so they could find and eliminate the Vietcong before they could cause more problems inside the rural populations.24 In order for the U.S. to obtain the necessary information they were seeking, U.S. military officials had to form close relationships with village officials and rural populations.25 This proved to be hard for the U.S., because they did not know whether the village officials were telling them reliable information or if they were setting them up for Vietcong ambushes. Additionally, U.S. military officials could not tell who was in support of the National Liberation Front and who was in support of the Government of Vietnam.26 This confusion caused the intelligence aspects of their counterinsurgency plan to be predominantly unsuccessful. The U.S. recognized that if they wanted to win the Southern Vietnam population there needed to be political and social reforms within the rural villages. The U.S. wanted to show the populace they were trying to improve their living conditions and village governments to gain more support from them. To jumpstart the political and social reform counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. decided to start training village officials more effectively, so they could better tend to their peoples needs.27 Advisory councils were established to help assist village officials, and were created in Southern villages that were still under the control of the Government of Vietnam.28 Government facilities and buildings were also created within the rural villages; some of these new facilities included health clinics, schools, and minor public works buildings to help tend to the population’s social needs.29 Civilian Civic Action teams were additionally set up within each village province to serve and protect people from Vietcong activities.30 Land reform policies were created, but the policies mainly failed due to their poor structure. In some cases the peasants had to pay for their land, whereas in North Vietnam the land was distributed amongst the population for free.31 The Government of Vietnam’s policies simply could not match the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s policies, even with the political and social reforms employed in the villages. The U.S. and Government of Vietnam could not keep the corruption of the Vietcong out of the villages. The Vietcong were still recruiting within these villages and people were secretly supporting and joining their insurgent actions.32 The support for the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam was too severe for the U.S. to overcome, as they would find out in the later years of the war. Another section of the early U.S.
counterinsurgency plans included the building of strategic and defended hamlets; the hamlets were created to protect the rural populations from Vietcong attacks. Strategic hamlets were government created villages with military protection built in white and pink areas.33 Defended hamlets were government constructed villages with heavy military protection built in red areas.34 These hamlets had strict governmental policies created within them. For example there were free fire zones created around them and curfews were set up for the people living within the walls.35 If someone was found in these areas past their designated curfew they were subject to be shot on the spot without any hesitation from the military.36 Identity cards were also distributed to the people living in the hamlets, as a way for the military to identify who was living in the hamlets and who the outsiders were.37 Furthermore, checkpoints were created around the hamlets, and throughout the roads and waterways to help eliminate Vietcong supply …show more content…
lines.38 The U.S. saw strategic and defended hamlets as a way to help separate the rural populations from the Vietcong, however, they did not take into consideration how the people living within these hamlets felt about being forced into a new living situation. Many of the people that lived in these hamlets were torn away from their native and ancestral villages that they had lived in their whole lives, and this angered the populace living in the hamlets.39 The people were also forced to build these villages with little to no pay, and this did not sit well with them.40 The corruption of government officials was also heavily present, and the populace did not trust the governments that were created in these hamlets.41 The only major impact strategic and defended hamlets had on the populace was trigger them to have more resentment towards the U.S. and their counterinsurgency polices. In mid 1963 the U.S. noticed some major complications within the Government of Vietnam. The government was not gaining the support of the population, and President Diem was not following U.S. policies and orders.42 President Diem and his brother, Nhu Diem, were publicly expressing their dislike for the U.S. policies in South Vietnam.43 The U.S. specifically did not look highly upon Nhu Diem, as he was a major source of the corruption present in the Government of Vietnam.44 Nhu Diem was creating corruption within the southern military, and was even in contact with the National Liberation Front at times.45 Nhu did not like the U.S. occupation of South Vietnam and wanted the Americans out of the country. Nhu’s criticism angered U.S. policy makers, as they saw his ridicules as a potential roadblock in their counterinsurgency plans.46 The U.S. contacted President Diem and told him to remove his brother from office, as he was not popular with the southern population.47 President Diem did not follow the U.S. orders, and a coup was developed with U.S. support to remove Diem from office. On November 1, 1963 a coup was started against Diem and Nhu, and the brothers were assassinated.48 The U.S. thought with Diem out of office it would improve the conditions in South Vietnam, however, they found their assumption to be incorrect and the situation in the South Vietnam progressively got worse.49 By 1964, the insurgency in South Vietnam was growing and the country was close to falling to the communists. President Johnson took office in 1964, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed on August 7, 1964.50 The passing of this resolution gave President Johnson the ability to launch any necessary actions he deemed essential to impede the communist aggressors from taking over the South.51 The passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution marked the beginning of a shift in U.S. counterinsurgency plans for the years of 1964 to 1968. One of the first features of the 1964-1968 counterinsurgency plan was to increase the amount of U.S.
troops present in South Vietnam. In 1964, the U.S. troops increased to 23,000 from the 16,000 mark that was in Vietnam in 1963.52 By 1965 the amount of troops in Vietnam reached 180,000 and by 1966 had reached 400,000.53 In 1968, nearing the end of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort, there were over 500,000 troops present in Vietnam.54 This dramatic increase of troops from 1963-1968 shows the difficulties the U.S. was having in fighting against the Vietcong. The U.S. thought that troop increase in South Vietnam would directly lead to more control over the country, and believed that with more troops present it could carry out more military operations against the insurgents. They were extremely mistaken; the insurgency was far too imbedded within the Southern population for even arguably the most advanced military in the world to take control
of. As the troops increased in Vietnam, military operations to find the insurgents were amplified. These new U.S. missions conducted in the Southern Vietnam countryside were known as “search and destroy” missions.55 These missions were offensive missions carried out with the aim of destroying Vietcong: military and logistic bases, shelters, training areas, supply lines, and command posts.56 The U.S. believed that if they could destroy these essential parts of the Vietcong insurgency, the Vietcong would be less effective in carrying out their missions and would lose their ground in the South.57 Additionally, the troops were told to kill as many Vietcong as they could during these missions, in hopes that the amount of Vietcong deaths would outstretch the amount of Vietcong recruits coming in to fight.58 Despite the 4 to 1 kill to death ratio favoring the U.S., these “search and destroy” missions were unsuccessful.59 The U.S. had enormous problems finding the Vietcong in the countryside because of how well hidden their bases and troops were in the Vietnam jungle foliage.60 The U.S. only ever located an estimated two percent of Vietcong forces present in South Vietnam.61 U.S. troops also had trouble distinguishing who the Vietcong were and who the civilians were, which led to civilian killings. This, in turn, made the Southern population dislike the U.S. occupation even more.62 Another part of the U.S. counterinsurgency plan that created more resentment towards the U.S. occupation of Vietnam was the air war. The air war was created as a way for the U.S. to use less troops to fight against the insurgency.63 The U.S.’s main objectives with the bombing campaign was to clear areas of jungle to make it easier for troops to navigate through the terrain, destroy Vietcong supply lines and bases, and to “Break Hanoi’s Will” in fighting the war.64 Even after the U.S. dropped millions of tons of bombs on North and South Vietnam, the insurgency continued to grow, and bitterness towards the U.S. grew even greater. Furthermore, the bombing campaigns did not affect the Vietcong to the extent the U.S. had anticipated. In the 1966 and 1967 reports released by Institute for Defense Analysis it was concluded that the Vietcong and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had become even stronger than they were before the air war even started.65 Moreover, the bombing raids destroyed thousands of South Vietnamese villages causing the majority of the populace to migrate to cities.66 Many South Vietnamese joined the National Liberation Front as a result of this, as they were tired of the U.S. ruining their homeland.67 After the Tet Offensive of 1968, President Johnson was faced with constant pressure from the American public to change his policies in South Vietnam.68 He decided to go with what has been called the “middle of the road approach”.69 In late 1968 Creighton Abrams took over for Westmoreland as the new MACV. Abrams brought a new approach to the counterinsurgency operations, he decided to slowly stop the intense search and destroy missions and bombing raids, while also intensifying the campaign of training South Vietnam’s Army.70 The U.S. wanted the Government of Vietnam to eventually be able to govern and protect itself, and in order to do this South Vietnam needed to be able to defend itself from the surging communists. The U.S. had supplied the South Vietnam Army with training throughout the whole war, and by 1968 there were 800,000 South Vietnam troops ready to fight.71 Though the number of these troops was immense, they still had many issues present. The troops were poorly trained, corrupt, and lacked the leadership of the North Vietnam Army.72 They also did not have the will to fight the North had, since many of the troops were forced into fighting.73 It was the corruption and brutality existent in the Southern Vietnam Army that eventually led to their downfall.74 The U.S. should have noticed these problems and eliminated them before they even considered pulling out their troops from Vietnam. The U.S. counterinsurgency policies in South Vietnam from 1961-1968 were largely unsuccessful. The plans they implemented failed to address the single most important characteristic of the war; winning over the population of South Vietnam. The U.S. did not take into consideration Vietnamese culture and social ideals when they were conducting their counterinsurgency campaigns in the southern countryside. This led to the population resenting the U.S., and engaged many of them to join forces with the National Liberation Front. The U.S.’s belief that advanced technology and military firepower could destroy an insurgency and win over a population was far from being correct.75 The U.S. handled a political war with firepower and this was the reason why the U.S. counterinsurgency operations failed to keep South Vietnam from falling to their communist aggressors.76 North Vietnam’s patriotism throughout the entire war was tremendous; they had full support from its people and military. The U.S. was the opposite; the support was not there from the beginning from Americans or the South Vietnamese, and its troops did not believe in what they were fighting for. It was for these reasons why the U.S. never had a chance in Vietnam, and why it should of never taken on the difficult challenge of protecting the country from communism.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Colby, William and Cooper, Chester. A Program for Laos and South Vietnam. Washington: May 21, 1964. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968. United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. Accessed April 2, 2013. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v28/d55.
Lemnizter, L.L, Joint Chiefs of Staff. CounterInsurgency Operations in South Vietnam. Washington: October 10, 1961. Texas Tech University. Accessed April 2, 2013. http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?8T7SJN@i63RndtVE@VS9@LZuPSNo3@qglrOk721zONsWTejoO1AByKoBykCPVte62n5ilZvT4MIRi9eMlrI5LT9h07YxzaSpRuo7WDPCeBE/2120203008.pdf
Pentagon Papers. American Troops Enter the Ground War, March-July 1965. Vol. 3. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. (pp. 389-433). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent8.htm.
Pentagon Papers. The Air War in North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Begins, February-June, 1965. Vol. 3. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. (pp. 269-388). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent6.htm.
Pentagon Papers. The Geneva Conference, May-July, 1954. Vol. 1. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. (pp. 108-46). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent7.htm.
Pentagon Papers. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. (pp. 201-76). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm.
Pentagon Papers. The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. (pp. 128-59). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent4.htm.
Pentagon Papers. U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965. Vol. 3. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. (pp. 1-105). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent1.htm.
Task Force in Vietnam. Outline Plan of Counterinsurgency Operations. Saigon: January 10, 1962. Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963. United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. Accessed April 2, 2013. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d11. Thompson, Robert, National Security Council . Delta Plan. Saigon. Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963. United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. Accessed April 2, 2013. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d51.
Secondary Sources
Carland, John. "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland 's Approach in Two Documents." The Journal of Military History 68, no. 2 (April 2004): 553-74. JSTOR. Accessed April 2, 2013.
Shultz, Richard. "Breaking the Will of the Enemy during the Vietnam War: The Operationalization of the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare." Journal of Peace Research 15, no. 2 (1978): 109-29. JSTOR. Accessed April 2, 2013.
Redfern, William. "Communist Strengthens, Saigon Weakness." Randolph-Macon College. 15 Mar. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Consequences of Tet." Randolph-Macon College. 19 Apr. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Diem 's Overthrow." Randolph-Macon College. 20 Mar. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Domestic Strains of the War, 1965-1970." Randolph-Macon College. 10 Apr. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Escalation under LBJ 1964-1966." Randolph-Macon College. 1-3 Apr. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Geneva Conference." Randolph-Macon College. 6 Mar. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Kennedy and Vietnam." Randolph-Macon College. 18 Mar. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "Nixon: Vietnamization and Pacification." Randolph-Macon College. 24 Apr. 2013. Lecture.
Redfern, William. "North Vietnam and The Start of the Southern Insurgency." Randolph-Macon College. 11 Mar. 2013. Lecture.
Rouse, Ed. "Psychological Operations/Warfare." http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html.
The United States policies of counterinsurgency throughout the Vietnam War have largely been criticized by historians, government officials, and the U.S. population ever since the escalation of occupation the U.S. had in South Vietnam starting in 1961. The Geneva Accords of 1954 stated that there was to be no foreign military presence in North and South Vietnam, however the U.S. ignored the accords because of their belief in the Domino Theory.1 The U.S. was scared that if one country fell to communism then all of Southeast Asia would be susceptible to falling to communism. The National Liberation Front was gaining support in South …show more content…
Vietnam, and was starting to cause problems within its borders starting in 1959-1960.2 With the insurgency growing the U.S. knew that it had to take action in Vietnam, or fear losing the South to the insurgent communists. The U.S. counterinsurgency programs started to take form in South Vietnam starting in 1961 under the direction of the Kennedy Administration.3 The programs continued to gradually escalate under the Johnson Administration, until his tenure in office came to an end in late 1968. These counterinsurgency programs were created with the idea of separating and eliminating the Vietcong communists that were all over the Southern Vietnam population throughout the years of 1961 to 1968. The programs created focused on winning over the Southern population from falling to the National Liberation Front, however, these plans failed to succeed.4 This paper is going to analyze and discuss the U.S. counterinsurgency tactics used throughout the 1961 to 1968 time period, and show why the U.S. counterinsurgency plans in Vietnam were mostly unsuccessful and really did little to obstruct the Vietcong insurgency.
The Geneva Accords of 1954 were entirely ineffective in creating a lasting peace in Vietnam. The U.S. did not abide to the accords, and claimed that they did not have to because they never officially signed them. The accords said that there was to be no foreign military presence in Vietnam, and that all North Vietnam troops had to return back to the North.5 The North troops returned back north of the 17th parallel, but a Southern insurgency was created with the National Liberation Front.6 Hanoi was controlling this insurgency from the North and was helping them militarily through planning, supplies, and aide.7 The Vietcong were growing rapidly in the South, and the U.S. knew that it had to get involved if it wanted to safeguard South Vietnam from communism. Starting in 1954 the U.S. succeeded the French in Vietnam, and began offering money and aide to the Government of Vietnam.8 This would be the main way the U.S. helped South Vietnam until the insurgency began to gain ground throughout 1959 to 1961.9 In 1961 the U.S. counterinsurgency policies started, and U.S. involvement in Vietnam continued to gradually increase until 1968. Some aspects of the counterinsurgency programs that were first implemented included: the use of psychological warfare, political and social reforms in rural villages, intelligence campaigns to gain knowledge on where the Vietcong were stationed, and increased security measures on villages in areas that were more susceptible to Vietcong infiltration and attacks10. These would be the counterinsurgency strategies that would predominantly be used throughout the 1961 to 1963 time period under the direction of Paul Harkins, who was the Military Assistance Commander in Vietnam (MACV) during this period. At the start of 1964 the U.S. started to change its policies, as the Vietcong were causing many problems within the Southern Vietnamese population.11 This change of policy was headed by MACV William Westmoreland, and was used until the end of the Johnson administration in late 1968. The U.S. came to the conclusion that it needed to up its military campaign in Vietnam in order to ensure the South did not fall to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. did this by dramatically increasing their troops in South Vietnam. After the troops were increased, the U.S. started to conduct search and destroy missions against the Vietcong, and bombing campaigns were started to destroy communist supply lines in the South.12 Another vital aspect of U.S. policy during this time period was the training of South Vietnam’s army. The U.S. wanted the South to be able to fight it’s own war, and in order to do so the troops needed to have proper military training to be able to fend off their communist counterparts effectively.13 In 1961, the U.S. began to analyze what the best strategies would be to locate the Vietcong in South Vietnam; it came to the conclusion the best way to do this was to examine South Vietnam’s rural villages, and decide which villages were most susceptible to Vietcong attacks and infiltration. The U.S. did this by assigning each village into one of three different areas, white, pink, or red.14 White areas were zones that the U.S. believed were mostly under the control of the Government of Vietnam, and had little Vietcong present inside its population to cause uprisings and attacks.15 Pink areas were zones that were believed to have Vietcong present within the population, but were still under the control of the Government of Vietnam.16 Within these areas fighting occurred between the Vietcong and the Government of Vietnam over control of the area.17 Red areas were zones considered to have a large percentage of the population under Vietcong control, and were established to be the areas most vulnerable to Vietcong uprisings.18 The U.S. wanted to maintain peace in white areas and keep it under the control of the Government of Vietnam. They believed that if white areas fell to Vietcong control then all of South Vietnam would be susceptible of falling to communist aggression.19 Pink and red areas had continuous counterinsurgency campaigns being conducted within them to attempt to win the population back over to the Government of Vietnam.20 Psychological warfare was one of the first counterinsurgency policies implemented by the U.S. in South Vietnam. These operations were directed with the idea of persuading the Vietcong that they could not match the firepower of the U.S. The U.S. believed if they showed the insurgents the advanced technology they had, then the Vietcong would be intimidated and scared to fight against them. These operations were mainly conducted in pink and red areas, where the Vietcong were more dominant in the population.21 Some of the most common psychological procedures the U.S. used in South Vietnam were helicopter and fighter-bomber flyovers, radio broadcasts, and distribution of leaflets to the population to persuade them to support the Government of Vietnam instead of the National Liberation Front.22 These psychological practices were predominantly ineffective in hampering the will the Vietcong had in fighting. The flyovers did not intimidate the insurgents, and the communication aspects of the plans did not win the population over to the Government of Vietnam’s side.23 Intelligence operations were imperative for the U.S. in the early years of their counterinsurgency operations. Gaining reliable intelligence on the Vietcong whereabouts was important for the U.S. so they could find and eliminate the Vietcong before they could cause more problems inside the rural populations.24 In order for the U.S. to obtain the necessary information they were seeking, U.S. military officials had to form close relationships with village officials and rural populations.25 This proved to be hard for the U.S., because they did not know whether the village officials were telling them reliable information or if they were setting them up for Vietcong ambushes. Additionally, U.S. military officials could not tell who was in support of the National Liberation Front and who was in support of the Government of Vietnam.26 This confusion caused the intelligence aspects of their counterinsurgency plan to be predominantly unsuccessful. The U.S. recognized that if they wanted to win the Southern Vietnam population there needed to be political and social reforms within the rural villages. The U.S. wanted to show the populace they were trying to improve their living conditions and village governments to gain more support from them. To jumpstart the political and social reform counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. decided to start training village officials more effectively, so they could better tend to their peoples needs.27 Advisory councils were established to help assist village officials, and were created in Southern villages that were still under the control of the Government of Vietnam.28 Government facilities and buildings were also created within the rural villages; some of these new facilities included health clinics, schools, and minor public works buildings to help tend to the population’s social needs.29 Civilian Civic Action teams were additionally set up within each village province to serve and protect people from Vietcong activities.30 Land reform policies were created, but the policies mainly failed due to their poor structure. In some cases the peasants had to pay for their land, whereas in North Vietnam the land was distributed amongst the population for free.31 The Government of Vietnam’s policies simply could not match the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s policies, even with the political and social reforms employed in the villages. The U.S. and Government of Vietnam could not keep the corruption of the Vietcong out of the villages. The Vietcong were still recruiting within these villages and people were secretly supporting and joining their insurgent actions.32 The support for the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam was too severe for the U.S. to overcome, as they would find out in the later years of the war. Another section of the early U.S.
counterinsurgency plans included the building of strategic and defended hamlets; the hamlets were created to protect the rural populations from Vietcong attacks. Strategic hamlets were government created villages with military protection built in white and pink areas.33 Defended hamlets were government constructed villages with heavy military protection built in red areas.34 These hamlets had strict governmental policies created within them. For example there were free fire zones created around them and curfews were set up for the people living within the walls.35 If someone was found in these areas past their designated curfew they were subject to be shot on the spot without any hesitation from the military.36 Identity cards were also distributed to the people living in the hamlets, as a way for the military to identify who was living in the hamlets and who the outsiders were.37 Furthermore, checkpoints were created around the hamlets, and throughout the roads and waterways to help eliminate Vietcong supply …show more content…
lines.38 The U.S. saw strategic and defended hamlets as a way to help separate the rural populations from the Vietcong, however, they did not take into consideration how the people living within these hamlets felt about being forced into a new living situation. Many of the people that lived in these hamlets were torn away from their native and ancestral villages that they had lived in their whole lives, and this angered the populace living in the hamlets.39 The people were also forced to build these villages with little to no pay, and this did not sit well with them.40 The corruption of government officials was also heavily present, and the populace did not trust the governments that were created in these hamlets.41 The only major impact strategic and defended hamlets had on the populace was trigger them to have more resentment towards the U.S. and their counterinsurgency polices. In mid 1963 the U.S. noticed some major complications within the Government of Vietnam. The government was not gaining the support of the population, and President Diem was not following U.S. policies and orders.42 President Diem and his brother, Nhu Diem, were publicly expressing their dislike for the U.S. policies in South Vietnam.43 The U.S. specifically did not look highly upon Nhu Diem, as he was a major source of the corruption present in the Government of Vietnam.44 Nhu Diem was creating corruption within the southern military, and was even in contact with the National Liberation Front at times.45 Nhu did not like the U.S. occupation of South Vietnam and wanted the Americans out of the country. Nhu’s criticism angered U.S. policy makers, as they saw his ridicules as a potential roadblock in their counterinsurgency plans.46 The U.S. contacted President Diem and told him to remove his brother from office, as he was not popular with the southern population.47 President Diem did not follow the U.S. orders, and a coup was developed with U.S. support to remove Diem from office. On November 1, 1963 a coup was started against Diem and Nhu, and the brothers were assassinated.48 The U.S. thought with Diem out of office it would improve the conditions in South Vietnam, however, they found their assumption to be incorrect and the situation in the South Vietnam progressively got worse.49 By 1964, the insurgency in South Vietnam was growing and the country was close to falling to the communists. President Johnson took office in 1964, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed on August 7, 1964.50 The passing of this resolution gave President Johnson the ability to launch any necessary actions he deemed essential to impede the communist aggressors from taking over the South.51 The passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution marked the beginning of a shift in U.S. counterinsurgency plans for the years of 1964 to 1968. One of the first features of the 1964-1968 counterinsurgency plan was to increase the amount of U.S.
troops present in South Vietnam. In 1964, the U.S. troops increased to 23,000 from the 16,000 mark that was in Vietnam in 1963.52 By 1965 the amount of troops in Vietnam reached 180,000 and by 1966 had reached 400,000.53 In 1968, nearing the end of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort, there were over 500,000 troops present in Vietnam.54 This dramatic increase of troops from 1963-1968 shows the difficulties the U.S. was having in fighting against the Vietcong. The U.S. thought that troop increase in South Vietnam would directly lead to more control over the country, and believed that with more troops present it could carry out more military operations against the insurgents. They were extremely mistaken; the insurgency was far too imbedded within the Southern population for even arguably the most advanced military in the world to take control
of. As the troops increased in Vietnam, military operations to find the insurgents were amplified. These new U.S. missions conducted in the Southern Vietnam countryside were known as “search and destroy” missions.55 These missions were offensive missions carried out with the aim of destroying Vietcong: military and logistic bases, shelters, training areas, supply lines, and command posts.56 The U.S. believed that if they could destroy these essential parts of the Vietcong insurgency, the Vietcong would be less effective in carrying out their missions and would lose their ground in the South.57 Additionally, the troops were told to kill as many Vietcong as they could during these missions, in hopes that the amount of Vietcong deaths would outstretch the amount of Vietcong recruits coming in to fight.58 Despite the 4 to 1 kill to death ratio favoring the U.S., these “search and destroy” missions were unsuccessful.59 The U.S. had enormous problems finding the Vietcong in the countryside because of how well hidden their bases and troops were in the Vietnam jungle foliage.60 The U.S. only ever located an estimated two percent of Vietcong forces present in South Vietnam.61 U.S. troops also had trouble distinguishing who the Vietcong were and who the civilians were, which led to civilian killings. This, in turn, made the Southern population dislike the U.S. occupation even more.62 Another part of the U.S. counterinsurgency plan that created more resentment towards the U.S. occupation of Vietnam was the air war. The air war was created as a way for the U.S. to use less troops to fight against the insurgency.63 The U.S.’s main objectives with the bombing campaign was to clear areas of jungle to make it easier for troops to navigate through the terrain, destroy Vietcong supply lines and bases, and to “Break Hanoi’s Will” in fighting the war.64 Even after the U.S. dropped millions of tons of bombs on North and South Vietnam, the insurgency continued to grow, and bitterness towards the U.S. grew even greater. Furthermore, the bombing campaigns did not affect the Vietcong to the extent the U.S. had anticipated. In the 1966 and 1967 reports released by Institute for Defense Analysis it was concluded that the Vietcong and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had become even stronger than they were before the air war even started.65 Moreover, the bombing raids destroyed thousands of South Vietnamese villages causing the majority of the populace to migrate to cities.66 Many South Vietnamese joined the National Liberation Front as a result of this, as they were tired of the U.S. ruining their homeland.67 After the Tet Offensive of 1968, President Johnson was faced with constant pressure from the American public to change his policies in South Vietnam.68 He decided to go with what has been called the “middle of the road approach”.69 In late 1968 Creighton Abrams took over for Westmoreland as the new MACV. Abrams brought a new approach to the counterinsurgency operations, he decided to slowly stop the intense search and destroy missions and bombing raids, while also intensifying the campaign of training South Vietnam’s Army.70 The U.S. wanted the Government of Vietnam to eventually be able to govern and protect itself, and in order to do this South Vietnam needed to be able to defend itself from the surging communists. The U.S. had supplied the South Vietnam Army with training throughout the whole war, and by 1968 there were 800,000 South Vietnam troops ready to fight.71 Though the number of these troops was immense, they still had many issues present. The troops were poorly trained, corrupt, and lacked the leadership of the North Vietnam Army.72 They also did not have the will to fight the North had, since many of the troops were forced into fighting.73 It was the corruption and brutality existent in the Southern Vietnam Army that eventually led to their downfall.74 The U.S. should have noticed these problems and eliminated them before they even considered pulling out their troops from Vietnam. The U.S. counterinsurgency policies in South Vietnam from 1961-1968 were largely unsuccessful. The plans they implemented failed to address the single most important characteristic of the war; winning over the population of South Vietnam. The U.S. did not take into consideration Vietnamese culture and social ideals when they were conducting their counterinsurgency campaigns in the southern countryside. This led to the population resenting the U.S., and engaged many of them to join forces with the National Liberation Front. The U.S.’s belief that advanced technology and military firepower could destroy an insurgency and win over a population was far from being correct.75 The U.S. handled a political war with firepower and this was the reason why the U.S. counterinsurgency operations failed to keep South Vietnam from falling to their communist aggressors.76 North Vietnam’s patriotism throughout the entire war was tremendous; they had full support from its people and military. The U.S. was the opposite; the support was not there from the beginning from Americans or the South Vietnamese, and its troops did not believe in what they were fighting for. It was for these reasons why the U.S. never had a chance in Vietnam, and why it should of never taken on the difficult challenge of protecting the country from communism.
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