The Soviet Union made these military shipments public, but did not reveal that it was secretly transporting ballistic missiles. In order to protect this secrecy, the Soviet government, under Nikita Khrushchev, went so far as to issue a statement that it would not “shift its [nuclear] weapons for the repulsion of aggression…to any other country, for instance Cuba” (Allison 78-79). In October 1962, a U2 spy-plane discovered missile bases in Cuba, causing President Kennedy to implement a quarantine on the Cuban island (Johnson 356). The Soviets responded by indicating that these missiles were for only the defense of Cuba. Yet, as the Realist perspective argues, the United States could not be certain these missiles were for defense and not offense. From the Realist perspective, there is no distinction between offensive and defensive weaponry because there is no guarantee of the opponent’s intentions. In this instance, the U.S.S.R. had already lied to the world about transporting ballistic missiles, and it was naïve to trust the U.S.S.R.’s claimed intentions that the missiles were for only defensive purposes. In addition, Cuba’s armament created a security dilemma. A security dilemma results from the fact that, as each group amasses power to protect itself, it inevitably threatens the other groups (Nau 31). The …show more content…
The United States and Soviet Union were the leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively. Each had a vested interest in appearing powerful in front of its allies and the world. If the U.S. was uninterested with the warheads in Cuba, or did not confront Russia with voracity and the might to support its rhetoric, its European allies would lose faith in their protector. Kennedy indicated that if they had not met this threat head-on then it “would convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our position” (Allison 115). Likewise, the Soviet Union had to assert that it was more powerful then the West for the socialist cause. By placing warheads on Cuba, the Soviet Union shifted the international balance of power in favor of the socialist (Allyn 155). Thus, the balance of power was also a diplomatic struggle. The forging of alliances and the strategic placement of nuclear missiles and conventional forces created an equilibrium of power: one side did not achieve a hegemonic domination over the other. When the Soviet Union used its diplomatic relations with Cuba to install missile bases, this tenuous balance