David Galula Second Law Essay
David Galula lays out four laws of counterinsurgency: The First Law is support of the population is necessary for both the insurgent and counter-insurgent forces. Second Law, an active minority can gain support for either insurgent or counter insurgent forces. Third Law, popular support is continually conditional. Lastly, it takes a true commitment of both effort and resources to win. Of these four laws both President Obama and GEN Petraeus focus on the first and third laws. (Galula p 583-586)
This first law, which seems more like a strategic end, is implied in President Obama’s 2009 West Point Speech. During his speech, he asserts that the additional 30,000 U.S. Troops in this eighteen month surge will target insurgents and secure key
population centers to provide security and stability to empower the pro-counterinsurgency minority. (speech p 6) GEN Petraeus, less subtle in his 2010 Counterinsurgency Guidance, directs allied forces to secure and serve the population and calls local population the center of gravity. (memo p 1) He correctly calls the indigenous population of Afghanistan the “the decisive terrain “(memo p 1)
David Galula’s third law, states popular support is conditional this is more like a strategic way because he also describes all the conditions necessary to gain and keep popular support. (Galula p 584) Here Obama and Petraeus identify three common themes to enhance the minority support for the counterinsurgency: reduction of corruption, reconciliations and enhanced ASNF capabilities as keys to maintaining minority support for counter insurgency.
They both recognize government corruption as a serious threat to good governance and therefor a threat to counterinsurgency support. In Obama’s 2009 speech he called on local Afghan Leaders to combat corruption and hold corrupt leaders accountable. (speech p 7) Petraeus charged his commanders to confront the culture of impunity: to identify and confront corrupt Afghan Leaders. (memo p 1 and 2) .
Understanding the need to reduce the number of “bitter-enders” both President and General provided a path for reconciliation. Obama mentioned an open door to any Taliban who abandon violence and respect the rights of his fellow citizens. ( sp p 8) Petraeus directed his command to promote local reintegration and encourage U.S. and Afghan leaders separate the reconcilable from the irreconcilable and help the reconcilable become part of the local solution. (memo p 3)
Last and most importantly, President Obama and General Petraeus recognized the absolute necessity of improving the ANSF and placing them in the lead in security and stabilization operations. Obama stressed the need for ANSF and Afghan government to take the responsibility for Afghan future. (speech p 6) This is how he justified this eighteen month time-line which completely violated Galula’s fourth law. (Galula p 586) Petraeus did not mention a time line, but did focus on increasing the ANSF capabilities, he directs commanders to live, eat, train, and plan with ANSF to help them achieve excellence and to act one team “brothers-in- arms”(memo p 3)
These three common points are essential to maintaining conditions conducive for promoting counterinsurgency support. These conditions will enable a counterinsurgency minority to begin to influence the “neutral” community towards the counter-insurgency force.
This first law, which seems more like a strategic end, is implied in President Obama’s 2009 West Point Speech. During his speech, he asserts that the additional 30,000 U.S. Troops in this eighteen month surge will target insurgents and secure key
population centers to provide security and stability to empower the pro-counterinsurgency minority. (speech p 6) GEN Petraeus, less subtle in his 2010 Counterinsurgency Guidance, directs allied forces to secure and serve the population and calls local population the center of gravity. (memo p 1) He correctly calls the indigenous population of Afghanistan the “the decisive terrain “(memo p 1)
David Galula’s third law, states popular support is conditional this is more like a strategic way because he also describes all the conditions necessary to gain and keep popular support. (Galula p 584) Here Obama and Petraeus identify three common themes to enhance the minority support for the counterinsurgency: reduction of corruption, reconciliations and enhanced ASNF capabilities as keys to maintaining minority support for counter insurgency.
They both recognize government corruption as a serious threat to good governance and therefor a threat to counterinsurgency support. In Obama’s 2009 speech he called on local Afghan Leaders to combat corruption and hold corrupt leaders accountable. (speech p 7) Petraeus charged his commanders to confront the culture of impunity: to identify and confront corrupt Afghan Leaders. (memo p 1 and 2) .
Understanding the need to reduce the number of “bitter-enders” both President and General provided a path for reconciliation. Obama mentioned an open door to any Taliban who abandon violence and respect the rights of his fellow citizens. ( sp p 8) Petraeus directed his command to promote local reintegration and encourage U.S. and Afghan leaders separate the reconcilable from the irreconcilable and help the reconcilable become part of the local solution. (memo p 3)
Last and most importantly, President Obama and General Petraeus recognized the absolute necessity of improving the ANSF and placing them in the lead in security and stabilization operations. Obama stressed the need for ANSF and Afghan government to take the responsibility for Afghan future. (speech p 6) This is how he justified this eighteen month time-line which completely violated Galula’s fourth law. (Galula p 586) Petraeus did not mention a time line, but did focus on increasing the ANSF capabilities, he directs commanders to live, eat, train, and plan with ANSF to help them achieve excellence and to act one team “brothers-in- arms”(memo p 3)
These three common points are essential to maintaining conditions conducive for promoting counterinsurgency support. These conditions will enable a counterinsurgency minority to begin to influence the “neutral” community towards the counter-insurgency force.