1.Voluntary act: Status offences – no conduct is required but the crime is committed when a certain state of affair exists or the defendant is in a certain condition or is of a particular status.
R v Larsonneur (1933) – Appellant was brought involuntarily back to the UK where she was charged on being an ‘alien’. LCJ Hewart claimed the ‘circumstances are perfectly immaterial’
Winzar v Chief constable of Kent (1983) – drunk on a public highway. LJ Robert Goff claimed ‘it is enough for the commission of the offence if a person is in a public place or a highway, he is drunk and in those circumstances he is perceived to be there and to be drunk, It does not matter if the appellant is only momentarily in the highway’.
Martin v State (1944)- Appellant was brought from his home to a public highway and arrested for using loud and profane language in a drunken condition. The trial judgment was reversed and the appellant was discharged. (Supreme Court of Alabama)
2.Ommissions- failure to act may result in the imposition of criminal liability in two situations: in conduct crimes the failure to act may itself, without more, constitute the crime. In result crimes the failure to act may contribute towards the harm specified in the offence and may thus, be deemed the requisite ‘act’ for the purposes of the offence. This will be so if the actor is under a duty to act.
a)Duty to act.
Special relationship – may be professional or familial
R v Downes (1875) – A father failed to call a doctor for his sick child and instead relied on the power of prayer. It was held that there was a duty to act where there is a close family relationship. He was convicted of manslaughter.
R v Evans (2009) – D failed to summon help for the victim who was suffering an overdose. It was held that there was no duty of care between the relationship of the defendant and the victim (half-sister) but there was a duty to act when he created or contributed to the creation of state of
References: to the defendant foreseeing that such harm was likely to result or that he had been reckless as to whether such harm would result, would be insufficient. Morrison – The defendant was seized by a police officer who stated that she was arresting him. He jumped through a window which resulted in the police officer’s face being wounded. The trial judge directed the jury that if he intended to resist arrest and was objectively reckless (in the now over-ruled Caldwell sense) as to causing the officer harm, he was guilty of the s18 offence. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and held that recklessness in the Cunningham (subjective) sense was required. Note that this means that the prosecution must prove the defendant intended to cause a wound or grievous bodily, or realised that it could be caused. According to the CPS Charging Standards (see below), factors which may indicate a specific intent to do GBH for s18 include: A repeated or planned attack; Deliberate selection of a weapon or adaptation of an article to cause injury, such as breaking a glass before an attack; Making prior threats; and Using an offensive weapon against, or kicking, the victim’s head. The charge of causing GBH with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person is of assistance in more serious assaults upon police officers, where the evidence of an intention to prevent arrest is clear, but the evidence of an intent to cause grievous bodily harm is in doubt.