Daedalus Statues Meno 
John Mulvihill
Professor McBride
Ancient Philosophy
9/22/13
At this point of the dialogue, Socrates and Meno have concluded that virtue is at least partly a kind of wisdom. Yet, even though virtue is a kind of wisdom, most virtuous men are not capable of teaching it. Socrates talks about virtuous men whose sons did not turn out as virtuous as their father’s were. Socrates argues, that the fathers taught their sons to the utmost of their abilities (since they were virtuous men), and certainly "would have found the man who could make [their sons] good men." If virtue could be taught at all, it would have been in these cases. Yet this apparently did not happen. Socrates believes that is why Meno and he have failed to find virtue itself in considering such virtuous men. This puzzles Meno, and Socrates explains that, while they had been looking for virtue as a kind of teachable knowledge, virtuous men's good deeds could equally well be the result not of knowledge but of "true opinion." While conversing, Socrates gives the example of a guide on the road to Larissa: whether the guide has knowledge of the way or a true opinion about the way, the result is the same, a successful trip. But if this is the case, Meno asks, "why is knowledge prized far more highly than true opinion, and why are they different?"
Socrates' answer gives the metaphor of a man who has a valuable sculpture by Daedalus. If the statue is "tied down," it is of lasting value. If, however, it is not tied down, it is vulnerable, temporary, and at risk from getting damaged and losing its’ value. Similarly, true opinions do not remain long, and they escape from the mind, so they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving "an account of the reason why" the opinion is true. Such an account allows true opinion to become knowledge through the process of "recollection" discussed earlier in the dialogue, and so to become fixed in the mind. Nonetheless, at least in terms of directing actions at given
Professor McBride
Ancient Philosophy
9/22/13
At this point of the dialogue, Socrates and Meno have concluded that virtue is at least partly a kind of wisdom. Yet, even though virtue is a kind of wisdom, most virtuous men are not capable of teaching it. Socrates talks about virtuous men whose sons did not turn out as virtuous as their father’s were. Socrates argues, that the fathers taught their sons to the utmost of their abilities (since they were virtuous men), and certainly "would have found the man who could make [their sons] good men." If virtue could be taught at all, it would have been in these cases. Yet this apparently did not happen. Socrates believes that is why Meno and he have failed to find virtue itself in considering such virtuous men. This puzzles Meno, and Socrates explains that, while they had been looking for virtue as a kind of teachable knowledge, virtuous men's good deeds could equally well be the result not of knowledge but of "true opinion." While conversing, Socrates gives the example of a guide on the road to Larissa: whether the guide has knowledge of the way or a true opinion about the way, the result is the same, a successful trip. But if this is the case, Meno asks, "why is knowledge prized far more highly than true opinion, and why are they different?"
Socrates' answer gives the metaphor of a man who has a valuable sculpture by Daedalus. If the statue is "tied down," it is of lasting value. If, however, it is not tied down, it is vulnerable, temporary, and at risk from getting damaged and losing its’ value. Similarly, true opinions do not remain long, and they escape from the mind, so they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving "an account of the reason why" the opinion is true. Such an account allows true opinion to become knowledge through the process of "recollection" discussed earlier in the dialogue, and so to become fixed in the mind. Nonetheless, at least in terms of directing actions at given